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Abstract:
This research is concerned with the manner in which the risk of a collision is managed by 
people in control of ships as they navigate the Dover Strait. Fundamental to the 
management of collision risks are the International Regulations for the Prevention of 
Collisions at Sea 1972 (Merchant Shipping Notice M. 1642/COLREG 1 1996) which are 
known as the COLREGs. These regulations are designed to give guidance to the people 
in charge of the ships in order to manage the collision risk.
A two-phase mixed method approach was utilised to investigate the reasons lying behind 
the decisions taken to manage the collision risk through the application of the COLREGs. 
The first phase consisted of an analysis of a 24 hour period of the radar record of all ship 
movements in the Dover Strait. The findings from this dataset informed the ethnographic 
second phase in which the actions of those in charge of the ships were observed onboard 
ship.
Strict compliance with the COLREGs required trust in the other ship to resolve the risk of 
collision. For the respondents, strict compliance with the COLREGs would have raised 
the risk of collision to an unacceptable level due to a lack of trust in the other. The people 
in charge of the ships then undertook unilateral action, in contravention of the 
COLREGs, to resolve the collision situation. This non-compliance occurred whilst under 
the observation of the regulatory authority. However, the authority failed to visibly 
enforce the COLREGs and so the surveillance lacked any deterrent value.
The issue of an ex-practitioner undertaking the research was investigated from both 
ethical and methodological aspects. It was found that being an ex-practitioner assisted 
greatly in gaining access but placed an added responsibility on the ex-practitioner to 
handle the data with great care.
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Chapter 1. Introduction
1.0 Collision Avoidance
This research is concerned with the manner in which the risk of a maritime collision is 
managed by people in control of ships, as they navigate the Dover Strait. The potential 
aftermath of a collision is the loss of the ship, deaths of members of the crew and 
passengers, considerable environmental damage and financial loss. For example, the 
collision between the Atlantic Empress and the Aegean Captain in 1979 resulted in the 
spillage of 2.2 million barrels of crude oil (nine times more oil than was spilled by the 
Exxon Valdez)', and the collision in 1987 between the passenger ferry the Dona Paz and 
the oil tanker the Vector resulted in the death of, approximately, 4,375 people. The 
avoidance of collision is, therefore, essential to the safe operation and management of 
ships.
The person in overall control of the ship is the Captain. The Captain usually controls the 
ship as it leaves port. Unlike the situation found on armed Naval ships, as explored by 
Hutchins (1990), navigation of a merchant ship is not undertaken by a team of 
individuals. Upon clearing the port, command of the ship is delegated to the officer of the 
watch. This means that the minute by minute control of a ship is at all times in the hands 
of a single individual. This person will have completed an internationally recognised 
training course of several years duration. This individual has near complete autonomy 
over the navigation of the ship. It is this single person who assess and manages the risk of 
collision. They are often assisted by a lookout whose job it is to visually spot other ships 
and a helmsman who manually steers the ship. However, this is not always the case and 
these people have no role in the decision making process.
Fundamental to the management of collision risks are the International Regulations for 
the Prevention of Collisions at Sea 1972 (Merchant Shipping Notice M. 1642/COLREG 1 
1996) which are known as the COLREGs. These regulations are designed to give
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guidance to the people in charge of the ships in order to manage the collision risk. Lying
at the heart of these regulations is the concept that one ship has the right of way over
another. This means that the other ship has to give-way and so must take action to resolve 
the collision situation. Conversely, the ship which has right of way, the stand-on vessel, is 
required to maintain its course and speed. This is to ensure that the stand-on vessel does 
not take action which would conflict with that of the give-way vessel. The result of this is 
that the stand-on vessel must wait for the other ship to take action, during which time the 
stand-on vessel is reliant for its safety on the actions of the other. Therefore, the issue of 
trust in the other is paramount in the operation of the COLREGs and the resolution of the 
collision risk. To this end the purpose of this thesis is to investigate the manner in which 
people in charge of ships use the COLREGs to manage the collision risk. Therefore, the 
two research questions are:
• How are the COLREGs being applied?
• Why are they applied in the way that they are?
These questions were used to explore this area as this was an approach which had not 
been explored in this way before. As detailed in Chapter 2, previous research in this area 
either concentrated on the actions of people involved in collisions, looked at collision 
situations involving students on simulators or looked at the movements of ships as seen 
on radar. However, this previous research did not adequately explore the human factors 
involved in collision avoidance. With the aid of these research questions, this research 
aims to address that. Firstly by gaining a broad baseline understanding of the current 
practices relating to collision avoidance and secondly to explore the underlying human 
element involved in the resolution of the risk of collision.
1.1 Maritime Traffic Research
An area as fundamental as collision avoidance, has been the subject of past research. 
Such research has involved the monitoring of ship movements through the use of radar, 
the observation of students in simulators and the use of questionnaires. From this 
research, which is reviewed in Chapter 2, it was found that the COLREGs were not being
2
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applied by the people in charge of the ships in a consistent manner. Deviations from the 
COLREGs were observed on many occasions both in real and simulated situations. 
However, even though the actions taken to avoid collisions were entirely in the command 
of the participants, in all bar two studies (Goodwin 1975a and Curtis 1977) there had 
been no attempts to directly relate the movements of those ships to the decisions taken to 
avoid collision by those in charge of the ships. The researchers in the studies simply 
calculated collision risks and isolated other issues, relating to the application of the 
COLREGs by concentrating on, either the routes and tracks of the ships, in order to 
formalise methods of reducing the traffic density in certain areas, or to highlight 
deviations from the COLREGs. But all without asking the people in charge of the ships 
why the deviations were occurring. In this thesis, I will argue that, although traffic 
density is an important factor in collision risk, it is however, inadequate to only look at 
the traffic density, for it is the decisions taken by those in charge of the ships which are 
most relevant to the resolution of the risk of collision. To this end I have utilised 
theoretical positions relating to the management of risk and used them to critically 
analyse the decisions of the people in charge of the ships.
7.2 Risk Management
The main method used to manage risk can be characterised as the setting of an acceptable 
threshold for a certain risk, before an attempt is made to quantify that risk, followed by 
putting into place control measures in order to minimise the risk (Fleury 1998). This has 
become the accepted paradigm by which risk is managed and this is the approach that 
people in charge of ships apply to the collision risks that they are faced with. The people 
in charge of the ships undertake a quantification of the risk through the use of onboard 
radar systems. After the assessment of the collision risk, the person in charge of the ship 
then takes steps to manage and regulate that risk through the application of the 
COLREGs.
3
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There exists a large body of literature relating to the application of rules. A review of this 
literature was undertaken (see Chapter 2) and a variety of reasons were found lying 
behind rule non-compliance. These may be listed as:
• Lack of knowledge of the regulations
• Lack of surveillance and enforcement
• Taking a short-cut or just getting the job done
• Lack of acceptability of the legitimacy of the rule
• Lack of trust where co-operation was required
• As a demonstration of a workers professional skills
• Regulations could not cover all the circumstances.
The wide range of interrelated factors and issues, which lie behind rule non-compliance, 
illustrate the complicated nature of the decision making involved in the application of 
rules. It was interesting to note that one aspect of non-compliance was found to be that of 
where highly trained workers demonstrated their superior knowledge and skills to co- 
workers by deviating from the regulations. The belief being that, through their superior 
knowledge, they knew the rules which could be deviated from, as they knew which rules 
really mattered. This is of particular importance as the seafarers, in charge of the ships 
within this study, regarded themselves as being highly skilled professionals who 
possessed abilities above the norm. Three other issues should also be highlighted at this 
stage as they have such relevance to this study and they are: the imposition of company 
rules, the concept of trust in the other and surveillance by shore authorities. The first 
because of the company rules put in place to manage the passing distance between ferries 
and traffic passing through the Dover Strait. The second, because of the way in which the 
application of the COLREGs is predicated on the issue of trust, where one ship is reliant 
upon the other to resolve a collision situation. And the third because of the radar 
surveillance regime backed up with the threat of sanctions in the event of non-compliance 
with the COLREGs, that ships navigating in this area are under.
4
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1.3 Methodology and Area of Study
To undertake this research, a two phase approach involving a mixture of methods was 
adopted. A mixed method approach was adopted in order to gain a broad and more 
complete understanding of the substance of the research area. The first phase of the 
research took advantage of the radar surveillance in the Dover Strait of the English 
Channel, which is operated by the Channel Navigation Information Service (CNIS), an 
agent of the Maritime and Coastguard Agency (MCA). The area under surveillance is 
shown in figure 1.1.
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Figure 1.1, Dover Strait radar surveillance.
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Within this area a traffic separation scheme (TSS) has been set up as a means by which 
opposing streams of traffic can be separated from each other such that they do not meet 
head-on. TSSs are located at various other choke points around the world. Such places 
include the Gibraltar Strait, the Malacca Strait and the Turkish Straits. Ships are directed 
by the COLREGs to follow the main traffic routes and cross the scheme at right angles to 
the general direction of flow.
In the first phase, an in-depth analysis of the radar record of all ship movements for one 
24 hour period was conducted. An investigation looking at all ship to ship interactions 
had not been undertaken in this manner before and a novel analytical tool of the Near 
Miss Encounter (NME) was utilised during the analysis of this data. From this, a unique 
dataset was created which directly related to the first research question of how the 
COLREGs were being applied in practice. Interesting results relating to how close ships 
passed from each other were found. Furthermore, it was found that the manner in which 
ferries leaving the port of Dover took action to avoid collisions warranted further study.
The second phase of the research involved in situ ship-based ethnographic observation of 
collision avoidance as conducted by those in charge of the ships. Previous ethnographies 
have shown how effective a method it is to explore workplace practices and culture 
(Hammersley and Atkinson 1995, Bellaby 1999). The research was conducted onboard 7 
cross-channel ferries operated by 2 different companies. Whilst onboard these seven 
ships, 52 separate crossings of the Dover Strait were observed. Contemporaneous 
fieldnotes of each of the crossings were taken, in addition to notes made shortly 
afterwards. Additionally, with the use of a hand-held video camera, the radar picture and 
speech of the participants during 33 of those crossings were recorded. Furthermore, 12 
tape-recorded interviews with the officers onboard 2 of the ships were undertaken. A 
systematic analysis of the qualitative data was then undertaken through the process of 
analytic induction within the paradigm of grounded theory. By exploring the second 
research question in this manner, a unique insight was gained into the reasons lying
6
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behind the decisions taken to resolve collision situations through the routine application 
of the COLREGs.
Through the exploration of the research questions by utilising this mixture of methods the 
identified gap in the literature relating to the decisions taken by the people in charge of 
the ships in the management of the collision risk has been addressed.
1.4 Structure of Thesis
This thesis is arranged into eight chapters with three (chapters 5-7) being empirical. 
These chapters are outlined below:
Chapter 1. Introduction.
In this chapter the research area is introduced and the themes of the thesis are outlined. 
Chapter 2. Literature Review.
An analysis is made of the literature relating to maritime traffic studies and the 
management of risk as it relates to rule following, trust and surveillance.
Chapter 3. Methodology.
A review is made of the methods used to investigate this subject area. The ethical issues 
raised by this project with particular reference to ex-practitioner research are dealt with. 
Chapter 4. The International Regulations for the Prevention of Collisions at Sea.
This chapter is concerned with an analysis of the problems inherent within the 
International Regulations for the Prevention of Collisions at Sea.
Chapter 5. Radar Data.
The aim of this chapter is to present the analysis of the empirical radar data relating to 
ship movements in the Dover Strait.
Chapters 6. Crossing the Dover Strait.
In this chapter an analysis of the process by which people in charge of ferries go through 
to successfully navigate the Dover Strait is presented with the use of the empirical 
ethnographic data.
Chapter 7. Risk, Trust and Surveillance in Collision Avoidance.
7
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An analysis of the ethnographic research data relating to the themes of risk management, 
trust and surveillance is resented in this last empirical chapter.
Chapter 8. Conclusions and Recommendations.
The arguments put forward in this thesis are brought together in this final chapter. A 
number of practical recommendations relating to these findings are then presented.
8
Chapter 2. Review of Literature
From this review, I will show that there exists a gap within the literature on this subject of 
how and why a professional group, who are highly trained, apply a set of regulations, in 
the manner that they do.
2.1 Marine Traffic Movement Studies
The study of the movements of traffic at sea first came to the fore in the 1970s. This was 
due to improvements in radar technology and photographic techniques. Radar sets 
became less expensive and their use expanded with the fitting onto merchant ships. This 
allowed research institutes the ability to gain access to data relating to the movements of 
ships which prior to this time had been modelled mathematically (Draper and Bennett 
1973).
2.1.1. Radar Observation of Traffic Movement
The first direct observation of marine traffic flows was undertaken by the National 
Physics Laboratory in 1971 (Johnson 1973). In this research ships were observed using 
land based radars at Dungeness and St Margaret’s, near Dover. These radars observed 
the traffic flows for a 72 hour period and were supplemented later that year by the use of 
the radar set onboard a fishery support vessel the Miranda. From this survey the first 
detailed knowledge of ship’s routeing in the Dover Strait were ascertained. However, the 
survey group could not positively identify the ships using the area nor analyse the data 
with respect to manoeuvres undertaken to avoid collisions. This method of direct 
observation of radar records was then used in several more studies, (Kemp and Holmes 
1977, Iijima 1977) however neither of these studies looked at the collision avoidance 
practices, only the traffic routeing and density. Goodwin (1977) used radar observations 
to study traffic densities in the Southern North Sea. In this study Goodwin looked at the 
actual distribution of ships and compared it with a theoretical traffic distribution model. 
In this she found that the ships were not randomly distributed but showed a degree of 
separateness between each other. Goodwin concluded that the people in charge of the
10
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ships were actively seeking to keep a space around their ship free from other vessels. 
Goodwin then mathematically modelled this data to produce a ship domain and tested the 
validity of it in a radar simulator (Goodwin 1975a, Goodwin 1975b).
This concept of a ship domain was derived from earlier work by Fuji and Tanaka (1971) 
in which they took the concept of proxemics, where a person requires a space to be kept 
free around them (Hall 1963) and applied it to the maritime field. However, Fuji and 
Tanaka’s domain was based on theoretical modelling of ship interactions, whereas, 
Goodwin’s was based upon the observed traffic movements. Goodwin then tested the 
validity of this domain model in a radar simulator using 70 maritime students (Goodwin 
1975a, Goodwin 1975b). However, she later recounted how using this study did not give 
all the answers by stating:
Unfortunately, when the original study was done, time and other practical 
considerations prevented a full study of ship domains in restricted visibility in real 
life. Certainly the differences in navigators behaviour in real-life and simulated 
conditions needs to be investigated’.
(Goodwin, response to Jingson et al., in Jingson et al., 1993: 436).
By 1973 the first radar station used for the routine surveillance of traffic was introduced 
into the Dover Strait area following the recommendations of an inter-governmental 
working group (Richey 1966). This new technology allowed researchers access to the 
direct observation of the traffic within this area without the need of additional equipment. 
Barratt (1977) made use of the newly installed radar surveillance at Dover coastguard and 
used time lapse photographs of the radar screens in order to ascertain the number and 
location of near misses between ships. In this research Barratt compared the tracks of all 
the ships using the south west bound traffic lane, both following and crossing, with each 
other for a 12 hour period. The criteria that Barratt used in the determination of whether 
an encounter was classed as a near miss or not was that of encounters with time 
clearances of less than two minutes. For Barratt a collision would occur between two 
ships if they attempted to pass through the same spot at the same time. Therefore, a near 
miss would occur if the ships passed through that same point but were separated by two
11
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minutes. Using this criteria Barratt recorded just one near miss for the entire 12 hour 
period. Upon further analysis Barratt found that this near miss was due to a ferry leaving 
Dover and altering course to port for ships following the south west bound traffic lane. 
The ferry passed behind the ship with a separation of one minute. This study should be 
compared with Curtis (1977) who used the violation of a ship domain of 8 cables as the 
determining criteria for a near miss. This domain of 8 cables was based on the earlier 
work of Goodwin (1975a, 1975b, 1977). In this study, Curtis observed the overtaking 
manoeuvres between ships following the south west bound traffic lane of the Dover Strait 
using Dover Coastguard’s radar station. Curtis found that each ship would be overtaken 
at ranges of 8 cables or less once in every 5 hours, a much higher figure than Barratt 
(1977).
Studies of traffic density and movements using radar observation continued throughout 
the 1980s and 1990s (Barratt 1980, Chalk and Coupard 1980, Lewison 1980, Dare and 
Lewison 1980, Cockcroft 1981, Goodwin, et al. 1983, Hagart 1983, McGeoch 1985, 
Wennink 1992, Judson 1992, Jingson, et al. 1993, Hara and Nakamura 1995). Chalk and 
Coupard (1980) for example, undertook a radar survey of vessel traffic movements 
within the English Channel over a seven day period using a considerable quantity of 
resources. These included: UK and French coastguard and military shore based radar 
stations; the radar observations from a UK fisheries protection vessel and a French 
warship; various small patrol boats, provided by the port authorities in the area; a number 
of flights by French military aircraft; and 14 flights by RAF Vulcan bombers. During 
this survey, photographs were taken of the radar screens in order to ascertain traffic 
densities and collision risks. From this they concluded that the traffic separation scheme 
was eliminating head-on collision situations and reducing traffic densities in certain 
areas.
Judson (1992) used shore based radar in conjunction with geographical information 
systems (GIS) to map the traffic movements in the approaches to the Strait of Juan de 
Fuca in Canada. Using this method, Judson found that traffic density and reduced
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visibility were the most significant factors in increasing the risk of collision. A similar 
finding had been found by Lewison (1980) where he stated that:
The number of collisions to be expected per million potential encounters depends 
primarily on the visibility, and is approximately 6 in clear weather, 60 in mist and 
fog and 900 in thick or dense fog.
(Lewison 1980: 322).
Studies of traffic movements continued with the turn of the Century and these have 
utilised improvements in computer technology in the analysis of traffic movements 
(Bichler-Robertson, 2002, British Maritime Technology 2003, Barber et al. 2003). Barber 
et al. (2003) used a shore based radar unit to monitor traffic movements in the vicinity of 
the Isles of Scilly traffic separation scheme. Once again the traffic densities within the 
survey area were used as a criteria for collision risk.
However, throughout this long history of using radar to monitor the movements of ships, 
only Goodwin (1975a) and Curtis (1977) made any attempts to directly relate the 
movements of ships to actual collision avoidance manoeuvres. Goodwin looked at the 
movements of ships to ascertain the size and shape of an area that the people in charge of 
the ships would wish to keep clear and Curtis analysed the movements of ships using a 
time clearance criteria. In both studies the collision avoidance manoeuvres of the ships 
were looked at in relation to passing factors. Whereas in the other studies, a simple 
measure of traffic density was used to ascertain the risk of collision. The collision 
avoidance manoeuvres of the ships were not taken into account when determining this 
collision risk. I would argue that, although traffic density is an important factor in 
collision risk, it is however, inadequate to only look at the traffic density. This is because 
a major factor in collision avoidance is how people in charge of ships take actions to 
avoid the collision risk through their use of the COLREGs.
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2.1.2 Questionnaire Surveys
One method that has been used recently, to explore the area of collisions and the 
application of the COLREGs, has been that of questionnaire surveys. These surveys have 
been sent to members of professional organisations (Syms 2003a), to people working on 
particular ship types (Cockcroft 1998), administered at various training institutions 
(Singh 2003, Hagart 1983) or as part of a wider study of collision avoidance (Smeaton 
and Aldridge 1996). Smeaton and Aldridge (1996) for example used a questionnaire as 
part of a study of navigation within pilotage waters. Pilotage waters for the purposes of 
this study were waters close to a port or up a river (the Mersey in this case) where a local 
pilot was required to be carried. This study also utilised semi-structured interviews and 
direct observation of the work of pilots. Smeaton and Aldridge do not state how much 
reliance was placed upon data gained through each method, however, they did find that 
the COLREGs were deviated from on many occasions.
In general terms the study has revealed that the COLREGs do provide a 
framework of operation. However, in practice so many deviations occur related 
to terrain, geography and local practice, that collision avoidance in pilotage 
waters can be considered a separate and distinct skill from that practised in coastal 
and deep sea navigation.
(Smeaton and Aldridge 1996: 134).
By this statement they talk about the tacit skills that the local pilots have for the area, the 
understandings that exist between the pilots such that they can co-ordinate their 
movements, and the local custom and practice that exists within this area which explains 
the many deviations from the COLREGs. This, they contrast, with their perception of 
deep sea collision avoidance where there are not the same constraints on action such as 
tidal restrictions, geography and commercial imperatives.
However, even though questionnaire surveys are of course an accepted method of 
enquiry (see for example: de Vaus 1991, Fowler 1993, de Vaus 2001) this form of 
quantitative investigation has limited value as a method to explore the application of the
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COLREGs. Syms (2003a, b, c, d) for example, used a questionnaire to present a series of 
hypothetical collision situations, with possible solutions, to the participants. From Syms's 
report and articles it would appear that he was interested in whether seafarers took correct 
or incorrect actions to avoid the hypothetical collision. The criteria for whether actions 
were correct or incorrect was his own interpretation of the COLREGs that govern the 
particular scenario. Syms interpreted the situations in a very particular manner which has 
prompted some heated debate within the wider maritime community (see: Cockcroft 
2003, Woinin 2003, Huinink 2003, Crosbie 2004, den Hartog 2004, Toner 2004). 
However, Syms did conclude that although he had decided that certain actions were 
incorrect and illegal in some cases, the survey could not ascertain which rules had been 
applied to each of the situations. This means that the respondent could have answered the 
question in the manner that Syms determined to be correct, but through the application of 
the wrong rule.
The main problem in using questionnaires as the main research instrument in a survey of 
the application of the COLREGs is that the actions of seafarers cannot be placed within 
the context of the reality of collision avoidance. Furthermore, the researcher cannot 
explore the background behind how the decision was actually reached. Goodwin (1975a) 
attempted to explore the relationship between how collision avoidance decisions were 
made through the use of a ship simulator and this has become a popular method of 
exploring collision avoidance.
2.1.3 Simulator Studies
Harrald et al., (1998) used a simulator in order to test a model of human error within a 
maritime environment. They stated that there were three main advantages in using 
simulators:
1. The occurrence of human error in simulated hazardous situations can be 
observed
2. Trained observers can provide uniformity in data collections
3. Participants can be questioned to confirm the types of errors made.
(Harrald et al., 1998: 247)
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Perdok and Wewerinke (1995) stated that marine simulators were able to successfully 
simulate the realities of navigation and collision avoidance and so the findings produced 
by studies based upon them can be relied upon. Simulators provide the opportunity to 
test various collision avoidance scenarios upon research participants in a manner which 
could not be undertaken in any other environment. It would be unsafe to place a ship in a 
situation involving risk of collision purely for research purposes and so the advantages in 
using simulated situations are evident. Furthermore, under the International Convention 
on Standards of Training, Certification and Watchkeeping for Seafarers 1995 (STCW 95) 
(IMO 1995), there is a requirement for seafarers to undergo routine training on 
simulators. This means that simulators are located at every maritime college and so these 
simulators provide a ready opportunity for research into collision avoidance (Cannel 
1981, Uchino and Kobayashi 2002, Manrai et a l  2002, Ince and Topuz 2004).
However, a number of authors have stated that there are problems in relying upon data 
generated with the use of a simulator. Lamb and Hunt (1995) have claimed that 
simulator based research is not the best way to study collision avoidance because the 
reality of collision avoidance at sea can never be truly simulated and so there is a great 
danger in the reliance based upon the results. They state the main reason for this is that 
the seafarers training on them do not have to contend with the psychological pressure of a 
serious penalty in case of an error, as they would in real life, and so behave in a 
considerably different manner than they would at sea. Now Lamb and Hunt might be 
being too critical, as simulators have been successfully used in the study of flight deck 
operations (Smith 1979, Hutchins and Klausen 1996) and nuclear power stations (Dien 
1998). However, there are further drawbacks in the use of simulators as it is nearly 
impossible to fully simulate the reality of life at sea with its: broken sleep patterns; 
fatigue; separation from family; operational distractions; ship movement, all being 
missing from the simulated collision encounter and the absence of these factors must 
have some effect upon the performance of the participants in any simulator study. In fact 
Hutchins and Klausen (1996) state that it would be preferable to study an actual flight 
deck, but that it would be impossible due to issues of safety and constraints of space.
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Furthermore, simulators are geographically located in maritime training colleges and the 
participants used in the studies are students of those colleges, undergoing routine training. 
Pourzanjani (1996) stated that students were aware that they were in a test environment 
and so were expecting something to go wrong or be placed in a dangerous situation.
But with these limitations over the use of simulated situations in collision avoidance 
research, borne in mind, the research has illuminated the variable nature of the way 
seafarers apply the COLREGs. For example, Curtis (1986) placed ten seafarers on ships 
heading North, with a ship crossing from the port side and a third ship in the vicinity. 
None of these ships were on a collision course at the start of the exercise. The ship 
crossing from the port side then turned so that it was heading directly at the student’s 
ship. Curtis then recorded the various actions taken by the students as shown in figure
2. 1.
TMMCT C f
17 M l
Figure 2.1, Curtis 1986
17
Chapter 2. Review of Literature
What can be seen is that none of the seafarers took the same action at the same time. 
Four altered course to port (in contravention of the COLREGs), four altered course to 
starboard and two stopped their ship. The ones that stopped subsequently collided with 
the other ship. All of the seafarers took differing action with regards to how much they 
altered course by and when they altered course. This illustrates the diversity of action 
which seafarers take in avoiding a simple collision situation. Corbet (1986) used four 
different scenarios to ascertain the collision avoidance manoeuvres. In this study 108 
subjects were placed on a ship heading north. In the first scenario they were faced with a 
ship coming straight down on them from ahead, in the second the other ship was 
programmed to pass 0.5nm down their starboard side, this was increased to 1 .Onm and 
2.0nm in scenarios 3 and 4 respectively. The actions that the participants took are shown 
in table 2.2.
Initial passing distances
Action taken O.Onm 0.5nm l.Onm 2.0nm
Alter course to starboard 98% 77.8 % 34.3 % 0.9%
Alter course to port 0 % 12.0 % 25.0 % 14.8 %
Reduce speed 0 % 4.6% 21.3% 15.7 %
Stop engines 0 % 0 % 0% 0.9%
Stand-on 0 % 3.7 % 15.7% 65.7 %
Undecided 2% 1.5 % 3.7% 1.9%
Table 2.1, Corbet (1986).
As can be seen only in the first scenario where a ship was directly ahead of the 
participants did 98% of the subjects alter course in the same direction. This first scenario 
conforms closely to that described within the COLREGs for a head-on situation and so 
the people took very similar action in accordance with the rule. However, when the same 
participants were presented with varying passing distances, then there was great 
variability in their actions. This illustrates the problem of rule finitism in that people 
encounter difficulties in trying to extrapolate from the rules to cover situations not quite 
covered by them (Wittgenstein 1953) (see section 2.2). Similar diversities in participants
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responses to collision situations were found in other studies (Cook and Crawshaw 1985, 
Colley et al., 1984, Habberley and Taylor 1989, Taylor 1990, James 1994, Zhao et al.,
1995). This indicates that even when studies are undertaken at maritime colleges, in 
front of the instructors who, it would be presumed, are not teaching the students to break 
the COLREGs, the students adopt a flexible approach to COLREG interpretation. 
Pedersen et al., (2003) for example used a simulator as a means to aid the process of 
collision avoidance for fast craft operators within Tokyo Bay. In this study a model of 
traffic within Tokyo Bay was used to test software designed to show areas of safety. In 
this the courses and speeds of the simulated ships were processed and areas of predicted 
safety were shown as areas on a radar screen. 19 students of the Tokyo maritime college 
took part in the study and they were taught to steer the ship across Tokyo Bay by keeping 
within the predicted safety areas. The researchers found that the participants maintained 
a safe distance around the simulated ship, however, it was also seen that a number of 
manoeuvres made by the participants may not have complied with the COLREGs.
It should also be pointed out that some subjects showed that they were tempted to 
make frequent and minor course alterations that are difficult to detect by other 
ships and might be contrary to the requirements of the COLREGs.
Pedersen et al., (2003: 425).
In an earlier study Cannell (1981) placed the research participants in a multiple ship 
encounter situation. Again there were a variety of responses and differing interpretations 
of the COLREGs. Cannell described the process through which the participants went 
through in determining the actions that they would take:
Observations of mariners during collision avoidance exercises on a radar 
simulator suggest that in most complex encounters, one ship is singled out as the 
main threat and action is taken to avoid it in accordance with the regulations for 
two-ship encounters. At the same time attention is paid to the other ships in the 
encounter to make sure its action does not endanger them by predicting their 
probable actions and also to make sure the action taken is reasonably predictable 
by them. This statement obscures the fact that the reasoning involved here must 
be rather complex.
(Cannell 1981: 237).
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From this, it is interesting that the seafarers concentrated their attention upon what they 
perceived to be the most serious threat and kept out of its way, but at the same time kept 
an eye on the other ships, but all within an interpretation of the COLREGs. However, it 
should be noted that Cannell did not actually ask the seafarers if this was the manner in 
which they went about the decision making process; the conclusion he came to was 
inferred from observation. This was the same situation for all of the other simulator 
studies. Even though the researchers had spent a large amount of time and energy 
looking at the actions of the seafarers, they did not report on whether they asked the 
seafarers why they took the actions that they did. Harrald et al., (1998) stated that the 
ability to question the research participants was one of the major advantages in using this 
method of inquiry. Analysis from these studies, was undertaken through a study of the 
tracks of the simulated vessels in the light of simple compliance with the collision rules 
or passing distances. These studies were, in effect quantitative studies of collision 
avoidance differing from radar studies of real life traffic movements only by their 
hypothetical collision situations presented to the participants.
Direct observation of the bridge of ships have been undertaken in the past (Hutchins 
1990, Richter 2001). Hutchins (1990) used observational techniques to study a section of 
a bridge team onboard a warship in order to see how communication aids teamwork. 
Richter (2001) observed the bridge team onboard a ferry so as to ascertain their cognitive 
work-load when leaving port. Neither of these studies looked at the issue of the 
application of the COLREGS, however, they do illustrate how effective observational 
techniques can be in the understanding of the manner of work on the bridge of a ship. 
Smeaton and Aldridge (1996), it should be noted, did use direct observation as a means 
of data collection in combination with questionnaires and semi-structured interviews in a 
study of collision avoidance in pilotage waters. As previously discussed, they did find a 
flexible approach to the application of the COLREGs due, in the main, to local custom 
and practice.
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2.1.4 Summary, Marine Traffic Movement
From this review of the marine traffic research literature it is clear that the subject has 
been studied using a broad range of methods and techniques. These methods have 
included questionnaire surveys, direct observation of traffic movements through radar, 
ship simulators and, to a very limited extent, observation of the work of the people in 
charge of ships. These studies have shed light upon the actions of seafarers during 
general navigation and collision avoidance. The studies have further explored the 
variable interpretations of the COLREGs as illustrated by the actions of those navigating 
real or simulated ships. Furthermore, the interpretation of the manner in which the 
researchers have applied the COLREGs to their subjects actions have also produced 
considerable debate (see section 2.1.1). From this review, the skills required by the 
people applying the COLREGs are evident. The individuals need to analyse a 
considerable quantity of information and then take such action which will resolve the 
collision risk.
It is clear that there exists a major gap in the literature relating to the reasoning lying 
behind the actions taken by the seafarers. Only in two studies (Goodwin 1975a, Smeaton 
and Aldridge 1996) was there any attempt to draw out the manner in which the 
COLREGs were applied. Goodwin tried to bring together the observed movements of 
ships with the actions of students in a simulator. She was unsuccessful due to monetary 
and time constraints. Smeaton and Aldridge (1996), by comparison, observed the 
collision avoidance manoeuvres onboard ships and found that there were numerous 
deviations from the COLREGs due to local custom and practice. However, this gap 
within the literature shows the need for this study. Due to this, an analysis of the wider 
theoretical and empirical literature on risk management, rule non-compliance, trust and 
surveillance was undertaken.
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2.2 The Management of Risk
The concept of risk permeated the literature relating to collision avoidance. However, as 
demonstrated above, the researchers did not explore the wider aspects relating to the 
perception of risk nor the reasoning behind the decisions taken to lessen that risk. This 
should be contrasted with the way in which the study of risk has permeated to many areas 
of social science enquiry (see, for example, Krimsky and Golding 1992, Luhmann 1993, 
Adams 1995, Lupton 1999). Risk, has been used as the unit of study with the case of the 
environment (Bennett 1999), road safety (Rasanen et a l  1999), nuclear power (Dien 
1998), HIV transmission (Bloor 1995), nursing (Adams 2001), police work (Dorn and 
Brown 2003), high technology (Perrow 1999), health and safety at work (Bellaby 1990), 
health and safety on the railways (Hutter 2001), biological research (Lynch 2002) and 
banking (Power 2003). The list of studies employing risk as an analytical unit is near 
endless. The manner in which risk has come to dominate social science literature is 
encapsulated by Lash and Wynne in the introduction to Ulrich Beck’s Risk Society (Beck 
1992).
Risk has become an intellectual and political web across which thread many
strands of discourse relating to the slow crisis of modernity and industrial society.
(Lash and Wynne 1992: 3).
This publication, The Risk Society,1 probably more than any other, has come to epitomise 
the discourse on risk in late modernity. The concept of “risk” is of course nothing new, 
Knight (1921), for example, wrote about the need to distinguish between risk (which he 
stated could be calculated in terms of probability) and uncertainty (which was 
incalculable). Indeed Bernstein (1996) points out that since the middle of the last 
millennium the study and calculation of risk has been driven by the requirements of 
governments and industry in order to plan their future undertakings. Brown (1987) states 
that the calculation of the risk of ship and cargo loss enabled the insurance market of 
Lloyd’s to flourish in the 1800s. The word ‘risk’ would appear to be derived from the 
Italian risco and riscare, meaning to run into danger (Trumble, et al., 2002) a term with a
1 The Risk Society was first published by Ulrich Beck in Germany in 1986 and entitled 
Risikogesellschaft: Aufdem  Weg in eine andere Moderne.
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maritime background. The term “to run into danger” was used by seafarers in the 14th and 
15th Century upon entering uncharted waters (Ewald 1991, Giddens 1999, Lupton 1999, 
Mythen 2004). Interestingly, this phrase survives today as a warning to other ships 
contained in the meaning of the single letter flag U (Hydrographic Office 1999).
The main approach to the management of risk is the homeostatic approach2. This 
approach can be characterised as the setting of an acceptable threshold for a certain risk, 
an attempt to quantify that risk, followed by putting into place control measures in order 
to minimise the risk (Royal Society 1992, Seiler 2001, Fleury 1998). This has become the 
accepted paradigm by which risk is managed and this is the approach that people in 
charge of ships take to the collision risks that they are faced with. It should be noted that 
this approach to risk management aims to reduce and control risk rather than an attempt 
to eliminate the risk (Baldwin et al. 1999).
For example, Corby (1996) describes how people charged with the protection of children 
utilise a check-list of factors, which attempts to quantify the risk that a child faces. Once 
the risk is assessed some form of control would be placed over the care of the child in 
order to lower the risk that they were exposed to. Similar approaches are used by 
professionals in the realm of mental health (Ryan 1996), the probation service (Kemshall
1996) social work (Littlejohn 1996), naval flight operations (Rochlin et al. 1987) and 
nuclear power plants (Dien 1998). In many instances these measures to control the risk 
rely upon socially negotiated notions of feasibility and practicality (Royal Society 1992). 
For example, the Environmental Protection Act 1990 (HMSO 1990) uses various terms to 
represent the practical nature of risk reduction such as (as low as reasonably practicable) 
ALARP:
As low as reasonably practicable is a wide statement of principles and forms the 
cornerstone of nuclear plant safety. A risk that has been reduced to ALARP 
corresponds to the concept of tolerable risk. This implies that any further
2 For a full review o f the approaches to risk management see Chapter 6 o f the Royal Society Risk report 
(1992), Hood and Jones (1996) and Kemshall and Pritchard (1996)
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reduction in the risk can be achieved only at grossly disproportionate cost and that 
the benefits afforded by the risk are judged to outweigh the costs.
(Defra 2002)
However, as Wynne (1992) has illustrated, such decisions about the tolerability of a risk 
are often based upon contested scientific knowledge. Therefore, there can be problems of 
legitimacy and acceptability of the control measures when there is a divergence between 
expert and lay beliefs on the control measures used to moderate risks (Baldwin and Cave 
1999, Bennett 1999, Bloor 2000) or where the control measures conflict with ideas of 
those tasked to follow them (James and Walters 1999).
Furthermore, the quantification of the risk as illustrated by the use of check-lists obscures 
the qualitative nature of the risk assessment. In the realm of pharmacological or 
engineering studies, risk may be assessed through the application of statistical tests based 
upon simulated models, previous studies or accident statistics (CIA 1987, Rasanen et al. 
1999, Reason 1990, Vogel 2001). However, in other areas involving people the use of a 
check-list of risk factors is not the only means by which the risk assessors assessed the 
risk faced (Corby 1996, Kemshall 1996). Other factors such as trust, previous history 
and experience has been shown to have an affect upon the level of the assessed risk 
(Coleman 1990, Corby 1996, Bachmann 1998, Viklund 2003). As I will demonstrate in 
chapters 6 and 7 the quantified collision risk as calculated by the ship’s radar system 
becomes a qualified risk when the person in charge of the ship applies other factors such 
as trust, previous history and experience.
Control measures, in the main, take two forms, firstly, the attempt at designing out a 
particular risk from the system and secondly, the implementation of rules designed to 
manage the risk (Fleury 1998, Hutter 1999, Seiler 2001). Both of these approaches exist 
within the process of collision avoidance, however, the first is used to only a very limited 
extent. For example, as will be expanded upon in Chapter 4 and Chapter 7, attempts have 
been made at removing the risk of head-on collisions with the introduction of traffic 
separation schemes. However, the second element forms the bulk of this study, the 
operation of regulations designed to prevent collisions.
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It should be noted that there is usually a third element to the risk management equation, 
this being the introduction of personal protective measures in order to minimise the 
effects in the event that the preventative measures fail. Examples of this normally take 
the form of personal protection equipment in factories and workshops (MCA 2002, 
Bellaby 1999). In the realm of ship to ship collisions their exists a collision bulkhead 
(wall) near the bow (front) of the ship, but this would offer only limited protection for the 
ship. However, such ship protection only comes into force after a collision has occurred 
and so does not form part of this study.
2.2.1 Regulating Risk
This research is concerned with the application of regulations designed to prevent 
collisions The main issues relating to this is why are the regulations being applied in the 
manner that they are? Therefore, in the analysis of the literature relating to regulations I 
will focus upon the reasons behind the application of, and non-compliance with, 
regulations.
Lack of knowledge or understanding of the regulations.
The people in charge of ships, it is reassuring to know, have to go through a considerable 
period of initial and refresher training. At various stages in this training the individual 
undertakes an oral examination on the COLREGs undertaken by a MCA surveyor. 
Therefore, it would be interesting to find that the individuals were ignorant of the 
requirements of the COLREGs. However, through a review of the literature a major 
reason for non-compliance was a complete lack of understanding or ignorance of the 
existence of the rules (Baldwin 1995, Hutter 1997, Hutter 2001a, Hutter 2001b, Rasanen 
et al. 1999, Leplat 1998, Davis and Kottemann 1995). Such a situation was particularly 
relevant when there had recently been a change in the rules. Rasanen et al. (1999) for 
example, in their study of road regulations found that 67% of drivers did not know about 
the change to priority regulations concerning bicyclists and a further group did not
25
Chapter 2. Review of Literature
understand the changes. The fault for this lack of knowledge was placed with the 
government authorities and driving schools. Similarly, Davis and Kottemann (1995), 
found that managers exhibited a lack of detailed knowledge and understanding regarding 
decision rules, due to frequent rule changes and also their complexity. Hutter (2001b) by 
contrast in her study of occupational health and safety on the railways, although agreeing 
that ignorance of rules was often a cause of non-compliance, in this case she found that it 
was not a cause. She stated that although the safety rules which were contained within 
‘voluminous’ and complicated publications they also represented the accumulated 
‘wisdom’ of the workforce (Hutter 2001b, 384).
Lack of surveillance and enforcement.
All of the ships navigating in the Dover Strait area are subject to a very intense 
surveillance scheme. A radar station sits above the cliffs of Dover and monitors the 
movements of all the ships in the area. Therefore, the issue of compliance with rules 
when people are subject to surveillance is of great importance to this research. The wider 
aspects of surveillance will be returned to in section 2.4 when I will review the literature 
relating to the metaphor of the Foucauldian Panopticon.
A number of studies have found that people account for their non-compliance with 
reference to a lack of surveillance (Hutter 2001a, Baldwin et al. 1999, Hutter 1997, 
Bennett 1999, Aberg 1998, Young 1999, Black 2002, Comeliussen 2004), or through an 
indifferent regulatory environment (Reason 1990, Rothstein 2003), or because of a lack 
of sanctions following a rule transgression (Kagan and Scholz 1984, Hutter 2001a, 
Baldwin 1995, Hutter 1997, Aberg 1998, Young 1999, Black 2002). Aberg (1998) for 
example states that in Germany 40% of drivers voluntarily wore seatbelts, this rose to 
60% when it became compulsory to do so. However, when sanctions were enforced for 
not wearing one, compliance rose to 90%. Aberg also found that drivers were more 
likely to break speed limits and alcohol limits in the absence of surveillance. Hutter
(1997) in a study of environmental inspection found that compliance with regulation 
increased with surveillance. Reason (1990) found that a major influence in non- 
compliance was that of the indifference by authorities to the rule in force. Rothstein
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(2003) found in a study of governmental inspectors that the inspectors’ own perception of 
the risk that the rule was designed to regulate, influenced the surveillance and 
enforcement of that rule. For example, National Radiological Protection Board (NRPB) 
inspectors are charged with the monitoring of radioactivity in workplaces. Rothstein 
found that artificial radioactive sources were closely monitored, however, natural sources 
such as Radon gas (which can present an equal risk to workers) were widely ignored. 
Baldwin et al., (1999) in their submission to the Bristol Royal Infirmary enquiry claimed 
that weak sanctions following rule transgressions did not encourage compliance.
Clipsham (1990) studied the application of criminal sanctions following transgressions of 
the maritime collision regulations. In this he found that breaches of the rules were 
insufficient to trigger a prosecution, there needed to be additional factors present before 
the authorities took action. This was a similar finding to other studies in that a 
prosecution was only commenced when there was evidence of the most serious breaches 
of safety rules (Grabosky and Braithwaite 1986, Baldwin 1995, Hutter 1997, Hutter 
2001a) (see also section 2.4.3 for details of MCA prosecutions).
Taking a short-cut or just getting the job done.
Taking a short-cut can have two different meanings in this research. The first being a 
physical short-cut, for example taking the most direct route across the Channel; and the 
second being taking a short-cut in the application of the COLREGs, for example the by­
passing of the requirement to maintain course and speed for the stand-on vessel.
Non-compliance with regulations has often been attributed to either taking a short-cut or 
the desire to just get the job done (Reason 1990, Hutter 2001a, Lawton 1998, Olin and 
Wickenberg 2001, Comeliussen 2004). Olin and Wickenberg (2001) studied decision 
making by managers during new product development. In this they found that managers 
would routinely circumvent rules in order to facilitate the rapid development of new 
products. The managers believed that in a rapidly changing environment rigid rules were 
seen as too cumbersome and unweilding and so short-cuts needed to be taken. Hutter 
(2001a) found that many infractions of the rules governing crossing railway tracks was
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due to the desire to get the job done quickly by taking a short-cut across the tracks. The 
belief was that large delays would be incurred if the proper procedures were followed, 
whereas the individual could achieve all that they wanted to through a brief infringement 
of the rules. Lawton (1998) observed similar routine brief track infringements whilst 
studying railway shunters.
Lack of acceptability of the legitimacy of the rule.
Another reason behind non-compliance with rules is that of a lack of legitimacy. This is 
a particular problem in command and control style regulatory approach (Ayers and 
Braithwaite 1992). The resonances within this study relate to the development of the 
COLREGs over the centuries (Plant 1996). It could be argued that rules designed to give 
rights of way for one sailing vessel, due to the direction of the wind, over another, have 
no relevance to the situation today for modem ships .
Comeliussen (2004) in her study of non-compliance with rules governing a biotech firm 
in Norway, found that there was a lack of acceptance with these rules due to a belief that 
the rules were neither legitimate nor fair. The issue of legitimacy is a common theme 
running through a number of studies of rules and regulatory practices (Aalders 2002, 
Badlwin 2000, Black 2002, Leplat and Hale 1998, Young 1999, Leplat 1998, Baldwin 
and Cave 1999, O ’Malley 2004, Baldwin 1995, Baldwin 1990). Baldwin in his various 
publications on regulation and regulatory practices (2000, with Cave 1999, 1990, 1995) 
makes it clear that to ensure the legitimacy of the regulations, the body who both draws 
up and monitors the regulations must not only have a clear mandate to regulate but must 
also be in possession of the necessary expertise in the area. If these factors are found to 
be lacking then the regulatory effect of the rules will be limited and will not be seen as 
legitimate. Similarly Young (1999) found that there were certain rules which were not 
accepted when they were seen as a means by which individual managers were imposing 
their own agendas upon their subordinates. One method that has been used successfully 
to ensure the acceptance of rules is that of ensuring worker involvement during the 
creation and implementation of rules (Dawson et al. 1988, Walters et al. 1993, James and 
Walters 1999). Through this the workers are able to both understand the concepts behind
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the rules and see the need for their implementation. This lends legitimacy to such rules 
and assists in the compliance with them through worker involvement and ownership of 
the risk.
Lack of trust where co-operation was required.
Within maritime collision avoidance co-operation and co-ordination between the parties 
are essential elements for the successful implementation of the collision avoidance rules 
(Cannell 1981, Plant 1996, Cockcroft 2005) (see also Chapter 4). This is because the 
COLREGs place differing requirements onto the parties involved in the collision 
situation. One ship is directed to maintain its course and speed and the other is required to 
keep out of the way. Therefore, the issue of trust in the give-way ship to resolve the 
situation is required for the successful implementation of the COLREGs. Similarly, 
where co-operation is required between parties for the implementation of rules then the 
issue of trust is of the greatest importance (Fukyama 1995, Renn and Levine 1991, 
Pidgeon et al. 1992, Slovic 1993, Cvetkovich and Lofstedt 1999, Poortinga and Pidgeon, 
2003, Siegrist et al. 2003, Poortinga and Pidgeon 2003). Stein (1990) argues that a lack 
of trust between actors ensures that it is a rational for each actor to adopt a dominant 
strategy which will maximise their own profits at the expense of others. By way of 
contrast, Dorn and Brown (2003) showed how trust between police officers allowed 
traffic rules to be broken, because of a shared understanding of the situation and each 
others’ roles within it. In Bennett’s research on the implementation of environmental 
rules (1999) he states that corporations are theoretically disadvantaged by the full 
implementation of rules which have negative cost and efficiency implications if they 
implement them and other corporations do not (see also Taylor 1987, Ridley 1996, Hale 
and Swuste 1998). However, Bennett argues that such a situation ignores any ongoing 
relationship between the actors which can create an environment of trustworthiness, in 
that he states:
The combination of a stable group who expect to continue to interact in the future, 
together with comprehensive information on the behaviour of others and the 
possibility of sanctioning facilitates trustworthiness.
(Bennett 1999: 202)
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Although, it should be noted that Bennett assumes transparency and the threat of 
sanctions to ensure trustworthiness between the parties. Comeliussen (2004) in her study 
of a biotech company found that one reason for non-compliance with a number of 
environmental regulations was due to the costs to be borne by that company and a lack of 
trust that others would also implement them. Aalders (2002) claims that an essential 
prerequisite of ensuring trust is that of ensuring communication pathways between 
competing companies and regulators are kept open. Rasanen et al. (1999) found that 
bicyclists would not force car drivers to comply with the priority regulations and give 
bicyclists right of way. This was due to a lack of trust that the car driver would comply 
with the regulations which, if they did not comply, would result in dire consequences for 
the bicyclist due to the asymmetrical injury risks involved in collisions between bicycles 
and cars.
Therefore, in order for people to trust each other to comply with regulations they require 
openness, transparency, the threat of sanction, a shared interest in the outcome and, most 
importantly, an ongoing relationship between the parties. Due to the co-operative nature 
required by the collision regulations I will return to the wider issues relating to concept of 
trust, in section 2.3.
As a demonstration of a workers professional skills.
The skills that a worker possesses are the hallmark by which they are judged and 
accepted by their peers (Keating 2001, Dorn and Brown 2003, Comeliussen 2004). This 
role of the peer group has particular resonances onboard ship where on-the-job training is 
the norm and the individuals’ skills are gained through the close observation of their 
training mentors’ activities. For example, I will illustrate in Chapters 6 and 7, the 
instillation of such routine non-compliance is an important aspect of training and fitting- 
in with the working practices onboard the ships. Similarly, Keating (2001) in his analysis 
of health and safety in the construction industry found that rule bending or out-right rule 
rejection was a means by which people demonstrated their competence with the job. In 
this respect Keating argued that workers showed how good they were at the job by
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knowing the circumstances when certain safety rules could or should apply. Comparable 
results were also found in a number of other studies (Reason 1990, Reason et al. 1998, 
Dien 1998, Lawton 1998, Hutter 2001, Baldwin et a l 1999, Free 1994, Olin and 
Wickenberg 2001, Dorn and Brown 2003, Comeliussen 2004). Free (1994) for example, 
in a study of safety on the railways found that bending safety rules was viewed as the 
hallmark of skill and experience. Habberley et al. (1986) in a simulator study of navigator 
behaviour claimed that the navigators saw no reason to avoid passing close to other ships 
as from their past experience they knew that they possessed the skills to extricate 
themselves from that situation. In fact, by passing close to other ships they were 
regarded as being the most successful ship handlers. Reason (1990) in a study of car 
drivers found that those who rated themselves as better drivers also undertook the most 
rule violations. Reason believed these violations were a part of the driver’s habitual 
behaviour and were seen by the drivers as being a means by which they displayed their 
superior skills. Similarly, Comeliussen (2004) studied non-compliance within a biotech 
firm and found that the firm did not comply with the rules because of their belief that 
their skills as professional chemists negated the need for such rules. In their minds the 
scientists within the biotech firm were operating from a position of principled 
disagreement based upon what they viewed as being superior knowledge. Baldwin et al., 
(1999) claimed that doctors were more tolerant of rule breaking amongst each other than 
were midwives. They believed that this was in part due to the doctors being able to show 
that their decision was based upon their clinical judgement which was better suited to the 
job that they undertook than simply applying rigid mles.
Another interesting aspect of compliance is that identified by Bittner (1965) in his study 
of police rule enforcement. In this he found that police officers demonstrated 
considerable skill in their ability to retrospectively justify non-compliance as, in fact, 
being within the rules. Through this retrospective justification these officers were 
accorded membership of the organisation. Dom and Brown (2003) identified a similar 
degree of retrospective justification among police officers in the aftermath of driving 
accidents. However, as Bloor (1980) has argued, any such actions whether in compliance
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or not with rules, must conform to accepted norms held by the group in order to gain 
continued acceptance within that group.
Where actors must engage in activities under the gaze of their work associates 
then they run the risk of being penalised for offending their colleagues sense of 
piety by engaging in practices which appear to others unacceptable formulations 
of the formal scheme.
(Bloor 1980: 51)
Similarly, Zimmerman (1970) and Fortes (1983) regarded compliance with the group’s 
norms as prerequisites of membership of a group or organization. Wittgenstein (1953) 
argued that not complying with the accepted norm of a society, whether through 
compliance with a rule or not, meant that the person was not complying with that form of 
life and so demonstrated that they had no membership of that grouping (see also 
Garfmkell 1967, Bloor 1983, Sidnell 2003). Such compliance with the operating norms 
of the workplace or organisation, rather than the formal external rules, was a common 
occurrence within other studies (Lawton 1998, Bailyn 2002, Leplat and Hale 1998, 
Schultz 2003, Reason et al. 1998, Olin and Wickenburg 2001, Aalders 2002). Lawton
(1998) in her study of rule violations on the railway found that the essential element was 
that of compliance with the normal working practices of the group. Reason et al. (1998) 
in a study of workers within hazardous technologies claimed that the workers expected 
their colleagues to routinely breach safety rules. Therefore, it can be seen that an 
important aspect of gaining entry, acceptance and membership of an organisation is 
reliant upon compliance with the norms of that organisation. These norms often include 
routine rule violations which are seen as essential in order to demonstrate an individual’s 
skills and professionalism.
Regulations could not cover all the circumstances.
The belief in the failure of the applicability of rules to cover all circumstances is 
particularly applicable to the Dover Strait’s area. This is a Strait in which there are 400+ 
ship movements every day. This means that multiple collision avoidance situations are 
encountered by those crossing the Strait. However, as will be described in chapter 4, the 
COLREGs are designed to control two-ship interactions and not multiple encounters.
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Others have stated that one aspect that is often cited as a reason behind non-compliance is 
that the rules can not or do not cover all circumstances encountered by people (Bittner 
1965, Garfinkel 1967, Hutchins 1991, Black 2002, Bloor 1980, Bennett 1999, Leplat 
1998, Baldwin et al. 1999, Sharrock and Button 1999, Fleury 1998, Dien 1998, Rasanen 
et al. 1999, Reason, et a l  1998). Reason et al. (1998) for example, stated that the variety 
of rules developed to govern safe behaviour will always be less than the possible variety 
of unsafe conditions. Sharrock and Button (1999) describe the problem as such:
The number of examples which can be given to someone in order to teach them a 
rule is finite, but the number of applications which they may make of the rule 
once they have been taught it, is potentially infinite (or at least, indefinitely large) 
such that it is not possible for the teacher to give instructions in what to do in 
every case.
Sharrock and Button (1999: 196).
The solution to this rule finitism is that which Garfinkel (1967) referred to as the etcetera 
clause. This is a clause within the rules which asks those applying them to extrapolate the 
existing rules to cover unforeseen, but similar, situations and to do it within the spirit of 
the existing rules. As will be explored further in Chapter 4, the COLREGs are no 
exception to this as they have an entire section devoted to it.
However this creates problems in the application of the rules as people are unsure about 
the application of rules in marginal cases. Rasanen et al. (1999); in their study of crossing 
points where bicyclists had right of way over car drivers, they observed that car drivers 
would not give-way in marginal cases. In a study of nuclear power station operators, 
Dien (1998) observed them trying to apply rules designed for emergency situations to 
operations which were just beyond the tolerances of normal operation, but beneath the 
level of an emergency. In this the operators referred to their responses as being an 
extrapolation from the rule in such a manner as to be both consistent with the rule as well 
as being within its spirit. Shultz (2003) saw how managers developed new in-house 
operating procedures in order to deal with new situations not envisaged by the rule 
makers, but such that these new operating procedures took into account the existing rules. 
In summary, when people are faced with circumstances beyond those envisaged by the
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drafters of the rules, they then apply the etcetera clause, which is often included within 
the rules. This means that they try to extrapolate the existing rules so that they cover the 
new situation. This is an area of particular importance to this study as the COLREGs 
were written to cover two-ship situations. However, simple two-ship encounters were 
found to be extremely rare within the area of study.
2.2.2 Summary, Rule non-compliance Studies
The manner in which a set of rules are applied by a professional group is the subject of 
this research and all of the reasons behind the non-compliance with rules find resonances 
within this study. In summary, from this review of literature it was shown that there are a 
wide variety of reasons lying behind rule non-compliance. These may be listed as:
• Lack of knowledge of the regulations
• Lack of surveillance and enforcement
• Taking a short-cut or just getting the job done
• Lack of acceptability of the legitimacy of the rule
• Lack of trust where co-operation was required
• As a demonstration of a workers professional skills
• Regulations could not cover all the circumstances.
With regard to the reasons above, it should be noted that officers in charge of ships are 
required to undergo a considerable quantity of initial and refresher training throughout 
their careers and so their knowledge of the COLREGs should be very high. All of the 
participants within this study (bar two unqualified trainees) had sat for at least one MCA 
oral examination on the COLREGs and most of the participants were also master 
mariners. Therefore it would be of particular interest if the participants demonstrated a 
lack of knowledge of the COLREGs and this would indicate a massive failure of the 
nautical training regime. Furthermore, the physical area of the Dover Strait is under 
constant surveillance by the MCA and so any non-compliance should be detected (the 
surveillance aspects will be further explored in section 2.4). Therefore, any short-cutting
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should also be observed by the authorities. However, such observation by the authorities 
would also be undertaken in conjunction with an acceptance that the rules are applicable 
to the situation and that they should be enforced in. For, as has been illustrated, without 
acceptance of the legitimacy of the rules then non-compliance often takes place 
especially within a highly trained work force who are able to demonstrate their superior 
knowledge and skills to situations which in themselves, deviate from those covered by 
the rules. The other factor that was highlighted was that of trust. Trust within the context 
of the application of the COLREGs is of vital importance. As will be shown in chapter 4, 
the COLREGs require one ship to maintain its course and speed whilst waiting for the 
other to take action to keep out of the way. This means that, the stand-on ship is directed 
to trust the other ship to resolve the situation. If the other ship does not take any action, 
or does so quite late, then the collision situation is not immediately resolved. Therefore, 
the issue of trust is highly relevant to this study.
There are a wide range of interrelated factors and issues which lie behind rule non- 
compliance. This review of the literature relating to this area has highlighted them. 
However, two issues are of particular relevance to this study and they are trust and 
surveillance. The former, because of the way in which the issue of trust is of paramount 
importance to the application of the COLREGs, where one ship is reliant upon the other 
to resolve a collision situation, and the latter, because of the strict surveillance regime 
that ships navigating in this area are under. However, this does not negate the importance 
of the other highlighted issues. As will be seen, trust and surveillance also emerged from 
the empirical data through the process of analytical induction as being of great 
importance to the respondents and this study.
2.3 Trust.
In this section I will explore the wider concepts relating to trust between people which 
were touched upon in section 2.2. Trust is an important concept due to the amount of 
trust that a person in charge of a ship must have in another person in charge of another 
ship which is on a collision course with their own, if they are to apply the COLREGs
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correctly. For example, if a person is placed in charge of a ship which is directed not to 
take action, then that person has to rely on the other to resolve the collision situation. 
Thus, trust in the other is of primary importance to this study, for if trust does not exist 
then the COLREGs will not be applied in the way that they were intended.
Trust in another person or organisation is one of the founding preconditions of any form 
of social interaction. Garfinkel (1967) stated that trust was an irreducible condition of 
social action, that is without trust no social action could take place and that it was a part 
of the essential social capital. Tyler (2001) developed that concept by stating that the 
ability to trust someone is essential if a person is willing to take the risks in order to enter 
into a productive social exchange. Latour and Woolgar (1979) classified trust in a more 
economic sense when they included it as a form of investment within a cycle of credit. 
Luhmann (1979) stated that the function of trust facilitated the ability of people to live 
and work together in ever greater complexity. In essence, Luhmann saw trust as a means 
of facilitating risk taking in that without trust nobody would undertake a risk when an 
uncertainty was present (Luhmann, 1988). Therefore, for risk taking to occur, trust had 
to be present (Bachmann 1998, Viklund 2003, Beck 2002). Coleman (1990) took that 
idea further by suggesting that the concept of trust was simply a decision taken under 
risk. However, the issue of trust first came to the fore within risk perception studies 
through the work of Wynne (1980). In this work Wynne accounted for the differences 
between the lay and expert opinions on the risks associated with nuclear re-processing 
were due to the level of trust between the parties and in institutions. The issue of trust, 
however, continues to create great debate within the area of risk perception research 
(Viklund, 2003) and it is an important issue when co-operative action is required (Renn 
and Levine 1991, Pidgeon et al. 1992, Slovic 1993, Cvetkovich and Lofstedt 1999, 
Poortinga and Pidgeon, 2003, Siegrist et al. 2003, Poortinga and Pidgeon 2004).
Various attempts have been made to conceptualise trust through definitions. For example 
Rousseau et al. defined trust as:
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A psychological state comprising the intention to accept vulnerability based upon 
the behaviour of positive expectations of the intentions of or behaviour of another.
(Rousseau etal. 1998: 395)
Whereas Siegrist et al. defines trust as:
Trust is defined as the willingness to make one-self vulnerable to another based 
upon a judgement of similarity of intentions or values.
(Siegrist et al. 2003: 706)
Both of these definitions of trust share the idea of placing one-self in a position of 
vulnerability and this would appear to be the crux of the issue relating to the concept of 
trust. However, they differ in their concepts of both the outcome and the intention of the 
other. With Rousseau the essential element is the willingness to accept vulnerability in 
return for a positive outcome. In contrast, for Siegrist et al., the operative element is the 
combination of vulnerability with the belief in shared or similar values. This difference 
alludes to the idea that trust is more than a simple negotiation as shown by work 
undertaken upon risk perceptions which has allowed for a much more nuanced approach 
to theories of trust revolving around a combination of contextual variables (Poortinga and 
Pidgeon 2003, Renn and Levine 1991, Kasperson et al. 1992, Horlick-Jones et al. 2003, 
Pidgeon et al 2003, Siegrest et al. 2003).
Giddens (1991, 1994, and with Pierson, 1998) takes the position whereby the individual 
takes a reflexive approach to the concept of engaging in a risk through the idea of active 
trust. This is where the individual engages with the other person so that trust is both 
created and won and so reflects a future orientated relationship. Giddens equates this to 
the reliability of a system in that it will perform to expectations, trust is therefore based 
upon the reliability of past performances being repeated in the future. Van Loon (2002) 
takes a contrasting approach in that for him trust is not only a reflection of past 
experiences but also one with more transcendental concerns. In this trust can also be 
experienced as a matter of faith or fides  which stems from a moral obligation to place 
one’s trust in the hands of another. In essence this could be equated to trust stemming 
from duty. Lane (1998) states that there are three assumptions present to constitute the
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issue of trust: firstly there must be an interdependent relationship between the parties; 
secondly, trust forms a way of coping with risk or uncertainty; and thirdly, there is an 
expectation that the vulnerability inherent within the risk will not be taken advantage of 
by the other party. Zey, (1998) taking a rational choice perspective, acknowledged the 
concepts of trust relating to future expectations, vulnerability and risk by stating that:
The likelihood of an actor, A, trusting, is the product of the value that actor B has 
for actor A plus the probability with which actor A expects actor B to realize that 
value in a particular interactional episode.
(Zey 1998: 65).
Brenkert (1998) sees trust within business transactions as an attitude which is based 
around the shared beliefs of the other parties to the transaction. In this, there is an 
expectation that no one party will exploit or take advantage of the vulnerability of 
another, thus, trust is lost if they do. A similar view is taken by Boden (2000) in her 
analysis of international futures trading. In this study the issue of trust is based around 
the belief in common expectations and shared values for as she states there is no time 
available for any long winded rationalisation of whether to trust or not.
Liebeskind and Oliver (1998) in their study of trust within academic collaboration, state 
that trust stems from several factors which include social processes, calculation or shared 
values. Trust stemming from social processes is due to previous collaboration and 
friendship and so there is an expectation that the successful past partnership will result in 
future success. Calculative trust is based upon the clinical assessment of the value of the 
others’ motives and interests. In this, a calculation is undertaken of the costs associated 
with the consequences of untrustworthy behaviour of the other person. Trust that is 
based upon shared values comes about through a shared understanding of values and 
outcomes. Fukuyama (1995) stated that this form of trust is most commonly influenced 
through shared social structures and institutions.
Renn and Levine (1991) analysed the specific factors that they perceived to be critical in 
the construction of trust through a review of literature. In this review five components
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were identified, these being: a perception of competence in the other; a belief in their 
objectivity; the thought that the other will act in a fair manner; that the other’s behaviour 
will be consistent with their past actions; and that there is a belief in the goodwill of the 
other. Kasperson et al. (1992) took a similar position in that they identified four elements 
in the construction and preservation of trust, these being: commitment to a common goal; 
competence in the other; a belief that the other cares; and that the other’s behaviour is 
seen as predictable.
Siegrist et al. (2003) in their study of risk perceptions relating to electromagnetic fields 
ascertained a number of variables which constituted the construction of trust. In this they 
identified the following variables:
• General trust: a belief that most people are trustworthy most of the time;
• General confidence: the expectation that future events will unfold as expected;
• Value similarity: the assumption that values are shared between the parties;
• Past performance: judgements based upon previous actions of the other;
• Social trust: the willingness to make oneself vulnerable to another.
In addition, they stated that counter to the belief that regulations are attempts at 
increasing trust through ensuring confidence in a system, regulations can, however, be 
interpreted as signs that shared values do not exist and so distrust is created through lack 
of confidence brought about through the mere existence of the regulations (see also 
Nissenbaum 2001, Ribstein 2001).
Poortinga and Pidgeon (2003) in their study of lay perception of risk regulation used the 
term critical trust in order to reflect the manner in which trust is created from a multitude 
of factors which included the balancing of a concept of general trustworthiness with 
scepticism.
From this review of the theoretical perspectives relating to trust, it can be seen that no 
single uniting position can explain why people trust others in order to bring about a
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required outcome. It must be seen that in constructing the issue of trust, people take into 
account a variety of aspects before entering into a relationship which places themselves 
in a position of vulnerability and these may be summarised as:
• Previous history;
• Predictable, consistent behaviour;
• The concept of shared values or vested interest;
• A belief in the competence of the other;
• A belief that the other cares about their welfare.
Furthermore, as alluded to by Garfinkel (1967), Tyler (2001) and Coleman (1990), for 
trust to exist there should be a willingness and desire to enter into a relationship with 
another. This is because the relationship is necessary when the desired outcome has to be 
facilitated by another. Therefore, a person who does not trust, in any way, the other party, 
who would be needed to cooperate in order to facilitate an outcome, would attempt to 
circumvent the need to enter into a relationship, with that person, by undertaking actions 
that do not require the other’s cooperation.
The issue of trust within the maritime industry has always been highly regarded with such 
institutions as Lloyd’s of London traditionally using “my word is my bond” as their 
motto (Lloyd’s List 2003). Maritime commentators often lament the fact that trust is a 
scarce commodity and is often lost when past breaches have occurred (de Bievre 2003). 
However, there are few areas where the issue of trust is as fundamental as it is within 
collision avoidance. This is because in all collision avoidance situations, as envisaged by 
the COLREGS, there is always an element of co-operation between the two parties. 
Therefore, the element of trust within these interactions is of great importance for one 
ship must rely upon the other to take a mutually co-ordinating action in order to avoid a 
collision. As I will try to demonstrate in Chapters 7, the trust exhibited in the other party 
is constructed from a variety of factors.
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2.4 Surveillance
In this section I will explore the wider concepts relating to surveillance which were 
touched upon in section 2.2. Surveillance is an important issue within this study for the 
MCA operate a radar station on the cliffs of Dover. I will draw upon the writings of 
Michel Foucault and the related work by others, to explore the concept of compliance 
with regulations due to the fear of punishment for non-compliance as observed though 
surveillance. The form and type of punishment for contraventions of the COLREGs is 
important for as previously highlighted in section 2.2, the lack of an enforcement regime 
often results in a greater number of rule infractions.
2.4.1 Discipline and Punish
In his seminal work Discipline and Punish (1975) Foucault describes how disciplinary 
power is used mainly to train the behaviour of the individual such that they conform to 
the regulations in force. Foucault described how the underlying requirement to ensuring 
compliance was that of complete observation:
The perfect disciplinary apparatus would make it possible for a single gaze to see 
everything constantly...a perfect eye that nothing would escape and a centre 
towards which all gazes would be turned.
(Foucault, 1975: 173).
Such a situation is encapsulated in the design and construction of the ideal carceral 
institution as designed and constructed by Jeremy Bentham in the Eighteenth Century. 
Foucault describes the design of the institution and its Panoptic tower, the Panopticon:
At the periphery, an annular building; at the centre, a tower; this tower is pierced 
with wide windows that open onto the inside of the inner side of the ring; the 
peripheric building is divided into cells, each of which extends the whole width of 
the building; they have two windows, one on the inside, corresponding to the 
windows of the tower; the other, on the outside, allows the light to cross the cell 
from one end to the other.
(Foucault, 1975: 200).
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Through this architectural arrangement, the cell was constantly illuminated. The 
arrangement allowed light to fall upon the cell which allowed complete visibility, 
visibility for Foucault, became the trap, the opposite of the dungeon. Therefore, the 
person incarcerated in the cell could be observed at any time by the guard in the tower. 
However, an additional factor was that the prisoner could not observe the guard, the 
prisoner could only assume that they were being observed. This assumption would lead 
the prisoner to believe that any transgressions of the rules of the institution would be 
observed, resulting in the application of disciplinary measures. Through this fear of 
disciplinary measures, the prisoner complied with the rules of the institution, and the 
power of the institution functioned automatically. Hence the major effect of the 
Panopticon was to:
...induce in the inmate a state of conscious and permanent visibility that assures 
the automatic functioning of power.
(Foucault 1975: 201).
Therefore, the role of the Panopticon was to ensure compliance with the rules of the 
institution through the inmates automatic conformity (Norris and Armstrong 1999). So, 
for Foucault, those subject to the gaze of the authorities’ agents should automatically 
conform to the rules laid down.
2.4.2 The Metaphor of the Foucauldian Panopticon
The Foucauldian Panopticon has been widely, and critically, analysed as a metaphor for 
surveillance and control within the literature on surveillance (Dandeker 1990, Agamben 
1998, Feeley and Simon 1994, Ditton 1999, Norris and Armstrong 1999, Bogard 1996, 
Gandy 1993, Ball 2000, Lyon 2001, McCahill 2002, Wood 2003, Vaz and Bruno 2003, 
Ball 2003, Yar 2003, Lianos 2003, Campbell 2004, Williams and Johnson 2004).
The role of closed circuit television (CCTV) systems has proved a very popular area of 
study (Feeley and Simon 1994, Ditton 1999, Norris and Armstrong 1999). Ditton (1999) 
for example, analysed the deterrent effects of CCTV camera systems in Glasgow. Ditton 
found that these effects were diluted through lack of knowledge about the system, as only 
41% of respondents to a questionnaire were aware of the CCTV system’s existence, 15
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months after its installation. Norris and Armstrong (1999) rejected the idea that CCTV 
systems represented a movement towards panopticisation. Similarly, Yar (2003) claimed 
that although people are aware of CCTV systems, they take no practical cognisance of 
them. That is to say that, the observed do not self-regulate their actions to automatically 
conform to the rules of those undertaking the observation. Feeley and Simon (1994) 
claim that CCTV systems are not an attempt at self-regulation through self-surveillance, 
but are simply a technical means used to manage the threat posed by rule breakers. The 
CCTV pictures are simply used during the arrest and trial of suspects, rather than as a 
means of encouraging rule following. For example, police in Newcastle stated that 
between 1991-7 2,800 people were arrested following the inspection of CCTV pictures. 
Of those arrested 99% pleaded guilty to the offence when presented with the CCTV 
evidence (Economist 1997).
Agamben (1998) looked at other forms of post-Panoptic surveillance such as computer 
data collection. Rose (2000) theorised that visual surveillance would be surpassed by 
other forms of electronic surveillance constructed from the trail of data left by individuals 
during their daily lives. Visual surveillance would become dataveillance. Tam and Mui 
(2001) in their research on call centres in three different countries found that managers 
used information technology to quantify the work being undertaken through the analysis 
of measurable indicators, such as numbers of calls dealt with. However, the managers 
themselves accepted that this produced only a crude measure of efficiency and did not 
reflect some of the more complex tasks that the workers undertook. But for Green
(1999), the opportunities that the collection and analysis of electronic data that people 
leave behind, a person’s electronic footprint, represents a simple extension of the gaze of 
the Panopticon. Where once a whole population could be surveyed with one glance, now 
authorities can only observe at certain points, but the effects remain the same. Wood
(1998) (see also Dandecker 1990) analysed the process of electronic data collection 
within the workplace and saw it as a means of ensuring the control of the forces of 
production remained with the employers. Surveillance was used to repress any 
differences between workers so as to guarantee uniformity within the workplace.
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Hansen (2004), by contrast, saw workplace surveillance as having positive benefits to the 
worker under the gaze. In her study of employee assistance programmes, she found that 
through surveillance, management were able to identify employees on the verge of 
having problems which could reduce that person’s productivity. Such potential 
problems, both work and domestic in source, once identified, could be dealt with before 
they affected the efficiency of the workplace. Of course, it could be argued that such a 
programme of preventative action is simply an extension of the control of the 
management has over the workers, in the same manner as identified by Wood (1998). 
However, Hansen’s respondents stated that they saw it as extremely beneficial to 
themselves as they saw it in terms of concern by their employers, rather than as a means 
of control or repression.
Worker response to surveillance within the workplace has been studied, especially with 
regard to privacy and ethical issues (Sewell 1996, Oz et al. 1999, Miller and Weckert 
2000, Ball 2001, Lankshear and Mason 2001, Lankshear et al. 2001, Findlay and 
McKinlay 2003, Whitty 2004). Lankshear et al. (2001) found that employee responses to 
electronic surveillance within a call centre represented a complex interaction between the 
employee and the management team. Similarly, Oz et al. (1999) found that worker 
responses to surveillance at work were situated within the dynamic of that particular 
organisation. They further identified that employees of companies that did not undertake 
workplace surveillance objected strongly to the concept of any form of surveillance. 
Interestingly, Findlay and McKinlay (2003) found that electronic data collection was only 
thought of as unobtrusive by the employees only when they accepted that it was objective 
in nature. However, a common theme running through the literature dealing with 
electronic data collection is that far more data was generated than could ever be managed 
by the collecting authority (Oz et al. 1999, Lankshear et al. 2001, Tam and Mui 2001, 
Findlay and McKinlay 2003).
However, even though these studies are critical of some parts of Foucault’s writing, they 
retain the essential elements relating to the relationship between visibility, vulnerability 
and self-surveillance. Vaz and Bruno (2003) describe this self surveillance as:
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Self-surveillance is usually understood as the attention one pays to one’s 
behaviour when facing the actuality or virtuality of an immediate or mediated 
observation by others who’s opinion he or she deems relevant, usually, observers 
of the same or superior social position.
(Vaz and Bruno 2003: 273).
Yar (2003) ascribes the true power of the Panopticon, outside of any ideal carceral 
institution, as lying within those being observed:
The Panopticon is rather like Dorothy’s Wizard- its power to command those 
whom it addresses rests upon their belief in its omnipotence, their taking seriously 
its sinister authority or menace, the barely veiled threat of sanction or reprisal 
should they refuse to obey.
(Yar 2003: 267).
Yar ascribes a major sense of fragility to the metaphor of the Panopticon, this being that 
if people do not believe in the power of that which it represents, then the deterrent effects 
of any sanctions for rule breaking, are removed. So within the Dover Strait area, for 
those in charge of ships to automatically conform to the authorities rules, then they must 
believe that their transgressions would be both observed and punished. If they do not 
ascribe such beliefs to the surveillance regime, then it becomes an irrelevance and fails to 
ensure conformity and only serves to provide evidence in the aftermath of an incident in 
the same manner as CCTV systems.
2.4.3 The Channel Navigation Information Service (CNIS)
The MCA operate a radar station on the cliffs of Dover. This station overlooks the Dover 
Strait, observes and records the actions of the ships in transit through the area. Their 
stated functions are:
The functions of CNIS are to keep the Dover Strait TSS under observation, to 
monitor the flow of traffic and to detect and report vessels which contravene the 
International Regulations for Preventing Collisions at Sea 1972, as amended 
(COLREGS).
(MCA 2004b: 3).
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These functions are broadcast to all seafarers in the area through warnings on charts, 
radio transmissions at 30 minute intervals and merchant shipping notices. Details of 
prosecutions following transgressions of the COLREGs are regularly reported in the 
maritime press and are posted on the MCA’s website (www.mcga.gov.uk). Furthermore, 
one of the ferry companies have a policy of encouraging seafarers to visit the radar 
station in order to observe its operation. In addition, the scanner of the radar turning on 
the cliff directly above the port is clearly visible. It could, therefore, be argued that a 
surveillance regime similar to a Panopticon exists within the area of study. During a visit 
to CNIS I was informed by the deputy director that one transgression of the COLREGs 
occurs every 24 hours. Clipsham (1990) in an earlier study of the CNIS found that 69% 
of ships passing through the area failed to make the correct reports. He also found that in 
1989, 335 ships were deemed to have contravened the COLREGs. Furthermore, it was 
found that 1127 ships were classed as ‘rogues’ for not reporting at all, from a total of 
12,380 ship transits. I was further informed that such transgressions are treated seriously. 
When a ship appears to be contravening the COLREGs it is called on the radio by the 
operator. The ship is then informed of the situation and a report is made to the flag state. 
A prosecution for a breach of the COLREGs would then be commenced for any UK 
registered ships or, for any transgressing ships, upon entry into a UK port. Therefore, 
even when taking into account the fact that only a small proportion of the ships passing 
through the Dover Strait every day are either UK registered or will call at UK ports, there 
should still be a large number of prosecutions occurring from breaches of the COLREGs. 
Table 2.1 summarises all of the prosecutions undertaken by the MCA for breaches of the 
COLREGs between 1999 and 2003.
2000 Yacht sailed for 24 miles in the 
wrong direction.
Aircraft and ship launched to 
identify the ship following 
failure to answer radio calls.
£15,000
2001 Breaching Rule 13, Overtaking. 
Collision between two cargo 
ships.
Collision with other ship. £7,950
2001 Breaching Rule 13, Overtaking. Collision with other ship. £3,000
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Collision between two cargo 
ships.
2001 Pleasure boat sailed for 20 
miles in the wrong direction
Close-quarters situation3 with 
17 ships.
£2,500
2001 Fishing vessel sailed for 14 
miles in the wrong direction.
Close-quarters situation with 4 
ships, one of which reported 
the incident.
£11,164
2001 Fishing vessel sailed in the 
wrong direction. Collided with 
a cargo ship.
Did not show any navigational 
lights. Collision with other 
ship.
€7,500
2002 Fishing vessel, sailed in the 
wrong direction.
Master of the fishing vessel 
reported that he was lost as the 
vessel was not equipped with 
any navigational charts.
£9,110 
(Owner fined 
£11,110 for not 
supplying the 
charts)
2003 Failure to keep a proper watch. 
Collision between two ferries.
Collision with other ship. £4,500
2003 Breaching Rule 13, Overtaking. 
Collision between two cargo 
ships.
One fatality after one ship 
sank.
12 months 
imprisonment
Table 2.2 MCA prosecutions for breaches of the COLREGs, 1999-2003. (MCA 2004a)
In each of those cases, there were aggravating circumstances in addition to simply 
breaching the COLREGs. For example, the Honeyborne III, a UK registered fishing 
vessel, was observed sailing in the wrong direction up a traffic lane. The master of the 
fishing vessel reported to CNIS that he did not know where he was due to the electronic 
chart system not working and that he did not have any paper navigational charts. The 
master was subsequently fined £9,100 for breach of the COLREGs, whereas the owner of 
the Honeyborne III, was fined £11,100 for not equipping the ship correctly. In another 
case, the Club Med, a large fast yacht, sailed for 24 miles in the wrong direction, was 
involved in close situations with 13 ships and passed 0.1 nm off a ship carrying dangerous 
cargoes. In order to identify the Club Med, operators at CNIS ordered the launching of a 
ship from Dover and an aircraft from Manston airfield, as the yacht did not respond to 
frequent radio calls. The master of the Club Med was subsequently fined £15,000. 
Furthermore, there were no prosecutions of cargo ships for breaching the COLREGs save
3
The MCA uses the term ‘Close Quarters’ to cover all situations where there is a serious risk of collision. 
By this they mean that with slightly different circumstances a collision would have occurred. No distance 
is placed upon this definition.
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for four cases each of which resulted in a collision. That is to say that no merchant ship 
was prosecuted for simply breaking the COLREGs, a collision with another ship had to 
occur before proceedings were commenced. The penalties for the collisions ranged from 
fines between £3,000 to £7,950 and in one case imprisonment for 12 months following a 
conviction for manslaughter. From this, it is clear that breaches of the COLREGs are not 
enough to warrant prosecution through the courts. Clipsham (1990) reported that 
prosecutions did not occur following transgressions of the COLREGs. Additional factors 
needed to occur before the authorities would take action.
Of course in such an international industry as shipping it is often difficult to find the 
people responsible for the ship in question due to layers of bureaucracy. Winchester 
(2003a) has stated that:
Hand-in-hand with being offered vessel registration, the shipowner is often 
offered a means to register a company whose sole asset is the vessel. Offshore 
company legislation of the kind found in tax haven jurisdictions around the world 
have attracted a great deal of publicity for their derogation of the principle of 
publicness. Minimal local participation, the lack of registers of directors and the 
routine acceptance of bearer shares, often cloud the real ownership of a company 
through layers of bureaucratic opacity. In effect, the ownership of vessels 
appearing on open registers is often shrouded in corporate veils which may take 
many months to pierce.
(Winchester 2003a, 78-7.)
For example, in the case of the Erika, which sank off the Brittany coast in 2000, after 
exhaustive enquiries lasting 14 months, the French authorities could not identify who 
actually owned the ship (Winchester 2003b). The Erika's ownership was hidden behind 
ship management companies and a multitude of off-shore brass plate companies. The 
true ownership only became known when the owners voluntarily came forward. 
Therefore, an argument could be made that the MCA try to enforce the regulations, but 
cannot find those responsible. It could further be argued that, in common with many 
other forms of safety inspection, a prosecution is only commenced when there is evidence 
of the most serious breaches of safety rules (Grabosky and Braithwaite 1986, Baldwin 
1995, Hutter 1997, Hutter 2001a). Baldwin (1995) reports that prosecutions are rarely 
undertaken for anything less than serious breaches of health and safety regulations as
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viewed by governmental inspectors. For example, the Factories Inspectorate secured 
1,488 convictions (from 1,771 cases brought) compared with the issuance of 10,457 
warning notices in 1989. Hutter (1997) reports a similar situation involving the Railways 
and Industrial Air Pollution Inspectorates. In this she states that prosecution would only 
occur when there has been clear evidence of blatant and flagrant disregard of safety 
measures.
The surveillance regime covering the Dover Strait is designed to ensure compliance with 
the COLREGs through the fear of punishment for any transgressions of the COLREGs. 
Further, all seafarers should be aware that transgressions will be observed, as no actions 
escape the gaze of the radar. Therefore, the MCA have set-up what they believe will be a 
surveillance scheme that will ensure automatic compliance with the COLREGs due to 
concerns over the punishment that would follow from any non-compliance. However, as 
illustrated by the research on CCTV systems, the deterrent value of surveillance schemes 
is limited through lack of knowledge of the scheme and the associated punishments and 
so they have increasingly become the means by which the authorities collect evidence. I 
have illustrated that it would appear that the MCA, in common with other enforcement 
agencies, only prosecute when there are aggravating circumstances. However, the MCA 
expect that the surveillance system will ensure compliance with the COLREGs, therefore, 
the influence of the system upon the actions of the people in charge of the ships will be 
further explored within Chapters 6 and 7.
2.5 Summary
The research that I have undertaken is concerned with the application of the rules 
regulating maritime collision avoidance. These rules, known as the COLREGs, are 
applied by a professional group who have undergone a considerable quantity of initial 
and refresher training throughout their careers.
To this end I have tried to critically analyse literature relevant to this research and those 
underpinning questions. Firstly, the previous research on the application of the
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COLREGs was analysed. From this it could be seen that the subject has been researched 
using a variety of methods including: radar observations; questionnaire surveys; and 
simulated collision encounters (see section 2.1). These studies have produced a wealth of 
data concerning the application of the COLREGs in both real and simulated situations. 
From direct observation of ship movements several researchers found that the people in 
charge of the ships wished to keep an area around them clear of other ships (see section 
2.1.1), this area being termed the ship domain. However, the researchers were unable to 
ask the people in charge of the ships about what actions they took to maintain that area. 
Studies utilising radar and ship simulators were also reviewed (see section 2.1.3). In these 
it was shown that, despite both the wording of the COLREGs and the high level of 
training, the people in charge of the ships did not apply the rules in a consistent manner 
when compared with the other participants. The participants would take dissimilar actions 
when confronted with an identical collision situation. However, the researchers did not 
report on whether they pursued the reasons lying behind the participants’ actions. 
Similarly, with questionnaire surveys, although the actions taken to resolve a theoretical 
collision situation were noted, the researchers did not ask questions regarding the reasons 
lying behind the participants’ actions.
From this review, the researchers did, in part, explore the first of my two research 
questions, but they failed to investigate the second. The causes lying behind the 
phenomena were simply not reported. The main underlying cause of this was that the 
researchers either, could not, or did not, ask the respondents why they were taking the 
actions that they did. The human element of collision avoidance was not fully 
investigated. Such an omission does show the need for this study. However, these studies 
have shed light upon the actions of seafarers during general navigation and collision 
avoidance. The studies have further explored the variable interpretations of the 
COLREGs as illustrated by the actions of those navigating real or simulated ships. From 
this review, the skills required by the people applying the COLREGs are evident. The 
individuals need to analyse a considerable quantity of information and then take such 
action as will resolve the collision risk.
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In order to adequately explore the issues relating to why people apply the COLREGs in 
the manner that they do, an understanding and review of the wider literature on risk 
management was required. This was due to the fact that this is the environment that the 
people in charge of the ships were operating in and that the COLREGs can be seen to be 
a risk management tool.
From a review of risk management literature it could be seen that risk management can 
be characterised as the setting of an acceptable threshold for a certain risk, an attempt to 
quantify that risk, followed by putting into place control measures in order to minimise 
the risk (see section 2.2). It should be noted that this approach to risk management aims 
to reduce and control risk rather than an attempt to eliminate the risk (Baldwin et al.
1999). The control measures used to minimise the risk are, in part, composed of rules and 
regulations. The other aspects involve the engineering out of risk and putting in place 
physical barriers to minimise any hazard. In relation to maritime collision avoidance, it is 
the application of rules which is of primary importance to this research. Therefore, the 
review of literature focused upon the issues surrounding non-compliance with rules. In 
summary, it was shown that there are a wide variety of reasons lying behind rule non- 
compliance (see section 2.2.1).
However, it was noted that the factors were not found in isolation from each other. Rule 
non-compliance has been found to be very complicated involving a whole range of inter­
related factors. It is this inter-relation of factors which makes the study of this phenomena 
so fascinating. Trust and surveillance were of particular interest within this study. The 
former, because of the way in which the issue of trust is of paramount importance to the 
application of the COLREGs, where one ship is reliant upon the other to resolve a 
collision situation, and the latter, because of the radar surveillance regime that ships 
navigating in this area are under. Due to this I critically analysed previous studies 
undertaken in these area. However, this did not mean that the other issues were ignored.
Trust was seen to be one of the preconditions for any form of social interaction and one 
in which a state of vulnerability was accepted based upon a belief in positive expectations
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(see section 2.3). Within the COLREGs one ship is required to trust the other to resolve a 
collision situation and so the ship places itself in a vulnerable position in order to gain the 
resolution of the collision situation, without having to take any action. However, it 
became clear that before a person would place themselves in a vulnerable position certain 
other factors were required to be in place. The balancing of such factors was termed by 
Poortinga and Pidgeon (2003) as being critical trust in which a concept of general 
trustworthiness was offset by scepticism. It will be shown in chapter 7 that the 
participants in this study also use a variety of factors to create a level of trust, or rather 
mistrust, in the other ship during the resolution of a collision situation.
The literature relating to surveillance, with special reference to the writings of Michel 
Foucault, was critically analysed with respect to the deterrent effects of surveillance 
systems upon potential rule breakers. The reason for this was that all the traffic passing 
through the Dover Strait is subject to a surveillance scheme. The scheme is operated by 
the Maritime and Coastguard Agency which has comprehensive disciplinary powers over 
those who break the COLREGs. In fact, this surveillance scheme was utilised in this 
study to explore the actions of ships navigating through the Channel (see Chapter 5). 
Further, the MCA expect that the surveillance regime would ensure compliance with the 
COLREGs. From a review of the sanctions undertaken by the MCA for rule 
transgressions it was shown that aggravating circumstances had to be present for the 
successful prosecution of those who broke the COLREGs. Therefore, the influence upon 
the actions of the people in charge of the ships will be further explored within Chapters 6 
and 7.
Collision avoidance can be seen to be a complicated process involving the skilful 
interpretation of safety rules undertaken in an environment of risk, where trust is required 
in the other ship and where the authorities are able to monitor a ship’s every movement. 
Therefore, all of this literature was of interest due to its relevance to a workplace that has 
a deep seated culture of risk aversion. This risk aversion is due to the consequences of a 
collision which should not be underestimated, as one could result in serious loss of life 
among the thousands of ferry passengers and crew onboard each of the ships in this 
study.
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3.0 Introduction
In this chapter I will discuss the methods that I used to investigate the issues that the 
research questions highlighted. I will explore the strengths and weaknesses associated 
with each of the methods and the strategies that I used to best employ those methods. 
The two main methods that I will describe are: a radar survey of traffic transiting the 
Dover Strait, and an ethnography of the work involved in avoiding collisions onboard 
ferries crossing the Dover Strait. Data was recorded during the ethnographic phase with 
the use of a hand held video camera. This enabled real time collision avoidance practices 
to be recorded at the same time as the justifications given by the participants for their 
actions.
Analysis of the radar data was undertaken using the novel analytical tool of the near miss 
encounter (NME). Whereas, analysis of the ethnographic data utilised the process of 
analytic induction within the paradigm of grounded theory (Glaser and Strauss 1967, 
Frankland and Bloor 1999).
Throughout this chapter I have adopted a reflexive approach. The main reason for this is 
the acceptance that research is never conducted within a vacuum and that the researcher 
will always have some effect upon the interactions with the participants (Punch 1993). In 
my own case I believe that my effects upon the research process should not be 
underestimated. This is because I am an ex-practitioner. I was a seafarer for 10 years 
and hold a Master Mariner’s certificate of competency. To this end I have considered the 
ethical dimensions of this research as this is an under represented area within the social 
science methodological literature. Further, I felt that I owed the participants a special 
responsibility due to the trust that they had placed upon me, in part, by being an ex­
practitioner.
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3.1 Research Questions
The purpose of any form of inquiry is to ask and attain answers to particular questions 
(Giddens 2001, Eisenhardt 2002). This research is no different, for the purpose of this 
research was to explore the following two simple questions:
• How are the COLREGs being applied?
• Why are the COLREGs being applied in the way that they are?
The first question was used to explore the current everyday application of the COLREGs. 
In this I wished to explore the reality of collision avoidance practice and to undertake this 
a large quantity of data was required. Therefore, to answer this question the first phase of 
the research was concerned with the undertaking of a comprehensive survey of current 
collision avoidance practices and navigation. Through this process a dataset containing 
all of the details relating to how ships physically avoid colliding with each other will be 
built up.
The second question explores the nature of the application of the COLREGs. In this 
second phase of the research I expected to be influenced by what was found in the first 
phase of the research. The first phase survey raised issues which could not be answered 
by a survey alone as it was only able to show the results of the decisions of the people in 
charge of the ships, rather than their reasoning which led up to those decisions. 
Therefore, the most effective method for exploring this question was through an 
ethnographic investigation of the nature of the work of the people in charge of the ships. 
As was stated in the literature review (see section 2.1) an ethnographic investigation of 
the process of collision avoidance had not been undertaken before. Through this 
ethnographic phase I would be able to explore in-depth and in real-time, the decision 
making process lying behind the application of the COLREGs and the process of 
collision avoidance. I would be able to ask such questions, “why are you ignoring that 
ship?” or “why are you altering course at this moment?” Through such a process a 
deeper insight should be gained of the process of COLREG application and collision 
avoidance.
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No one method can be used to answer all of the possible permutations of the research 
questions (Ackroyd and Hughes, 1981, Shipman, 1997) and so extend the possibilities of 
knowledge production (Flick, 1998) a mixture of methods was utilised. This is not to say 
that the mixture of methods was used as a means of triangulation (Denzin, 1970) but 
more as a means of exploring different areas through the use of different methods.
3.2 Access and Field Relations
The issue of access is one of vital importance within the research process for without 
access to the site the research cannot be undertaken (Johnson 1975). Hammersley and 
Atkinson (1995) describe how the process of gaining access can prove to be troublesome. 
In order to assist this process I gained letters of endorsement from the MCA; the Marine 
Accident Investigation Branch (MAIB), the UK’s maritime accident and investigation 
body; the Nautical Institute, a professional body which represents the interests of 
navigators; and the National Union of Marine and Aviation Sea Transport officers 
(NUMAST) the UK’s merchant navy officers union. These letters all stated that this was 
a valuable piece of research which had the potential to improve safety at sea. Following 
this access to the various companies ships was never a problem.
However, once onboard it became clear that access was not something that was simply 
switched on when the company said it was OK. Gaining access was simply the very first 
stage in the research process and the next was ensuring good relations with the research 
participants. Johnson (1975) claimed that the maintenance of good relations occurred 
through the gaining of trust of, and acceptance by, the members of the shipboard 
community.
The strategies that I used revolved around adopting a non-threatening and friendly 
demeanour as well as making it clear that I was an ex-seafarer. Beynon (1983) stated that 
he often used his own biography in order to facilitate his entry and acceptance within in 
the field:
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More significant by far, however, was my own background in teaching and 
experience in secondary schools, which I unashamedly employed to show staff 
that I was no stranger to teaching, to classrooms, and to school life in general.
(Beynon 1983: 41)
My own background was of great help in demonstrating a level of technical proficiency 
as well as being seen as one of them. Wichroski (1997) found that her Catholic 
background was immensely useful in providing easier access to the cloistered 
communities that she studied. The Captain’s were unfailingly helpful throughout the 
process. Another element that made the process of access easy was that the respondents 
were flattered that I wanted to talk to them. Several people remarked about how nice it 
was for someone to take an interest in their work and this appears to be a common issue 
within social research (Davies 1999, Finch 1993, Letherby 2000). Onboard the Wye Max 
stated that he was surprised but glad that I had come onboard (Fieldnote, Wye 4/4/02). 
Captain Damon on the Usk said that it was about time this sort of thing (collision 
avoidance) was looked at and he was pleased that people were taking interest (Fieldnote, 
Usk 2/5/02).
Throughout the research it was clear that access was something that could be withdrawn 
at any time. Hey (2002), for example, encountered problems with a head teacher part 
way through her research within a school, as he believed that the research was too 
disruptive and so should be stopped. Therefore, I adopted various means to try to ensure 
that good field relationships continued. Hunt (1984) and Punch (1993) both adopted the 
same unsociable working hours as the police officers that they researched. I adopted a 
similar strategy by being on the bridge for most of the sailings and so demonstrated my 
willingness to work unconventional hours. I also maintained my friendly demeanour and 
listened to the accounts of the people onboard. However, the major factor in maintaining 
good relations, as Johnson (1975), Beynon (1983), Armstrong and Harris (1991) and 
Wichroski (1997) found, was a shared biography with those I was studying.
56
Chapter 3. Methodology
3.3 Selection of a method to study vessel movements
In order to gain a comprehensive overview of the process of collision avoidance a large 
quantity of quantitative data was required. Through an analysis of this, pertinent issues 
would be highlighted which would then be used to inform the second phase of the 
research. From a review of the two main journals which deal with navigational issues 
(namely Seaways, the journal of the Nautical Institute and Navigation, the journal of the 
Royal Institute of Navigation) it became clear that radar observations had proved to be a 
key resource in the study of maritime traffic movements (see Chapter 2, section 2.1).
Large quantities of vessel movements occur at choke points around the world and this 
also increases the risk of collision (Lewison 1980, Cockcroft 1983, R0mer et al. 1995, 
Cockcroft 1998). Such choke points include: the Turkish Strait; the Strait of Gibraltar; 
the Sound; the Strait of Malacca, the Gulf of Suez; and the Dover Strait. Of all of those 
options the Dover Strait was seen as the most advantageous site in which to set the study. 
There were two main reasons for this: the first being that it is the busiest of all the choke 
points with over 400 hundred ships passing through the area every day; and secondly, 
there is a very well established radar observation centre located at the Dover Coastguard 
station and operated within the CNIS. Furthermore, Dover is the busiest ferry port in the 
world with 16 million passengers and 49,000 ferry sailings in 2002 (ShipPax 2003). This 
meant that there would be the possibility of gaining access to ships of various companies 
and so provide the opportunity to conduct ethnographic research in the second phase of 
the research whilst being within the same geographical area as for the analysis of the 
radar records. In addition, the Dover Strait is geographically close to Cardiff and so 
taking into account financial constraints, it is close enough to allow for multiple visits.
The Channel Navigation Information Service was set up in 1972 with a mandate to 
provide an information service for vessels transiting the straits of Dover (HM Coastguard
2002). The strait is monitored from both the French and British sides of the Channel. The 
operators at the station observe vessels passing through the UK sector of the strait on 
their radar screens, take details of the ships and give out information broadcasts relating
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to navigational dangers. The CNIS only has responsibility for the vessels that pass 
through the SW bound lane and the deep-water route in the NE lane, as these lie within 
UK territorial waters. The radar data archive covered all ship movements within the 
surveillance area for the last 5 years. The system did not allow for electronic transfer of 
the data due to it being a bespoke system. However, a printing facility did allow for all of 
the ship movements to be printed onto A3 sheets and so allowed for in-depth analysis off 
site.
Previous collision avoidance research looked at short time periods of single hours or 
multiple hours over several days mainly due to the constraints of the technology in its 
ability to handle the quantity of data generated (Goodwin 1975a, Lewison 1978, Lewison 
1980, Barratt 1980, Goodwin et al. 1983, Wennink 1992, Judson 1992, Jingson et al. 
1993). However, I believed that it would be better to concentrate on a longer continuous 
time period as this would provide richer data. Therefore, I chose to select one 24 hour 
period and analyse all the shipping movements within the Dover Strait area during that 
time. There are a multitude of factors that have an effect upon the navigation of a ship. 
These factors may be summarised, although not exhaustively, as follows:
• Visibility,
• Weather,
• Daylight,
• State of the tide and current,
• Type of vessel,
• Training and number of personnel in charge of the ship,
• Experience, health and alertness of the personnel in charge of the vessel,
• Technological equipment on the vessel,
• Speed of the vessel.
The first four factors were within my control to influence, in the sense that I could select 
a day where they had the smallest effect. The remaining factors were the ones that I was 
most interested in and formed the basis of further exploration during the ethnographic 
stages of the research.
With the use of a nautical almanac (HM Nautical Almanac Office 200X) a day was 
selected which was half way between an equinox and a neap tide. For the day in question
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there were 12hours and 3minutes of daylight with sunrise at 0602 and sunset at 1805. 
Meteorological data was also obtained from the UK’s meteorological Office in Bracknell 
in order to find out whether the weather on that day would be acceptable. On the day 
wind speed never went above Beaufort scale 5, fresh breeze, and the visibility was very 
good, with a slight reduction in the early hours. For these reasons the day was acceptable 
for the purposes of data collection.
3.3.1 D ata collection and  analysis
After reviewing the traffic flows on the radar screen the research became focused on one 
area of the south-west bound traffic lane, between the MPC buoy and the Varne bank 
(See figure 3.1) (please also note figure 1.1 for the overview).
y
Limits of the Area of Study; 
The South-west bound 
traffic lane of the Dover 
Strait
Port of Dover
MPC Buoy
Varne Bank Port of Calais
Port of Dunkirk
Figure 3.1, area of study.
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The main reasons for this were:
• This is the closest area to the radar site and so the radar returns are of very high 
quality and reliable, thus, allowing close analysis of the vessel tracks.
• This area covers both the main cross-channel route as well as a natural choke 
point for vessels in-transit through the area.
• The south-west lane is within the UK’s territorial waters and all vessels must call 
Dover Coastguard, rather than the French coastguard, to pass on their information. 
This means that the vessel information is of a primary source.
• The courses of vessels in-transit through this section should remain constant, as 
there are no navigational features to pass around, and so any alterations of course 
would be due only to collision avoidance.
• This was the area which represented the greatest numbers of crossing and 
overtaking situations due to the concentrating effect of the Varne and the 
proximity of the ferry traffic from Dover.
Once the area of analysis was decided upon the paper record of all the traffic in the area 
was then printed for the day. Due to the number of vessels in the area it was decided that 
the day would be split into 24 one hour periods with overlap between them.
These plots were then photocopied, the area of study cut out and the image then scanned 
into the computer. Figure 3.2 shows a scanned plot for the area of analysis.
Lat. 51 ION Lat. 51 ION
Lo. 00120E Lo. 00140E
Dover
Traffic 
Separation 
SchemeVessel
Lat. 51 01N . Navigational Lat. 51 01N
Lo. 00120E mark Lo. 00140E
Figure 3.2. Scanned Image. 60
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The solid horizontal and vertical lines represent lines of latitude and longitude 
respectfully. The hashed lines delineate the traffic separation scheme and the 
navigational marks are shown by the three letter acronym, for example the Varne Bank 
light vessel is marked by “VAR”. The port of Dover is drawn on the top left of the 
diagram and a representation of the breakwater and detached mole can be seen. Vessel 
tracks are shown as solid lines with short perpendicular time marks attached to them. 
These time marks are printed at six minute intervals, six minutes being a tenth of a 
minute.
Once the image was scanned into the computer the image was cleaned with the objective 
of reaching a point where each track was isolated from every other one. To start the 
cleaning the image manipulation software, Corel Photo-paint 8 was used. Firstly, all of 
the individual bits of dirt, that are picked up in the photocopying and scanning stages, 
from the image and all the lines of latitude and longitude were removed. The next step 
was to isolate each individual track and so the cleaned general image was returned to the 
image manipulation software. Great care was taken at this stage to ensure that the correct 
track was isolated when several individual tracks crossed each other.
Through this process the individual vessel track was isolated, see Figure 3.3, Individual 
vessel track.
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708 SS 
1350
1432SCO
o
/ /
VAR
Figure 3.3, Individual vessel track.
Once a track was isolated a unique identification reference number was attached along 
with a time reference. In figure 3.3 the reference number “708 SS 1350” means that: it 
was the 708th target that the CNIS computer tracked; the first “S” refers to the vessel’s 
southerly route; the second “S” means that the vessel has some form of specified 
dangerous goods onboard; and the “ 1350” refers to my track folder designation. This 
process continued over a period of two months until all the tracks were isolated.
Once all the individual tracks were isolated they were photocopied onto clear acetate 
sheets. Each track was then overlain on each other and the interaction noted, see figure 
3.4.
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1331/ /
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✓ /-
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1341
Figure 3.4, Ship to ship interaction.
Through this process 1946 ship to ship interactions were classified by their encounter 
direction (crossing, parallel passing or overtaking) and how close they passed to each 
other. Figure 3.4 shows how two tracks intersected with each other. The collision 
regulations were then applied to this and the situation was analysed in the light of Rule 
15, Crossing situation. In this situation it was found that the vessels passed lnm from 
each other at 1408 and no avoiding action was taken.
Through this method reliable data on the movement of ships within the Dover Strait was 
generated. These tracks related directly to the decisions taken by the person in charge of 
the vessel and so could be used to analyse collision avoidance manoeuvres within this 
area. They could also be used to generate descriptive statistics with regard to passing 
distances and encounter directions for all the vessels within the study area.
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3.4 Selection of a method to study shipboard collision avoidance
The second phase of the research concentrated on the study of the process of collision 
avoidance and the application of the collision avoidance rules in practice. A description 
of the review of methods used previously to explore this area is given in Chapter 2, 
section 2.1.
3.4.1 Ethnographic studies
Ethnography, although having its origins located within anthropology (Geertz 1975), has 
a long tradition of use within social science qualitative research methods. Ethnographic 
investigation is typified by such classic studies as Street Corner Society (Whyte 1993) 
and Boys in White (Becker et al. 1961) in which the researchers spent an extended period 
of time immersed in the lives of those they were studying. This immersion involved 
direct observation and participation in the work and social life of the participants within 
the study (Agar 1996). As Davies (1999: 62) states:
Participant observation is usually taken as the archetypal form of research 
employed by ethnographers.
However, I will use a wider definition of ethnographic research in that it should not just 
be conceived of as simply data gathered through observation, but a means that 
encompasses many methods of qualitative research (Marcus 1998). As Hammersley and 
Atkinson explain (1995):
In its most characteristic form it involves the ethnographer participating, overtly 
or covertly, in people’s daily lives for an extended period of time, watching what 
happens, listening to what is said, asking questions- in fact, collecting whatever 
data are available to throw light on the issues that are the focus of the research. 
(Hammersley and Atkinson 1995: 1)
From this, ethnography can be seen as a research approach which goes beyond simple 
observation so as to gain a full insight into the lives of those being researched. The end 
point of the research is to understand the lives and culture of those being research to the 
same extent as an insider (Collins 1998, Pinch et a l 1996, Davies 1999). Barker (1984)
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in her study of a religious cult has stated that the level of understanding that is required is 
such that the researcher:
[Attempts to recognise the assumptions or ‘filters’ through which their [the 
participant’s] world is seen so that, the actions and perceptions of the people he 
[sic] is studying make sense.
(Barker 1984: 20)
One area in which ethnography has produced some of the best data is within the realm of 
work place studies as Smith (2001) states:
The vantage position of ethnographic researchers - the direct experiences, the 
sustained observation, or the immersion - has allowed a degree of penetration into 
the inner workings of an occupation or a work setting that is not easily attained by 
other approaches.
(Smith 2001: 223)
3.4.2 Workplace ethnographies
Ethnography has been used very successfully in the past to investigate the world of work. 
Researchers have beep involved in almost every aspect of work from farm labourers 
(Thomas 1985) to phone sex workers (Flowers 1998) and have been able to gain the point 
of view, and understand the reality of, the workers they have been studying (Harper
1998). Ball (1967) in a study of the then illegal practice of abortion believed that it was 
the most appropriate means of studying that work-place as:
It is only with such procedures that the natural context of deviance can be studied 
without the skewedness typical of the usual sources of data.
(Ball 1967: 279)
Hutter (1997), in her two year study of the various regulatory government inspectorates, 
utilised a mixture of overt observation and interviewing. Through this she was able to ask 
questions of the inspectors when she was unsure of what was going on or to seek an 
explanation of the reasons behind their actions. In this research Hutter spent 18 months 
shadowing inspectors and surveyors from the Factory, The Industrial Air and the Railway 
Inspectorates, as they went about their daily business of checking various work places to
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ensure compliance with industrial legislation. As she states, when recounting the 
research experience, observation was coupled with discussions of the inspector’s work:
The first weeks of the fieldwork were spent with the Inspecting Officer 
responsible for the enforcement of health and safety legislation and accident 
investigation. During this period I was able to discuss the nature of his work, 
observe him at work, including accompanying him on meetings.
(Hutter 1997:252)
In this type of enquiry where a researcher is trying to ascertain reasons behind the 
application of legislation and rules, it is imperative that discussions and interviews are 
held with the participants for reasons of investigation and clarification. Hammersley and 
Atkinson (1995) state that:
It should be noted that there are distinct advantages in combining participant 
observation with interviews.
(Hammersley and Atkinson 1995: 131)
The main reason behind this statement is, as Hammersley and Atkinson (1995:132) go on 
to state:
What people say in interviews can lead us to see things differently in observation. 
(Hammersley and Atkinson 1995:132)
Hutter followed up her research on the Railway Inspectorate with a later study on the 
health and safety of the British Railway (Hutter 2001a) in which she made extensive use 
of semi-structured interviews in conjunction with participant observation of safety 
officials.
In this research the research participants were interviewed in various situations and 
locations, both alone and with others present, all in order to seek as much information 
and clarity about their actions and beliefs as possible. Only during the interviews with 
personnel within the bounded space of their cabin, or private meeting room, was an 
interview schedule used. Later in the research the private interviews were dispensed with. 
The reason for this was that the time when people were available for interview coincided 
with the time when other people were navigating the ship. Therefore, the interviews that 
were undertaken within a private space, severely interrupted my ability to observe the
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practice of collision avoidance. Instead, I worked the same questions and themes into the 
conversations and discussions that I had on the bridge. Through this method I was able to 
gain information relating to the same questions located within the context of the reality of 
the unfolding events on the bridge.
In addition to asking questions of the participants within this study, I also observed them 
in their work and social time. I participated in the bridge operations, ate my breakfast 
with them, watched the news and entered into discussions in areas such as politics and 
maritime safety and on one ship I even assisted in the training of cadets in basic 
navigational techniques. In all, I tried to participate in the daily lives of the personnel on 
the ship in order to understand their experiences and to see the work from their point of 
view. Punch in his study of an Amsterdam police unit stated that his desire to use 
participant observation was:
...to penetrate the social world of the policemen [sic]... inside the station, away 
from the public, relaxing in the canteen, taking time off when on duty, socialising 
with them outside of duty and out of uniform.
(Punch 1993: 185)
In Punch’s study he spent 6 months split into several periods, working and walking 
alongside police officers in central Amsterdam. He states that in addition to directly 
observing the police in their work he also became more and more involved with them as:
I chased people, searched people, searched cars, searched houses, held people, 
and even shouted at people who abused my “colleagues”.
(Punch 1993: 191).
By doing this he felt that he better understood the work of, as well as the role of, the 
police within that society. Similarly, Bittner (1967) in his study of police discretion in 
emergency apprehension of people who appear to exhibit psychological problems, spent 
10 months as a participant observer of police officers going about their everyday 
business. Bittner later recounted (1980) how he wanted to understand and analyse the 
workings of the force and to do this decided that the best way was to observe the lowest 
level of police officer in their everyday working life. Therefore, through this ethnography
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of those actually undertaking the work of navigation and collision avoidance I was able to 
generate reliable data on how rules are operationalised.
3.4.3 Data recording
During the fieldwork, data was recorded both electronically (digital tape recorder and 
hand held video camera) and by hand (field notes). The fieldnotes were created both 
within sight of personnel on the bridge as well as in the private surrounds of my cabin. 
Hammersley and Atkinson (1995: 175) describe fieldnotes as:
The traditional means in ethnography for recording observational data. In 
accordance with the ethnographer’s commitment to discovery, fieldnotes consist 
of relatively concrete descriptions of social processes and their contexts.
(Hammersley and Atkinson 1995: 175)
The writing of fieldnotes, I discovered, was not without issues. I found that my recording 
of observations within sight of the bridge personnel disturbed them to a certain extent. 
As I was writing I could see that the person in charge of the ship would become very self- 
conscious and double check something on the radar or the course that they had just 
changed, all in an attempt to discover what I was writing about. In fact I could see that 
the personnel were very curious as to what I was writing and on one occasion as the 
fieldnote extract below shows I could almost feel the Captain’s breath on the back of my 
neck as he peered over my shoulder:
As I was writing some notes I became aware of the Captain (Damon) standing 
behind me trying to read what I was writing. When I turned around he said “Oh 
so you make a little diagram of the traffic then do you, that’s good”. I ’m sure he 
was trying to read my notes, just out of curiosity. Just glad that my handwriting is 
so bad.
(Fieldnote, Usk 3/5/02)
However, I found it interesting that no one ever asked me what I was writing about, even 
though almost every other subject of conversation came up.
The second means of recording the work of collision avoidance was through the use of a 
hand held digital video camera. The use of video and photography is a widespread
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technique within anthropology (Collier and Collier, 1986) and visual sociology 
(Emmison and Smith 2000, Banks 2001). In this research, the camera was aimed at the 
radar screen in order to record the traffic situation as seen by the person in charge of the 
ship. The radar screen was the means by which that person interacted with the world and 
so by recording that screen their comments could be placed within the context of how 
they, literally, viewed the world. In addition to the visual image, a simultaneous audio 
recording was made. As the fieldwork progressed it became clear that the visual 
recording of the radar screen was an essential element in placing the words of the 
participants within the context of the collision avoidance. Without recording the screen, 
making sense of what was said would have been incredibly difficult without copious 
diagrams, the drawing of which would have seriously impeded my ability to observe the 
scene.
3.4.4 Data analysis
The data was handled through the master document function of MS Word. Qualitative 
data analytical software such as NUD*ST and QADAS was tried. Such software 
packages have a history of being used (Lee and Fielding, 1991, Richards and Richards, 
1991), have proved very effective as a means of data handling in the past (Kelle, 1995, 
Weitzman and Miles, 1995, Fielding and Lee, 1998) and this theme will obviously 
become more widespread in the future (Popping, 2000, Weitzman, 2000). However, the 
master document method was perfectly adequate for this process. Through the use of the 
master document I was able to create networks of themes, search for text and create 
linkages with the different parts of the data.
I transcribed all of the interviews held on audio or video tapes. I immersed myself in this 
data, a process which was aided by the action of transcription. In fact I viewed the 
transcription process as one of the first stages of the analytical process and fundamental 
to my understanding of the data. This was important as I believed that any theoretical 
findings of the research should be firmly grounded within the data (Glaser and Strauss 
1967).
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Grounded theory as espoused by Glaser and Strauss (1967) has at its heart the idea of 
emergent analysis. In this theoretical understandings of the researched subject are 
produced from the gradual examination of the data (Charmaz 2000). Ryan and Bernard 
(2000) states that:
Grounded theory is an iterative process by which the analyst becomes more and 
more “grounded” in the data and develops increasingly richer concepts and 
models of how the phenomenon being studied really works.
(Ryan and Bernard 2000: 783)
Lofland (1995) has termed this process analytic ethnography which has two basic 
process: the coding of data as it is accumulated; and writing notes about those codes. 
Frankland and Bloor (1999) describe the process of analytic induction whereby the 
researcher cyclically immerses themselves into the data in order to generate the recurrent 
themes and analytical categories which would be used to further examine the data. I 
undertook this process to generate the codes by which I would examine the data through 
a careful line by line reading of the text. Furthermore, by grounding the codes within the 
data I will have been able to shake off the biases or ‘value inertias’ (Sadler 2002: 124) of 
my own biography.
Eisenhardt (2002) states that coding themes should also include broader themes which 
derived from existing literature. Fielding (1993b) describes how these codes could be 
generated from either theory, coding down or from the data itself, coding up. I adopted a 
mixture of both coding up and down to generate the analytical coding framework. 
Therefore, a coding frame was initially constructed using broad theoretical themes such 
as risk and surveillance generated from the literature. Then, through an initial analysis of 
the data, themes revolving around the concept of trust and professional ability emerged 
from the data. The coding frame was then refined to incorporate these emergent themes. 
Through this process I was able to interrogate the data from the existing theoretical 
positions whilst at the same time allow any findings to be generated from the common 
themes found within the data. Through this process the ethnographic data could be 
effectively analysed.
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3.5 Ethical considerations
In common with all other pieces of research, ethical concerns came to the fore from a 
very early stage. During the initial drafting of the research proposal the need to prevent 
harm to the people that I would be talking to and observing whilst they went about their 
daily working lives was of paramount importance. Indeed the idea that your research 
should not harm the participants that have willingly given their time and attention to you 
is one of the central tenets of the social sciences. In this section a discussion of the ethical 
concerns that were faced and the strategies that were employed will be undertaken. I will 
also discuss elements of risk experienced by myself in a reflective manner and how that 
affected my relationship with the research participants. Furthermore, I will also describe 
how the ethical dimensions of the research developed as it became apparent that my 
interactions with the research participants were influenced by my position as an ex­
practitioner. This meant that I was accepted and trusted from the outset. For example, 
shortly after boarding the Tawe I was included in a meeting in which the professional 
abilities and career paths of several shipboard staff members were openly discussed 
(Fieldnote Tawe 29/5/02). To this end I have considered the ethical dimensions of this 
research at some length as I felt that I owed the participants a special responsibility due to 
the trust that they had placed upon me in part by being an ex-practitioner.
3.5.1 Preventing harm
Ethical considerations cover a very wide spectrum of concerns throughout the research 
process, from ensuring that the research participants freely give their consent, to how the 
research is disseminated. However, the one overriding concern that governs and guides 
all other considerations is that of not causing any harm to those being researched. The 
British Sociological Association (BSA) (2003) in point 13 of their Statement of Ethical 
Practice makes it quite clear that it is the researcher’s responsibility to ensure that no 
harm is caused to their participants when they state that:
Sociologists have a responsibility to ensure that the physical, social and 
psychological well-being of research participants is not adversely affected by the 
research. (BSA 2003:13)
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The preservation of the anonymity of the participants is probably the single most 
effective means of preventing harm to those involved (McNeill 1992, Punch 1998). The 
main reason for this is fairly self-evident in that authorities or employers will be unable to 
attribute anything that is said that they either do not like or is illegal to the actual person 
involved. This has two beneficial effects as not only does it protect the individual from 
harm through unwelcome attention, but also allows them the freedom to say what they 
truly mean, free from the fear of identification (Coffield et al. 1986). The BSA takes the 
issue of anonymity very highly as not only do they make a general assertion, in point 34 
of their Statement of Ethical Practice, for the need for anonymity (BSA 2003), but also 
provide guidance on how to achieve it, in point 36:
Where appropriate and practicable, methods for preserving anonymity should be 
used including the removal of identifiers, the use of pseudonyms and other 
technical means for breaking the link between data and identifiable individuals.
(BSA 2003: 36)
The importance of anonymising the data was shown by the way the wider industry, 
accident investigators and regulators view the non-compliance with the collision 
regulations as both illegal and reprehensible. These views were exemplified by the 
prosecutions of the personnel involved in the collisions between: the Ash and the Dutch 
Aquamarine', and the Diamant and the Northern Merchant (Maritime and Coastguard 
Agency 2003). Another example was the reporting of the Nautical Institute's study of the 
application of the collision regulations (Syms 2003), which argued that many seafarers 
apply the rules incorrectly, has been widespread and particularly damning (Irving 2003, 
Grey 2003). To this end great care was taken to ensure that as many identifiers as 
possible were removed from the data. Times and dates were altered, as were names of 
ships, people and companies. A further aspect of the participants’ names was that of 
gender identification. Female participation within the maritime industry is much less 
than male. The Institute of Employment Research (Institute of Employment Research
2000) estimated that women seafarers made up a total of 8.3% of the total seafaring 
labour on the UK flag. However, their representation within the navigation department is 
much smaller. NUMAST state that 1.3% of their membership consists of women 
(Belcher et al. 2003). Within this study, the female participation rate was less than 1%.
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Therefore, the decision was taken to use all male names as the women involved would 
have been instantly identifiable even with the use of all of the other anonymising 
strategies. However it should be noted that this is in no way any attempt to marginalise 
the contribution that that the women onboard the ships made to the safe operation and 
navigation of the vessels.
3.5.2 Informed consent onboard ship
The BSA takes the issue of informed consent very highly as, not only do they make a 
general assertion, in point 16 of their Statement of Ethical Practice, for the need for 
informed consent (BSA 2003) but also provide guidance on how to achieve it:
As far as possible participation in sociological research should be based on the 
freely given informed consent of those studied. This implies a responsibility on 
the sociologist to explain in appropriate detail, and in terms meaningful to 
participants, what the research is about, who is undertaking and financing it, why 
it is being undertaken, and how it is to be disseminated and used.
(BSA 2003: 16)
Furthermore, in point 17 they make it very clear that the participant should be conscious 
that they can refuse to take part:
Research participants should be made aware of their right to refuse participation 
whenever and for whatever reason they wish.
(BSA 2003: 17)
In addition to the BSA’s points Davies (1999) contends that informed consent consists of 
two distinct elements:
First, informing participants of the nature and likely consequences of their 
participation in the research in a way that is comprehensible to them; and, second, 
obtaining consent that is based on their understanding of this explanation and free 
of any coercion or undue influence.
(Davies 1999: 47)
With these points in mind I sought to ensure that all of the participants had a clear idea of 
what the research was about, what I would be doing and what I would do with it later on.
I would give a short talk to all of the bridge team and this talk consisted of:
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‘Hello, my name is Phil Belcher. I am onboard to conduct some research into 
how you go about avoiding collision and applying the collision avoidance rules. I 
want to make it clear from the start that I do not work for the Maritime and 
Coastguard Agency (MCA) or Iberian Ferries. I work for the Seafarers 
International Research Centre (SIRC) which is part of Cardiff University. SIRC 
was set up in 1996 to study the health and safety of the merchant seafarer with 
monies donated by the seafarers trust of the International Transport Federated 
workers union (ITF). I will spend most of my time onboard on the bridge during 
the passage. If it is OK, I will be using a video camera pointed at the radar screen 
and asking the officer of the watch (OOW) to narrate what is going on. I will also 
ask questions about the traffic and the application of the rules. For your 
information this research has been endorsed by the MCA, NUMAST, MAIB and 
the Nautical Institute. The purpose of the research is simply to find out how you 
go about the process of avoiding collisions. It will be written up as a PhD which 
should be completed in 2005. I take the issue of confidentiality very highly and 
so I will try to assure anonymity for all those who take part. Now you can never 
be 100% that people will not be identified but I will do my best to prevent that by 
changing your names, the company’s name, the ship’s name and the dates. All of 
this is undertaken to prevent anything you say getting back to you and also so that 
you can feel free to say anything that you want to. I also want to make it clear that 
you do not have to take part. If you do not want to take part then that is fine and I 
will not bother you. Thank you’.
Field note, Toff, 16/5/2002.
After I had made this talk everyone would nod or mutter something to the effect that they 
would be willing to take part. I had no refusals and everyone seemed very willing to take 
part. However, there was one incident on the Dee which indicated how someone may 
state that they are willing to take part but are so uncomfortable, due to an awareness of 
my presence, that they are in effect withdrawing their consent. In this incident the Master 
and the officer of the watch (OOW) had a disagreement with regard to the course 
selection on leaving Dover harbour. There was such a breakdown in the relationship 
between the two that the Master simply took over from the OOW. When the Master left 
the bridge the bridge team discussed the incident and below is an extract from my 
fieldnotes made immediately after the incident:
‘When the Master left the bridge Colin said that ‘it’s only in one in a thousand 
crossings that the master has ever countermanded what I believed should happen’. 
But the more sort of ethical questions appears is that Isaac the Master gives the 
impression that he is very very aware of my presence and so is changing his 
behaviour because of my presence and also very aware of the camera and I don’t
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think that he is happy with that. I think that he believes that he is on show and is 
being checked. Also he seems to be altering his behaviour. Both Colin and 
Percy, another OOW, basically said the same thing. He regarded the Master’s 
behaviour as strange and a bit out of the ordinary. So that then raises the question 
about whether it is ethical to record the movements and actions of a person who 
does not want them to be recorded? So with that in mind I went to see him [Isaac] 
after leaving the bridge and reiterated that if I am ever in the way, or if he is ever 
uncomfortable with the camera or uncomfortable with me then just say and I can 
turn the camera off or I can leave, that kind of thing. This was because I 
explained that it all hinges on being voluntary action and giving informed 
consent. He stated that he was behaving normally and this was the way it is done 
and its not an issue. But we’ll see.”
Field note, Dee, 14/6/2002, 1535.
From this it can be seen that the issue of informed consent went beyond someone simply 
saying, “yeah, that’s fine, I ’ve got nothing to hide”. In this consent was effectively 
withdrawn by one of the participants and this illustrates how the concept of consent can 
change throughout the research process. I also believe that this illustrates how consent 
was given on the basis of my being an ex-practitioner, rather than as a researcher. This 
distinction only became clear to the respondents when I started collecting data.
This incident also highlights the issue of coercion (Davies 1999) in that I felt that Isaac’s 
consent in conducting the research was based more on his fear of upsetting Iberian 
Ferries than in any actual willingness to take part. I believe that my strategy of using 
letters of endorsement from the main regulatory and professional bodies, as well as 
obtaining consent from the companies, effectively bullied Isaac into complying with the 
research. For, although I stated that anyone was free to withdraw at any time, in the mind 
of Isaac this option was unavailable to him. It should be noted that I have not used the 
transcript from that incident in any section of this thesis.
3.5.3 Researcher risk and harm
An element that is quite often neglected within research is the negative aspects of risk 
and harm to the researcher of undertaking the research. Accounts of the risks and dangers 
that researchers face do not normally enter into the general sociological literature (Coffey
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1999). In fact there seems to be almost no tradition of evaluating the risks to be faced by 
researchers undertaking the work. As Lee-Treweek and Linkogle (2000:197) state:
...the issue of protecting researchers is often disregarded and has never been 
fashionable to think about or to discuss.
(Lee-Treweek and Linkogle 2000:197)
Neither Monaghan (2002) nor Calvey (2000) appeared to give much thought to the 
dangerous incidents they would undoubtedly face during their covert participant 
observations as door supervisors (bouncers) prior to the commencement of the fieldwork. 
Westmarland (2000: 26) even goes so far as to state that not only are threats to personal 
safety inevitable when studying policing but essential to the understanding as they 
positively informed the research.
Lankshear (2000: 80) in an ethnographic study of a research laboratory in a hospital did 
not consider the dangers that could be faced in this environment because:
Initially I assumed the hospital to be a place of cleanliness and safety, a research 
site free from threat.
(Lankshear 2000: 80)
In common with the cases cited above before undertaking the fieldwork, I did not 
consider to any great extent the physical dangers that I would face. This was almost 
certainly due to my own biography for I believed that I had the training and experience to 
cope with those risks (Bellaby and Lawrenson 2001, Hutter 2001a, Natalier 2001).
Going to sea for any individual is an undertaking which has many inherent risks. The 
Marine Insurance Act terms the act of going to sea as an ‘adventure’ (Hodges 1996). In 
2001 155 ships were lost in maritime accidents around the world (Lloyd’s Register- 
Fairplay 2002). In 2002 one vessel was lost in the Bristol Channel shortly after a former 
director of SIRC had completed 3 weeks of fieldwork onboard. However, it could be 
argued that the maritime sector that I would be studying had not suffered any major 
casualties since the loss of the Herald o f Free Enterprise, back in 1987 (Department of 
Transport 1987), and this was one of the attractions of studying this maritime sector, the 
very lack of casualties. However, there had been several incidents in which lives have
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been lost in recent times (Marine Accident Investigation Branch 2003a, Marine Accident 
Investigation Branch 2003b). Accidents have also occurred involving ships within this 
sector mostly involving their collision with parts of the port’s infrastructure (Spurrier 
2003, Porter 2003, Warner 2003) in fact one of the ships still bore the marks of its 
collision with a crane when I joined it and another hit Dover’s breakwaters shortly after I 
left it. Therefore, major risks involving loss or damage to the ship which resulted in loss 
of life should not have been so casually disregarded.
One risk that I did think about before joining the ship, and took steps to avoid, was that of 
the risk of a traffic accident on the car deck of the ship. The car deck is an area in which 
vehicles of all types and sizes1 are crammed in as tightly as possible. Therefore, there is 
an increased risk of accidents due to being run over or crushed between the vehicles. 
Because of this risk I avoided the car decks completely during the research. However, 
this approach led to issues relating to how I dealt with unwanted invitations to visit those 
places whilst still maintaining good relations with the invitors. In one incident, Donald 
the Master of the Tawe stated that the ship was fitted with enhanced stability protection 
and that I should go down to the car decks to see it as I would be interested as a 
professional mariner. The following day he asked me if I had been down to see it yet and 
when I said no, I saw an expression of disappointment cross his face and from that 
moment on he ignored me completely. A second incident occurred on the Exe when 
Spencer invited me down to the car deck to see how they packed the cars in. By this 
stage in the fieldwork I was more skilled in the rejection of those offers and explained 
that I caught up on my sleep when we were in port. This elicited a humorous comment 
about sleep patterns. These incidents illustrate how the process of maintaining good 
relationships with the participants is fraught with problems when any perceived snub can 
effect the relationship between the participant and the researcher (Sampson and Thomas 
2003).
However, even though I had expected and taken steps to avoid the risk from traffic 
onboard the ship, I had not taken the possibility of being run over in the port into account.
1 On one crossing on the Tawe the ship carried a number o f  circus animals including an Elephant in an 
oversized horse box.
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When joining the ships of Iberian Ferries I was either escorted directly to the ship in a car 
or by bus, run by the port. However, as Sirius Line do not take foot passengers, such 
arrangements were not available and I had to walk across the whole ferry terminal which, 
taking into account that 4.3 million vehicles passed through the port in 2002 (ShipPax
2003), could be described as busy.
The lack of consideration given to the physical risks that were faced was a failing within 
the research design. However, even if those risks had been discussed, it seems unlikely 
that any part of the research could have been changed. Although during any future visit 
to the port of Dover I will be wearing a high visibility jacket.
Of concern, and an area that I did take into consideration, was the risk of the damage to 
my emotional health caused through research into maritime casualties. Emotional and 
psychological harm can occur throughout the research process especially when 
researching an area close to your biography (Peterson 2000). These problems are 
exemplified by Lankshear (2000) who undertook a research project located within a 
maternity ward of a hospital. This was the same maternity ward that she gave birth in 
and the research topic touched upon an important part of her life as a parent:
It made me confront and remember things that I preferred to block from my mind.
My view of and feelings about my life and past were threatened.
(Lankshear 2000: 85).
This issue of emotional risks first came to mind when I was working on the data 
management of separate project, Transational Seafarer communities (ESRC ref: 
L214252036). During this project I was involved in coding thematically interview 
transcripts and I unwisely chose to start with the interviews undertaken onboard a ship 
that I had worked on two years previously. This brought to the fore all the reasons why I 
left the sea in the first place. A second issue was that of researching in the field of 
collision avoidance. On the 3rd of June 1993 the British Trent collided with the Western 
Winner with the subsequent loss of nine lives (Marine Accident Investigation Branch 
1993). I knew most of those nine and this fact has, probably, more than anything else 
driven my desire to conduct research in this field.
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3.5.4 Ex-practitioner research
This issue of ex-practitioner research was one that has been woven throughout this 
chapter. Punch (1993) claimed that a person’s background will always have an effect 
upon the participants in any research. In essence, social science research can never be 
undertaken in a laboratory setting. Therefore, I could not, and should not, have ignored 
my own biography. Through the analytical methods that I have outlined (quantitative 
analysis of radar data coupled with an analytic ethnography of the shipboard workplace) I 
was able to limit my own biases or ‘value inertias’ (Sadler 2002: 124). This was 
undertaken by an objective analysis of the radar data, coupled with the analytical process 
involved in the exploration of the ethnographic data. By limiting my own biases based 
upon being an ex-practitioner, I was able to explore the richness of the data produced by 
those methods. However, biases stemming from my own biography were not the only 
issues that being an ex-practitioner brought forward. The other issues have revolved 
around informed consent due to the trust given by being a member of the same “club”.
The access that I was provided with, in each of the venues in which I undertook data 
collection, indicated that my presence was both non-threatening and welcome. Each 
individual freely spoke to me and, in a number of cases, provided me with some very 
private information. In addition, I was included in meetings in which the career prospects 
(both positive and negative) of people onboard were openly discussed. None of this 
information would have been provided if the participants did not trust me to handle this 
knowledge in a sensitive manner. It appears that this trust was, in part, based upon my ex­
practitioner status. As was explored in chapter 2 section 2.4, trust is based upon a number 
of factors including: a concept of shared values or vested interest; a belief in the 
competence of the other; and a belief that the other cares about their welfare. These 
factors resonated with my ex-practitioner status. Therefore, it appeared that much of the 
richness of the data was provided because of being an ex-practitioner, rather than through 
the participants’ complete understanding of the research process. Therefore, I felt that I 
owed the participants a special responsibility to, not only to act in the most ethical 
manner possible, but to be seen to be doing so.
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Being an ex-practitioner both assisted, as well as detracted, from the research process. 
The beneficial aspects meant that I was immediately accepted, could understand the 
technical and slang terms in everyday use and was able to place the actions being 
undertaken within the regulatory regime of the COLREGs. Lofland and Lofland (1995) 
illustrated these points by comparing the biographies of a number of researchers with 
their research topics, before stating that:
[M]uch of the best work in sociology and other social sciences -within the 
fieldwork traditions- is probably grounded in the remote and/or current 
biographies of its creators2.
(Lofland and Lofland 1995: 12-15)
The negative aspects revolved around the need to ensure that my biases did not creep into 
the analysis of the data, that I did not become too emotionally involved in the subject; 
and that the trust placed in my hands by others was not betrayed.
3.6 Summary
The methodology that is used in any piece of research should at all times be fit for the 
purpose of exploring the issues brought to light by the research questions. The research 
questions revolved around the application of regulations designed to control collision 
risks. The first question being one where I wished to explore how the COLREGs were 
being applied in practice and the second, being an examination of why they were being 
applied in that manner. These questions suggested a mixture of qualitative and 
quantitative methods. By taking a mixed method approach disadvantages of each method 
could be minimised and a more comprehensive analysis of the process of collision 
avoidance could be undertaken.
From a review of the literature on the previous methods used to explore the area of 
maritime collision avoidance (see chapter 2 section 2.1), quantitative radar surveys have
2 Of course, it should be noted that being an ex-practitioner is not a pre-requisite for producing high quality 
research as much work has been undertaken by non-ex-practitioners.
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been used to gain data on ship movements. As outlined, I wished to gain a large quantity 
of data relating to ship movements and so I concentrated on one area of the Dover Strait. 
All of the ship to ship interactions and movements in that area were then analysed for a 
single 24-hour period, a unique study. From this, as will be seen in chapter 5, a unique 
data set was created which directly related to the first research question of how the 
COLREGs were being routinely applied.
The second question had not been investigated in the previous marine traffic studies and 
so a qualitative approach was adopted. Once again, from a review of social science 
literature, it was seen that a successful method for exploring workplace practices was that 
of an ethnography. By undertaking an ethnographic investigation of the process of 
collision avoidance, I was able to explore the issues raised by the radar survey and the 
decision making process involved in applying rules designed to mitigate a risk (see 
chapters 6 and 7). In addition, I have systematically analysed the qualitative data through 
the process of analytic induction within the paradigm of grounded theory. By exploring 
the second research question in this manner, a unique insight into the reasons lying 
behind the decisions taken to resolve collision situations through the routine application 
of the COLREGs has been undertaken.
As an ex-practitioner my biography impacted upon the research. This occurred 
throughout the fieldwork and in part, facilitated the process of gaining access and data 
collection. Because of this, the ethical dimension of the research was of great importance 
to me due to the issue of informed consent. I believe that in a number of instances, the 
consent to conduct the research was given, not through a complete understanding of the 
research process, but through my being an ex-practitioner. Therefore, I felt that I owed 
the participants a special responsibility to act in the most ethical manner possible.
Researcher risk is an under reported aspect of the research experience. In this chapter I 
have explored the physical and emotional risks that were present within the work. The 
physical risks to an individual should be considered to a much greater extent before 
undertaking research. Furthermore, the emotional aspects of the work should also be
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considered. Of course, the work would almost always continue, but through a form of 
risk assessment, the issue should be explored and strategies could be adopted to minimise 
the risk. Such actions should be undertaken before any future piece of research.
Chapter 4. The International Regulations for the Prevention of 
Collisions at Sea.
4.0 Introduction
The aim of this chapter is to undertake a comprehensive analysis of the COLREGs. The 
underpinning principles of the regulations which are based upon rules first put in place in 
the 19th Century will be explored. I will then describe and analyse the make-up of the 
COLREGs before illustrating, with the aid of Admiralty court cases and diagrams, the 
way in which they are designed to be operated. These definitive examples of the 
application of the COLREGs will also be made with reference to the two leading 
authorities in this field, these being Cockcroft and Lameijer1.1 will then move on to 
describe the conflicts and gaps within the COLREGs when faced with situations which 
deviate from those described in the COLREGs. The principles underpinning traffic 
separation schemes will then be depicted.
Through this, authoritative interpretations of the COLREGs will be produced which will 
then be used to analyse the actions of ships navigating through the Dover Strait. In this it 
will be shown that the parties to the collision situation have variable responsibilities in 
the resolution of the risk. These responsibilities include the requirement for one ship to 
take action to keep out of the way and for the other ship to initially maintain its course 
and speed. Such reliance upon the other presupposes a certain level of trust that the other 
ship will in fact keep clear as required. It will further be demonstrated that the people in 
charge of the ships are provided with considerable leeway in the interpretation of the 
COLREGs. In order to aid the reader’s navigation of the COLREGs, and serve as a an 
aide memoir, they may be summarised as below:
1 Captains Cockcroft and Lameijer are regarded as being the leading authorities in the area o f collision 
avoidance. Captain Lameijer served on the original drafting committee at the IMO during the 1970s in 
which the 1972 COLREGs were produced. He then served as the chair of the ships routeing working group 
until 2004 at the IMO. It should be further noted that Captain Cockcroft served on the drafting committee 
in the middle 1970s in which routeing measures for the English Channel were introduced, in 2006 he 
retired as head of the International Association o f Institutes o f Navigation delegation to the IMO.
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No appreciable change in the compass bearing of an approaching 
ship. Open to interpretation as to the point when this occurs. 
COLREGS apply as soon as risk of collision occurs.
Must keep out of the way of the other by taking early and 
substantial action.
Must maintain its course and speed until it is clear that the give­
way ship is not complying with the COLREGS. The stand-on ship 
may then take action which does not conflict with the possible 
actions that the other ship may take. Stand-on ship must take 
action when a collision cannot be avoided by the actions of the 
give-way vessel alone.
Ship overtaking is the give-way ship.
Ship being overtaken is the stand-on ship.
Ship with the other on its own starboard side is the give-way ship 
(give-way to the right).
Ship with the other on its own port side is the stand-on ship.
Both ships are the give-way ships and must alter course to 
starboard.
Traffic separation scheme where opposing traffic streams are 
laterally separated, but all the COLREGS still apply.
4.1 History of the Collision Regulations.
Prior to the industrial revolution, ships were dependant upon either wind or muscle power 
for their propulsion. Various experiments involving the propulsion of ships utilising 
steam power had been conducted in Britain and the United States. This process 
culminated in the introduction of the first commercial steamship, designed by Robert 
Fulton in 1807, and registered in New York as the North River Steam Boat (KIAC 2004). 
By the time that Brunei’s steamship the Great Western crossed the Atlantic for the first 
time in 1838, steamships had become widespread, although they would not entirely 
displace traditional sailing ships for another century (National Maritime Museum 2004). 
However, due to the increasing number of steamships, concern was raised as to the 
conduct of such ships with regard to the collision risks. In order to stem the concerns of 
the Captains and sailing Masters of the ships, the Elder Brethren of the London based 
Trinity House Corporation published a set of advisory regulations in 1840 (Cockcroft and 
Lameijer 2004, Plant 1996, Gaskell et al. 1997). The 1840 Trinity House advisory 
regulations were designed to co-ordinate the actions of a steamship with another 
(Cockcroft and Lameijer 2004). The Trinity House regulations were adopted by 
parliament and became law in 1846 with the introduction of the Steam Navigation Act
Risk of collision:
Give-way ship: 
Stand-on ship:
Overtaking:
Crossing:
Head-on:
TSS:
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(1846). These rules required both steamships to keep out of the way of the other and so 
conferred a dual responsibility upon both ships. For example they stated that:
That every Steam Vessel when meeting or passing any other Steam Vessel shall
pass as far as may be safe on the Port Side of such other Vessel.
(Steam Navigation Act 1846, section IX).
Criminal liabilities amounting to a fine of £50 were also imposed for any instance of 
neglect to comply with the regulations (Steam Navigation Act 1846, section IX). 
However, when these regulations requiring dual responsibility were extended in 1851 to 
cover sailing ship encounters, great resistance was encountered from the seafarers (Plant 
1996). This was due to the fact that the principle of dual responsibility flew in the face of 
the accepted principles of right of way established between sailing vessels in which one 
ship would give-way to the other. This right of way had developed through custom and 
practice over time to take into account the relative manoeuvrability of the ships in 
relation to the wind direction. These practices were given added weight through their 
acceptance by the Royal Navy in the late eighteenth century. For example, the sailing 
vessel rule stated that, ‘a ship on a starboard tack, to keep her [s/c] wind’ (Plant 1996: 
378). This meant that a sailing ship which had the wind on its port side would maintain 
its course and the other ship, with the wind on its starboard side, would give-way. Due to 
the British seaborne hegemony of the time, these practices gained wide acceptance. 
From this, the new principle of dual responsibility, put in place by the regulations, was 
ignored in practice by the seafarers. This lead to the rule being reversed in 1863 with the 
introduction of a new set of regulations by the UK’s Board of Trade (Plant 1996). These 
1863 regulations, produced in consultation with the French government, not only codified 
the right of way principle within sailing ship encounters, but also extended them to cover 
steamships as well. To this end they stated that when two steamships met within a 
crossing situation, the one which had the other on the starboard side had to give-way 
(Cockcroft and Lameijer 2004). From this point on, the right of way system in which one 
ship had priority over another, was ingrained within the regulations to prevent collisions 
and so became an underpinning principle.
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An international maritime conference was held in 1889 which created a set of 
internationally recognised and accepted rules governing collision avoidance. These rules, 
which entered into force in 1897, established the practices which are still recognisable 
today, that is: giving way to starboard for crossing vessels, altering course to starboard 
for head-on situations, making the overtaking vessel the give-way vessel and requiring 
the stand-on vessel maintain its course and speed (Cockcroft and Lameijer 2004, Plant 
1996). Various changes to the collision regulations were agreed upon at maritime 
conferences over the following century and these resulted in major rewritings in 1910, 
1954 and 1960, which reflected the increasing number of ships and technological 
changes. The latest major rewriting occurred in 1972 after an international conference 
and a consultative phase with serving seafarers and other professionals (Cockcroft and 
Lameijer 2004, Kemp 2001). These 1972 regulations remain in force today, with minor 
amendments added in 1987, 1993 and 2003. However, the origins of the regulations for 
the prevention of collisions at sea derive from the codifying of the customs and practices 
of the sailing ships over the centuries which included granting right of way for one ship 
over another.
4.2 The 1972 International Regulations for the Prevention of Collisions al 
Sea (COLREGs).
The COLREGs entered into force in 1977 and 145 states are now party to this agreement 
(UN 2004) The UK enacted these regulations in the form of a statutory instrument and so 
any breach of the regulations would constitute a criminal offence (Gaskell, et al. 1997, 
see Statutory Instrument S.I. 1996/75) The COLREGs (Merchant Shipping Notice M. 
1642/COLREG 1, 1996) consist of 38 rules, arranged into 5 parts, with 4 annexes, the 
parts are shown below:
Part Title of part Rule Numbers
Part A General 1-3
Part B Steering and sailing rules 4-19
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PartC Lights and shapes 20-31
Part D Sound and light signals 32-37
Part E Exemptions 38
Parts C, D and E do not cover any part of the decision making or manoeuvring process 
involved in avoiding a collision and so will only be referred to where necessary for 
clarification. Part A deals with some general matters in that they set out where the 
COLREGs apply, the responsibilities for compliance and the definitions to be used. For 
example Rule la, states that;
These Rules apply to all vessels on the high sea and all waters connected 
therewith navigable by sea going vessels.
Rule la.
Rule 3c defines a sailing ship:
The term “sailing vessel” means any vessel under sail provided that propelling 
machinery, if fitted, is not being used.
Rule 3c.
It should be noted that the definition of a sailing ship is derived from its actions rather 
than its construction. So, for example, a yacht which had its sails up, but with the engine 
running, would not be classed as a yacht and would lose certain privileges under the 
COLREGS (Cockcroft and Lameijer 2004, Buzert and Holdert 1990).
Within part A of the COLREGs lies Rule 2, Responsibility. This rule contains some 
important elements with regard to liabilities and when departure from the COLREGs 
should be undertaken. Rule 2 a states that:
Nothing in these Rules shall exonerate any vessel, or the owner, master, crew 
thereof, from the consequences of any neglect to comply with these Rules or of 
the neglect of any precaution which may be required by the ordinary practice of 
seamen [s*c], or the special circumstances of the case.
Rule 2a.
The effect of this section in the COLREGs is to state to all seafarers that, not only do you 
have to follow all of the rules, but you also have to take into account the ‘ordinary 
practice’ of seafarers (Cockcroft and Lameijer 2004, Plant 1996). One of the ordinary
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practices is not to collide, therefore, a seafarer will always be at fault if they collide with 
another ship regardless of their responsibilities under the COLREGs (Meyer 2005, 
Caulkin 2005). Gaskell et al. (1997) adds to this when they state, in relation to the 
application of the liabilities within Rule 2, that:
In other words a slavish observance of the Rules is not always enough to disprove 
negligence.
(Gaskell, etal. 1997: 370).
The second part of Rule 2 (b) states:
In construing and complying with these Rules due regard shall be had to all 
dangers of navigation and collision and to any special circumstances, including 
the limitations of the vessels involved, which may make a departure from these 
Rules necessary to avoid immediate danger.
Within the second part of Rule 2, it is made clear that a departure from the COLREGs 
can be undertaken. However, a departure from the COLREGs can only be undertaken to 
avoid immediate danger in the light of special circumstances.
This Rule does not give any vessel the right to take action contrary to the 
Regulations whenever it is considered to be advantageous to do so. A departure is 
only permitted when there are special circumstances and there is immediate 
danger. Both conditions must apply.
(Cockcroft and Lameijer 2004: 24)
Rule 2 is in effect an etcetera clause, (See Chapter 2 section 2.2) An etcetera clause is a 
clause within the rules which asks those applying them to extrapolate the existing rules to 
cover unforeseen, but similar, situations and to do it within the spirit of the existing rules 
(Garfmkel 1967).
Part B of the COLREGs states what actions are required to avoid collisions within 
various situations. Rule 13 deals with overtaking situations and it states that any ship that 
is overtaking any other shall keep out of its way. Overtaking is deemed to exist when one 
ship approaches another from an angle greater than 22.5° behind the beam of the other 
ship. Rule 14 deals with head-on situations and states that both ships should alter course 
to starboard. A head-on situation is one where two ships meet directly ahead on 
reciprocal courses. This is the only rule in which one ship does not have right of way
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over another and when an actual course of action is dictated. Rule 15 deals with crossing 
situations and says that the ship which has the other on its starboard side shall keep out of 
its way. Crossing situations occur when ships are not overtaking each other, or meeting 
head-on. However, these rules only apply when risk of collision exists. Rule 7 (d)(i) 
states that:
Such risk shall be deemed to exist if the compass bearing of an approaching 
vessel does not appreciably change.
Rule 7 (d)(i)
This simply means that if a ship continues to approach from the same direction, then risk 
of collision exists. It should be noted that within the COLREGs there is no statement of 
distance within this definition of risk of collision. This could mean that provided that the 
compass bearing of another ship does not change, risk of collision could exist at great 
distances. Cockcroft and Lameijer (1990) state that this is not the case as they claim that 
the distance at which risk of collision commences is dependant upon the circumstances 
and the relative speeds involved. They go on to say that:
The 1972 Conference rejected a proposed definition that risk of collision exists 
between vessels when their projected courses and speeds place them at or near the 
same location simultaneously.
(Cockcroft and Lameijer 2004: 54)
This view echoed the precedent set within English Law in 1887 which involved a 
collision between the Banshee and the Kildare (the Banshee, 1887). In this collision the 
two ships collided during an overtaking manoeuvre in which there was a very slow 
relative speed of approach between the ships. The court addressed the issue of when the 
collision regulations applied by reference to when risk of collision commences:
Now at what period of time is it that the Regulations begin to apply to two ships? 
It cannot be said that they are applicable however far off the ships may be.
Nobody could seriously contend that if two ships are six miles apart the 
Regulations for Preventing Collisions are applicable to them. They only apply at 
a time, when, if either of them does anything contrary to the Regulations, it will 
cause danger of collision. None of the Regulations apply unless that period has 
arrived. It follows that anything done before the time arrives at which the 
Regulations apply is immaterial, because anything done before that time cannot 
produce risk of collision within the meaning of the Regulations.
(the Banshee 1887: 136).
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This issue goes to the heart of the process of collision avoidance, for before the point at 
which risk of collision exists a person in charge of a ship may do whatever they wish, 
after that point their actions are constrained by the COLREGS. The point at which risk 
of collision is deemed to exist is the crux of the matter. Yet, the only guidance provided 
by the COLREGS as to when risk of collision exists is that given in Rule 7(d) and that is 
devoid of any reference to temporal or situational aspects. Seafarers therefore, have to 
make an interpretation of this in order to work out when risk of collision exists and so 
when the COLREGs come into force. As will be seen in the following chapters, the point 
at which the COLREGs start to apply is of great importance..
4.2.1 Resolution of collision risks.
Once risk of collision has been established through a process of risk assessment and the 
situation determined (overtaking, crossing or head-on) then the ships involved will need 
to resolve the situation, or collide. Where one ship is directed to keep out of the way of 
another then it is the give-way ship. Rule 16 states that the give-way vessel should take 
early and substantial action to keep well clear. Rule 8 gives further guidance in that it 
states this ship should take action: in ample time; be large enough to be seen by the other 
ship; and that they should ensure that the action results in passing at a safe distance. 
Conversely, Rule 17(a)(i) ‘Action by stand-on vessel’ states that:
Where one of two vessels is to keep out of the way of the way other shall keep her
[sic] course and speed.
Rule 17(a)(i)
Various court cases have addressed the issue of what is meant by keeping course and 
speed (the Roanoke 1908, the Orduna 1924, the Ek 1966, the Aracelio Inglesias 1968 and 
the Toni 1974). In the main the courts have held that maintaining course and speed 
means just that and slowing down or changing course is against the COLREGs. 
However, in the case of the Roanoke (1908), the Roanoke was the stand-on vessel but 
slowed down whilst approaching a pilot station. The judges held that:
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In my judgement, “course and speed” mean course and speed in following the 
nautical manoeuvre in which, to the knowledge of the other vessel, the vessel is at 
the time engaged.
(The Roanoke 1908: 256)
Similarly in the Aracelio Inglesias (1968) the Nidareid, which hit the Aracelio Inglesias, 
was the stand-on vessel but had slowed to approach an anchorage. If the Nidareid had 
not slowed down then it would not have collided with the Aracelio Inglesias. However 
the judge held that the Nidareid was simply following a nautical manoeuvre by slowing 
down.
That speed which Nidareid was under duty to maintain was the reducing speed to 
which she [sic] was committed to when risk of collision arose.
(The Aracelio Inglesias 1968: 9)
Therefore, if a vessel is undertaking a nautical manoeuvre such as altering course to pass 
clear of a navigational hazard, then this could be deemed to be maintaining course and 
speed. It should however, be noted that for ferries crossing the Dover Strait, there are no 
navigational hazards located on the direct route between Dover and Calais, nor Dover and 
Dunkirk. Therefore, the stand-on vessel would have no grounds to justify a navigational 
course alteration which could fall within the test proposed in either the Roanoke (1908) or 
the Aracelio Inglesias (1968) cases.
However, it is not the case that the stand-on vessel should maintain its course and speed 
all the way to the site of the collision. Rule 17(a)(ii) does allow for the stand-on vessel to 
take action when it becomes apparent that the other ship is not following the COLREGS 
by stating that:
The latter vessel [the stand-on ship] may however take action to avoid collision 
by her [sic] manoeuvre alone, as soon as it becomes apparent to her that the vessel 
required to keep out of the way is not taking appropriate action in compliance 
with these Rules.
Rule 17(a)(ii)
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This Rule does not, however, give freedom of action to the stand-on ship to do as they 
please as there must be an element of allowing the other ship to take some action to keep 
out of the way. As Cockcroft and Lameijer (2004) state:
When risk of collision first begins to exist the stand-on vessel must keep her 
course and speed. A stand-on vessel which takes avoiding action before it can 
reasonably be assumed that the give-way vessel is not taking appropriate action is 
likely to be held to blame if practically simultaneous action by the give-way 
vessel causes a confused situation which results in collision.
(Cockcroft and Lameijer 2004: 124).
Furthermore, Rule 17(c) dictates that a ship should not alter course to port for a ship 
crossing from its own port side. This is because the collision avoidance action that a 
give-way ship is most likely to take in a crossing situation is an alteration of course to 
starboard. Thus, if the stand-on ship altered course to port at the same time as the give­
way ship altered course to starboard, then they would turn in upon themselves and this 
would cause confusion. In assessing whether another ship is taking appropriate action a 
sound signal may be used consisting of 5 or more short and rapid blasts sounded on the 
ships whistle (Rule 34). This sound signal may also be supplemented by a light signal 
consisting of 5 or more rapid flashes, but this would only be seen by night. Cockcroft and 
Lameijer (2004) do not state at what distance this warning should be given but they do 
regard that a ship in a crossing situation to have waited too long if it is not been given 
before 2 miles away from the other ship. However, the efficacy of this method of 
warning the other ship has to be questioned when in the technical Annex 3(c) of the 
COLREGs the maximum audible range of the ship’s whistle is prescribed to be 2 miles in 
still air. Therefore, it would seem extremely unlikely that a ship would be able to hear 
the whistle signal of another at ranges of greater than 2 miles. The other means of 
contact that could be used is that of very high frequency (VHF) radio. However, the use 
of VHF radio is discouraged by the UK’s maritime and coastguard authority (MGN 167 
M+F 2001). In this notice they state that:
The use of VHF radio in these [collision avoidance] circumstances is not always 
helpful and may even prove to be dangerous. Marine Superintendents would be 
well advised to prohibit such use of VHF radio and to instruct their officers to 
comply with the Collision regulations. (MGN 167 M+F, 2001: 1)
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Harding (2002) takes a rather unsympathetic view of the consequences suffered by 
seafarers who used VHF during collision avoidance whilst discussing the events leading 
up to a number maritime casualties in which 102 seafarers died, he states:
If navigators choose to believe information broadcast by another ship in relation 
to its manoeuvres, ‘more fool them’; can be added to their epitaph.
(Harding, 2002: 440)
The criticism relating to the use of VHF radio revolves around the problem of not 
knowing who you are talking to2. There is no means of positively identifying the identity 
of another ship when all you have is a disembodied voice coming through a speaker. 
However, the use of VHF radio to arrange passing manoeuvres has become widespread. 
Furthermore, it will be shown in Chapter 6 that the people in charge of ferries routinely 
use VHF radio to arrange passing manoeuvres between themselves which do not comply 
with the COLREGs.
Once it becomes clear that collision cannot be avoided by the actions of the give-way 
vessel alone, then Rule 17(b) states that the stand-on vessel must take action:
When, from any cause, the vessel required to keep her course and speed finds 
herself so close that collision cannot be avoided by the action of the give-way 
vessel alone, she [s/c] shall take such action as will best aid to avoid collision. 
Rule 17(b)
Therefore, the stand-on vessel must monitor the approach of the other ship, make an 
assessment of its manoeuvring characteristics and then at the point at which the stand-on 
vessel cannot avoid collision by its manoeuvre alone, then the stand-on vessel must take 
the best action to avoid collision.
2 Carraige of the Automatic Identification System (AIS) became mandatory in 2005. This 
is an automatic system for identifying ships and so potentially solves the problem of not 
knowing the identity of another ship. However, the use of AIS during the process of 
collision avoidance, especially to aid VHF conversations is strongly discouraged by the 
MCA and has been cited as a cause of the Sky Hope collison by the MAIB (MAIB 2006).
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4.2.2 The anatom y of a crossing situation.
If a simple crossing situation is used to describe a collision risk situation, then the 
ongoing, proactive nature of collision avoidance, and the way that the COLREGs 
interact, can be illustrated. In the first instance the persons in charge of the ships will be 
monitoring the traffic situation by sight and with the aid of the radar. The people in 
charge of the ships will be presented with information relating to the approaching ship in 
the form of computer generated radar data. Therefore, the risk of collision is presented to 
them in a quantified manner. See figure 4.1 below.
Figure 4.1, Radar information for approaching ship.
In figure 4.1 the course over the ground (COG) of 230° and speed over the ground (SOG) 
of 13.7 knots of the other ship are shown. In addition, the closest point of approach 
(CPA) 0.2 miles and the time to go to that closest point of approach (TCPA) 1.7 minutes 
are provided.
Rule 15 states that:
When two power driven vessel are crossing so as to involve risk of collision, the 
vessel which has the other on her [sic] own starboard side shall keep out of the 
way and shall, if the circumstances of the case admit, avoid crossing ahead of the 
other vessel.
Therefore, the ship with the other on its starboard side is the give-way vessel and should 
keep clear of the other, simply put, the ship should give-way to the right. Conversely, the
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other ship is the stand-on vessel and should maintain its course and speed, Rule 17(a)(i). 
The give-way ship should now take action to avoid the potential collision and this should 
be positive, made in ample time, with due regard to the observance of good seamanship, 
Rule 8(a) and be large enough to be readily apparent to the other vessel, Rule 8(b). Once 
the give-way ship has taken action, it should check that it has been effective and resulted 
in passing at a safe distance, Rule 8(d). Throughout this process, the stand-on ship will 
have been monitoring the situation and, if necessary, applying rule 17(a)(ii) which allows 
the stand-on vessel to take action by its manoeuvre alone, if the give-way vessel is not 
taking appropriate action. It should be remembered that this rule does not give licence to 
the person in charge of the ship to take whatever action they wish in order to resolve a 
collision situation (Cockcroft and Lameijer 2004). The stand-on vessel must take action 
when it gets to the stage when a collision cannot be prevented by the actions of the give­
way vessel alone. The various stages in this crossing situation are shown in figure 4.2 
below.
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Give-way ship,
should keep clear
and alter course to starboard.
Point of 
^  potential
 \  collision
Action required, 17(b)
Action permitted 17(a)(ii) 
Alter course to starboard
Bearing line between ships
\  A
Stand-on ship 
Maintain course and speed
No risk of collision, the 
COLREGs do not apply at this 
stage
Figure 4.2, Stages within crossing situation.
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From this description several points should be noted:
No distances are prescribed for taking action.
No time frame is given for taking action.
No actions are specifically dictated.
All the collision avoidance is undertaken without the need of radio 
communication between the vessels. (Weber, 1995).
From this it can be visualised how the COLREGs are intended to operate: the person in 
charge of the ship will have a complete understanding of the situation through the use of 
radar and observation; they know which rules are to be applied; they comprehend how 
those rules are to be communicated into action; and they know what has to be undertaken 
in the event that action does not occur. Therefore, the COLREGs are designed to operate 
in an environment of mutual comprehension, understanding and co-ordination, with clear 
logical steps ensuring clarity and predictability (Plant 1996).
However, if we a take situation in which three ships are crossing each others paths, then 
the outcome is more complicated. Such a situation is shown in figure 4.3.
Ship A
Ship B Ship C
^  Potential 
point of 
collision
Figure 4.3, Multiple ship collision situation.
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Rule 15 is quite clear, in that it requires only the vessel with the other on its starboard 
side to alter course. Conversely, Rule 14 states that ships head-on to each other should 
both alter course to starboard. Therefore, ship B is the stand-on ship for ship A, but give­
way ship for ship C. This means that ship B is faced with conflicting requirements under 
the rules. However, it cannot be the case that a vessel should be able to stand-on and 
maintain its course and speed for one vessel and at the same time be required to keep 
clear of another (Cockcroft and Lameijer 2004). Therefore, the requirement for ship B to 
keep clear of the ship C must pre-empt the requirement to stand-on for the crossing vessel 
A. However, this position of standing-on for one vessel whilst under a duty to give-way 
to another was stated as a contribution to the collision between the Norwegian Dream and 
the Ever Decent (Bahamas Maritime Authority 2000). However, in this theoretical 
situation all ships would probably alter course to starboard. This would mean that the 
person in charge of ship A will need to analyse the situation in the light of the fact that 
ship B, that would normally maintain its course and speed, will not. Pike has stated that:
[T]he collision risk could be compounded if each vessel does not anticipate the
action of the other.
(Pike 1995: 437)
From this description it is clear that the certainty and predictability of collision avoidance 
may be called into question. Furthermore, the resolution of the actions of the theoretical 
vessels discussed above was eventually reached after a period of time. However, in a real 
life situation (as will be demonstrated in chapters 6 and 7) the person in charge of a ship 
would be required to reach a decision in a matter of minutes, sometimes tired, stressed, 
and with the knowledge that if the decision is incorrect then it could result in an accident 
and subsequent prosecution (Challos 2001). In addition, this type of encounter is far 
from unusual within an area such as the Dover Strait (Lamb and Hunt 1995). With 400 
plus ship movements in the Dover Strait everyday, it is seen that multiple encounters 
frequently occur and so the people in charge of the ships must constantly analyse the 
situation and see the conflicts in the COLREGs.
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Taylor has claimed that this uncertainty within the COLREGs arises because, of the need 
to decide independently what to do, in a situation where other ships may also make 
independent decisions (Taylor 1990) and so collision avoidance becomes a game of co­
ordination, since both players have to choose independently mutually compatible 
strategies (Cannell 1981). Therefore, it is hardly surprising that many collisions at sea 
occur after one or both vessels take action to avoid collision (Zhao-Lin 1984, Perrow 
1999) when such ambiguities lie within rules designed to apply to all situations. In 
addition, as Taylor makes clear:
Lying at the heart of the problem of applying the COLREGs is the fact that, each 
ship has to understand the actions of the other: actual, likely, and potential.
(Taylor 1990: 238).
This brings forth a huge number of variables in almost any given situation and so the 
person in charge of the ship must use the COLREGS to analyse and interpret the situation 
and the subsequent actions of all the people involved. This further illustrates the manner 
in which the variety of rules developed to govern safe behaviour will always be less than 
the possible variety of unsafe conditions (Bloor 1980, Reason et al. 1998).
4.2.3 Traffic separation schemes (TSS).
The concept behind the traffic separation scheme (TSS) is that it removes head-on 
collision encounter situations by separating opposing traffic flows. Rule 10 covers TSSs 
and it states that ships should:
• Follow the traffic lanes in the general direction of flow, 10(b)(i).
• Stay away from the separation zone between opposing traffic directions, 10(b)(ii).
• Join or leave at the termination of the lane, 10(b)(iii).
• Join or leave the lane at as small an angle as practicable to the general direction of
flow, 10(b)(iii).
• Avoid crossing a TSS, 10(c).
• Cross a TSS on a heading at 90° as near as practicable to the general direction of 
flow, 10(c).
• Not use the inshore traffic zone unless: going to a port within it; or if it is unsafe 
to navigate within the traffic lane, 10(d)(i).
• Compliance with this rule does not relieve the ship of any obligations under any 
other rule, 10(a).
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Figure 4.4, illustrates these points.
Traffic lane
Separation zone
Inshore traffic zone
Figure 4.4, Traffic Separation Scheme.
From this it can be seen that ships in transit through the TSS will follow the appropriate 
traffic lane. Ships navigate on the starboard side of any channel, in effect, driving on the 
right and this is universal around the world. Therefore, opposing traffic flows are 
removed from the collision avoidance equation. Cockcroft (1982), illustrated the 
importance of the removal of head-on situations in his analysis of accident reports from 
vessels involved in collisions between the years 1968 and 1977. Cockcroft found that 
26% (59 out of 227) of collisions in clear visibility resulted from head-on or fine crossing
Chapter 4. The International Regulations for the Prevention of Collisions at Sea
situations and that in restricted visibility this proportion increased to 72% of collisions 
(357 out of 497). It should be noted that head-on situations will still occur between ships 
crossing the TSS, but the majority will have been removed. Ships will cross the TSS at 
right angles to the general direction of flow and those joining or leaving the TSS will do 
so at as small an angle as practicable. Rule 10(a) makes it clear that ships navigating 
within a TSS are still obliged to follow all the normal steering and sailing rules. This 
means that ships involved in crossing situations still have to give-way or stand-on as 
required when risk of collision exists. By following a TSS a ship is afforded no 
additional rights over ships crossing it.
The first TSS was introduced in the Dover Strait and the southern North Sea area in 1970. 
Prior to this the Dover Strait and the southern North Sea area accounted for almost half of 
the worlds’ collisions (Richey 1966). Following the introduction of the TSS the 
incidence of collisions occurring in the area fell from 142 (for the period 1956-1965) to 
37 (for the period 1971-1980) (Cockcroft 1982). Furthermore, in July 1994 a TSS scheme 
was set up in the Turkish Straits and the incidence of collisions fell from 155 (for the 
period 1990-1993) to 11 (for the period 1995-1998) (Cockcroft 1998; Grey 2001).
Thus, with the introduction of the TSS the seafarers should no longer be called upon to 
implement the head-on rules, as those situations are effectively eliminated for ships 
passing through the area. Vessels passing in different directions are separated from each 
other, by the TSS, and so head-on collision situations should not arise and so there is no 
need for the seafarer to attempt to operationalise the relevant COLREGs and thus, the 
casualty rate improves dramatically. Although it should be noted that some ships navigate 
the wrong way along the traffic lane (Dare and Lewison 1980).
4.3 Summary.
Through this review I have introduced the concepts that underpin the COLREGs, the 
means by which collision risk is managed. These concepts have been shown to have their 
origins located within the custom and practice of seafarers which have held true through
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the centuries. For example, the concept of one ship having right of way over another 
dates from the days of commercial sailing ships and yet still remains within the 
COLREGs to this day. I have tried, with the aid of diagrams and court cases, to illustrate 
the various obligations required by the COLREGs to each ship. However, the COLREGs 
require a certain amount of interpretation upon the part of the seafarer. This is 
particularly true with regard to the issue of risk of collision. For it is at the time when 
risk of collision occurs that the COLREGs apply and limitations with regard to actions to 
avoid collision will be placed upon the stand-on vessel. Once it is determined that a ship 
is classed as a stand-on vessel, then it is required to maintain its current course and speed. 
Only when it is apparent that another vessel is not taking action as required by the 
COLREGs is it released from the obligation to maintain course and speed. Due to this 
requirement to wait to see if the other ship will comply with their obligations requires a 
certain level of trust in the other ship. The limitations of the COLREGs could be seen by 
the subjective judgements that seafarers needed to make when applying them and this 
was further illustrated through a simple three ship interaction. Therefore, it is clear that 
the people in charge of ships are provided with a considerable amount of leeway in the 
interpretation of the COLREGs, especially with regard to when they start to apply.
It was interesting to note the dramatic reduction in the number of casualties with the 
introduction of a TSS into an area. This indicates how a TSS acts as an effective means 
of reducing the incidence of collisions through the lateral separation of traffic. However, 
when risk of collision exists, the obligations under the relevant steering and sailing rules 
continue when ships are navigating through a TSS.
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5.0 Introduction
In chapter 4 with the aid of the authoritative examples, I outlined the manner in which the 
COLREGs are designed to be operated. In this chapter I will explore the reality of 
collision avoidance by looking at the manner in which the COLREGs are actually applied 
in practice. Therefore, the aim of this chapter is to undertake a comprehensive analysis of 
the movements of all of the ships within the Southwest bound traffic lane of the Dover 
Strait. The process by which the data on which this chapter is based was previously 
outlined in section 3.5 Radar Methods. Through this I will show the routes taken by the 
ships and how close they pass to each other. Through the tool of the near miss encounter 
(derived from previous studies on ship domains) I will also show the collision avoidance 
manoeuvres undertaken by the ships within the area.
The structure of this chapter starts with a overview of the radar data, including profiles of 
typical ship movements, crossing and transiting the Strait. I will then move on to an 
exploration and discussion of passing distances. I have undertaken the analysis of the 
radar data by grouping the collision situations by encounter direction. Therefore, I will 
present the data from the perspective of whether the collision situation was one of 
overtaking, crossing or parallel course. The underlying reason for this approach is that the 
COLREGs approach the management of collisions through the perspective of encounter 
situation. From this analysis, it will be shown that ships pass each other at different 
distances in different collision situations. Overtaking took place at much closer distances 
than did crossing situations. Furthermore, ferries passing each other did so with a 
relatively large lateral separation. Through this analysis, areas of further study were 
found which warranted investigation during the ethnographic stages of this research. It 
should be noted that for clarity in understanding the location of these tracks reference 
should be made to the figure 1.1 showing the Dover Strait traffic separation scheme.
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5.1 General Overview
Within this study there were a total of 257 ships recorded by Dover Coastguard. This 
figure does not include ships which solely followed the Northeast bound traffic lane. As 
stated, I have used only the tracks of the ships that have used or entered the Southwest 
bound traffic lane. These ships were classified by their route as shown in table 5.1:
All directions 257
Crossing 124
Easterly Crossing 59
Easterly Crossing from Dover to Calais 47
Easterly Crossing from Dover to Dunkirk/Zeebrugge 12
Westerly Crossing 65
Westerly Crossing from Calais to Dover 47
Westerly crossing from Dunkirk/Zeebrugge to Dover 12
Westerly crossing from NE lane 6
Transiting the Strait 133
Transiting Southerly 131
Transiting Northerly 1
Miscellaneous 1
Table 5.1, Traffic routeing.
As can be seen, 124 ships crossed the Dover Strait, of which 59 crossed from the UK to 
the continent, whereas, 65 crossed from the continental side towards the UK. It should be 
noted that this difference in numbers was not generated by a greater number of ferries 
sailing from continental ports for Dover, but by 6 ships initially travelling up the 
Northeast bound traffic lane and then crossing the Dover Strait, near the MPC buoy (see 
figure 1.1), before heading up into the North Sea. These ships were included because 
they crossed the Southwest bound traffic lane. However, by excluding those 6 ships, it 
can be seen that there were 59 sailings and 59 arrivals at the port of Dover in this 24 hour
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period. Of these, 12 sailed to or from either Dunkirk or Zeebrugge. The remaining 47 
sailed exclusively between Dover and Calais.
133 ships were found to be transiting the Dover Strait, without crossing any of the traffic 
lanes. Of those 133 ships, only two did not follow the Southwest bound traffic lane. One 
was found to transit the Strait in a Northerly direction within the inshore traffic lane, 
adjacent to the port of Dover and the other, also within the inshore separation zone, 
followed a more circuitous path which involved travelling primarily in a Northerly 
direction in the vicinity of the port. Upon further analysis this vessel was identified as 
Dover coastguard’s emergency tug. The remaining 131 ships followed the Southwest 
bound traffic lane and stayed within it throughout their passage.
5.1.1 Crossing vessel tracks
Within the crossing vessel tracks there were three separate routes taken within the study 
area: the Dover/Dunkirk or Zeebrugge route; the Northeast lane/North Sea route; and the 
Dover/Calais route.
The Dover/Dunkirk or Zeebrugge route is shown in figure 5.1 below.
/  S  
/  /
/  /
/
/
/
S/  /✓ / / /
Figure 5.1 Dover to Zeebrugge track.
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As can be seen the ship in this case has departed from Dover in an Easterly direction 
within the inshore TSS before altering its course to starboard to cross the TSS at right 
angles as required by rule 10(c) of the COLREGS. This rule states that
(c) A vessel shall so far as practicable avoid crossing traffic lanes, but if obliged 
to do so shall cross on a heading as nearly as practicable at right angles to the 
general direction of traffic flow.
Once the ship crossed the Southwest bound traffic lane it altered course to port in order to 
enter and then follow the Northeast bound traffic lane. This ship was on passage to 
Zeebrugge in Belgium. For ships on passage to Dunkirk they continued on the course at 
right angles to the direction of traffic flow and headed straight for Dunkirk. The initial 
course was the same for both Dunkirk and Zeebrugge bound ships. 9 ships sailed from 
Dover for either Zeebrugge or Dunkirk.
Northeast lane/North Sea route is shown in figure 5.2 below:
>
/  /  /  //  /
/  ✓ ✓ //  //  //  //  /  
s  /
/  //  /
X //  /
/
//
Figure 5.2 Northeast Lane/North Sea route
6 ships exhibited this track profile which consisted of following the Northeast bound 
traffic lane before crossing the Southwest bound traffic lane at right angles, between the 
MPC buoy and the CS4 buoy. On departing the Southwest bound lane they would alter 
course to starboard and head northerly up into the North Sea. These ships were the only
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ones for which I gained track details for movements within the Northeast bound traffic 
lane.
Figure 5.3 indicates a typical track of a ferry which crossed from Calais to Dover.
see
VMt
Figure 5.3 Dover/Calais route
The ferries would adopt a track across the Southwest traffic lane within approximately 
10° of what would be perpendicular to the general flow of traffic. This approximately 
perpendicular course was used when travelling both to and from Dover. It should be 
noted that there are no navigational hazards located within this route across the Strait and 
so any deviation from the most direct route across would be due to traffic within the area.
5.1.2 Transiting vessel tracks
As previously stated 133 ships transited the Strait, of which 131 followed the Southwest 
bound traffic lane. The route was simply straight down the traffic lane as shown in figure 
5.4.
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SGC
/ /
?6c
VAR
Figure 5.4 Typical Southwest bound traffic lane transiting track.
Here the track of this ship can be seen in the northern part of the Southwest bound traffic 
lane passing to the north of the Vame navigational mark (marked ‘VAR’). The ship 
moved from right to left across the chart. No alterations of course were undertaken by 
this ship to keep out of the way of any other. Furthermore, ships in transit through this 
chart area would not have to make any alteration of course for navigational reasons. Any 
observed alterations of course would be due to the traffic within the area.
5.1.3 Traffic routes
From this it can be seen that ships moving in this area do so free from navigational 
hazards and that any deviations from the direct route either across or through the Dover 
Strait can be attributed to other traffic. Furthermore, ships would meet at right angles to 
each other for crossing situations, or at fine angles for both overtaking and head-on 
situations. This is in effect like a major crossroads for cars. Cars would cross at right 
angles, overtake each other whilst driving in the same direction and meet head-on for cars 
coming from the opposite direction. However, ships, unlike cars, have no brakes, no 
accelerators, no indicators, all are commercial vehicles and there are no road markings.
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The only control over the situation is that exhibited by the people in charge of the ships 
who apply the COLREGs.
5.2 Passing distances
As outlined in Chapter 3, each of the individual tracks of the vessels were compared with 
each other. The ships’ encounter directions and closest point of approach were all noted. 
In addition, the geographical position of the track in relation to either: the side of the 
TSS, for transiting ships; or the Varne navigational mark, in the case of crossing ships, 
were recorded. Through this process reliable data was recorded which related to the 
results of the collision avoidance practices of those in charge of the ships within the 
Dover Strait on that particular day. It should be noted that I make no claims about the 
generalisability of this data due it being confined to only one non-randomly chosen 24 
hour period. Due to this constraint I will use the statistics derived from the data in a 
purely descriptive manner.
Each of the 257 ships’ tracks were compared with each other. This produced 909 
incidents of ships passing within 5 nautical miles of each other, see figure 5.5.
Passing Distance Total
45
1 3 5 7 9 11 13 15 17 19 21 23 25 27 29 31 33 35 37 39 41 43 45 47 49
Figure 5.5, Total passing distances in tenths of a nautical mile.
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Figure 5.5 shows a breakdown of the passing distances of all the 909 ships that passed 
within 5 miles of each other. Figures 5.6, 5.7, 5.8 show the passing distances for crossing 
encounters, parallel course encounters and overtaking encounters, respectively.
Passing Distance Crossing
„ . n
u
dE
i t  I
'  '1 1 1 !
1 3 S 7 9 11 13 15 17 19 21 23 25 27 29 31 33 35 37 39 41 43 45 47 49
Figure 5.6, Passing distances for crossing encounters in tenths of a nautical mile.
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Passing D istance Parralle l Course
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1 3 5 7 9 11 13 15 17 19 21 23 25 27 29 31 33 35 37 39 41 43 45 47 49
Figure 5.7, Passing distances for parallel course encounters in tenths of a nautical mile.
Passing Distance Overtaking
1 3 5 7 9 11 13 15 17 19 21 23 25 27 29 31 33 35 37 39 41 43 45 47 49
Figure 5.8, Passing distances for overtaking encounters in tenths of a nautical mile.
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The mean and median passing distances in tenths of a nautical mile (cables) for each of 
these encounters is shown in table 5.2.
All encounters Crossing Parallel Course Overtaking
Mean 21.5 23.8 18.3 19.3
Median 20 22 17 18
Table 5.2, Average passing distances.
However, in order to undertake a more detailed analysis of those incidents I needed to 
focus on those encounters which involved a risk of collision. The concept behind this was 
two fold: firstly, in order to understand the manoeuvres undertaken by the ships, the ships 
must first have been placed in a position where there was a risk of collision, for that is the 
time when the COLREGS need to be applied (as outlined in Chapter 4); and secondly, by 
focusing on such near misses, a greater understanding of accidents could be achieved, as 
near misses can be viewed as near accidents. The study of near misses has become an 
accepted means of illustrating the causes of accidents within many industrial sectors 
(Phimister et al. 2003, Reason 1997, Perrow 1999). This is because by studying the 
events leading up to an incident, which nearly resulted in an accident, lessons can be 
learnt about the causes of actual accidents, provided of course that accidents and near 
accidents share the same causal factors (van der Schaaf and Kanse 2004). Additionally, 
the analysis of near misses has gained widespread acceptance within many industrial 
sectors because there is no need to punish mistakes if there are no losses (Tamuz 2002). 
The underlying assumption of near miss analysis is that one major incident is preceded by 
a large number of near incidents and an even larger number of hazardous conditions, all 
of which share the same causal factors (Phimister et al. 2003). Therefore, by studying the 
events leading up to near misses, accident precursors can be identified and safety 
improved.
The criteria which I used to classify whether an incident was a near miss was the 
violation of a ship domain, which consisted of a circular space 0.8 nautical miles (nm) in
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diameter around the ship, by another ship. Thus, when two ships passed within 8 cables1 
of each other, then this would be classified as a near miss. To reflect the dynamic nature 
of the interaction I termed such a meeting as a near miss encounter (NME). The selection 
of this space in both size and shape was based upon a review of literature relating to ship 
domains (Fujii and Tanaka 1971, Goodwin 1977, Coldwell 1983, Jingsong etal. 1993).
Goodwin defines a ship domain as:
[T]he surrounding effective waters which the navigator of a ship wants to keep
clear of other ships or fixed objects.
(Goodwin, 1977: 103).
This means that the person in charge of a ship will not only try to keep that space clear, 
but will also take steps to ensure the maintenance of such a space dependant upon future 
encounters. This concept of requiring a space to be maintained around the ship is derived 
from the idea of proxemics, where a person subconsciously requires an area to be kept 
clear around themselves, in order for them not to feel threatened in any way (Hall, 1963). 
Fujii and Tanka (1971) modelled a ship domain in relation to its length. For them the 
domain would alter dependant upon the size of the ship such that larger ships required a 
greater space than smaller ships. In this way the domain consisted of an ellipse centred 
upon the ship, apogee fore and aft, perigee athwartships. The width and length of the 
domain was 3.2 and 8 times the ship’s length respectively, see figure 5.9.
11/10* of a nautical mile is termed a cable and this is approximately 185m.
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3.2L
Figure 5.9 Fujii and Tanka ship domain (1971)
This would correspond to a very large crude carrier having a domain of approximately 6 
cables wide by 14 long. Conversely a small ship’s domain would approximate to one 2 
cables wide by 4 long.
By contrast Goodwin (1971) adopted a model which reflected the COLREGS such that 
different sectors around the ship had different values, see figure 5.10.
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Heading
Figure 5.10 Goodwin ship domain (1977).
This model was based upon a survey of actions taken to avoid collisions in a simulator, 
coupled with observations of actual ship movements around the Thames estuary. With 
this model there is a reflection as to the duties of the ship as a give-way or stand-on 
vessel. The ship is a give-way vessel for all ships which are encompassed by the 0.85 nm 
arc and stand-on to those in the other two arcs. The reduced distance within the 0.45 nm 
arc is due to the low relative speed inherent within overtaking encounters.
The third model was one produced by Coldwell (1983) which was designed to model 
seafarers reactions when encountering another ship on a reciprocal course, see figure
5.11.
(♦1.75L-4* a25L H
Figure 5.11 Coldwell ship domain (1983)
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With this model, only head-on encounters were calculated for, consequently there is no 
domain extending behind the ship. This model contains elements common to both the 
preceding models, in that the space is defined by the length of the ship and the orientation 
of the partial ellipse is modified by taking into consideration the demands of rule 14(a) of 
the COLREGS. This rule states that:
(a) When two power-driven vessels are meeting on reciprocal or nearly reciprocal 
courses so as to involve risk of collision each shall alter her [sic] course to 
starboard so that each shall pass on the port side of the other.
Therefore, the model reflects a desire to ensure the greatest freedom of action for the ship 
by preventing other ships coming into the area which it may be required to manoeuvre 
into. By this the starboard side was kept clear in order to allow for an alteration of course 
into this space to avoid another ship.
However, the major problem associated with these models, where different distances are 
attributed to various ship sectors, is that they do not take account of the dynamic 
relationship when two ships are involved. The models are constructed to take account of 
the movements of the single ship and do not consider what happens to the minimum 
distance around a ship when two ships pass each other. Figure 5.12 indicates what 
happens when Goodwin’s model interacts with another ship, also navigating with a 
similar ship domain around it.
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Figure 5.12, Goodwin ship domain overtaking 1.
Here we have two ships, one overtaking the other. According to Goodwin’s model the 
First ship is quite happy with this situation as the other ship has not entered its 0.45nm 
domain arc. However, the first ship has already entered the second’s 0.85nm arc and so 
the second ship will move so as to keep the first ship clear, see figure 5.13.
0.70 n.m. n.m
0.85 n.m.0.85 n.m.
0.45 rim.0.45 n m.
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As can be seen, when the movements of more than one ship are taken into account the 
idea that ships wish to maintain certain distances from each other dependant upon arcs 
around their vessels is false. The ship domain which actually results when the dynamic 
interactional nature of collision avoidance is taken into account equates to a circular 
space around the interacting ships of 0.8n.m., see figure 5.14.
0.8nm
Figure 5.14, Near Miss Encounter.
Figure 5.14 shows a near miss encounter where one ship enters another’s circular ship 
domain, radius 0.8nm.
Thus, by integrating the domains of Fujii and Tanaka (1971), Goodwin (1977), Coldwell 
(1983) and Jingsong et al. (1993) I have used a simple circle to represent the ship 
domain. The radius of this space is taken as 0.8nm. Through this process, a criterion was 
created which would define a NME, namely, a violation of a ship domain, 0.8nm in 
radius.
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5.3 Near Miss Encounters
All of the individual tracks were compared with each other and it was found that there 
were 175 occasions when NMEs occurred, see figure 5.15.
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Figure 5.15, Total NMEs.
As can be seen, the NMEs were made up of a range of passing distances within the broad 
classification of a NME. The mean passing distance was 5.1 cables with a median of 5 
cables. It should be noted that, I make no claim with respect to whether this is a safe 
passing distance or not, however, a passing distance of three cables or less should be 
regarded as being a remarkably dangerous situation. Three cables is a distance of 556m 
which is approximately twice the length of a large ship. Such a ship travelling at 14 
knots would cover that distance in 77 seconds, which would be too short a time to react to 
a problem or unanticipated event. Additionally, for a ferry, this distance would be 3 
times it’s length and be covered in 47 seconds at 23 knots. Therefore, it was interesting 
to note that passing distances of three cables or less occurred on 41 occasions and 
represented 23% of all NMEs.
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The distribution of the NMEs across the 24 hour period is shown in figure 5.16.
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Figure 5.16, distribution of NMEs.
There was little difference between passing distances at night in comparison to passing 
distances during the day. The mean passing distance for the night was 5.20 cables 
compared with 4.99 cables for the day. Therefore, daylight does not appear to have an 
effect upon the passing distances selected by the ships. This is further illustrated when a 
comparison is made between each of the passing distances for daylight versus night time 
situations, as illustrated by figure 5.17.
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Passing distance
Figure 5.17, percentage of day and night NMEs.
However, these broad statistics do not allow for a more nuanced analysis of the collision 
situation and the application of the COLREGs. By grouping all together, it is impossible 
to see if there are any differences between the various collision situations. Therefore, I 
undertook an analysis of the NMEs for each of the three encounter situations, overtaking, 
crossing and parallel courses. Through this process, differences may be highlighted 
which would warrant further exploration within the ethnographic stage of the research.
5.4 Overtaking situations
There were 288 overtaking manoeuvres within the study period. An overtaking 
manoeuvre was recorded when one of two ships, within 5nm, on approximately parallel 
courses, passed the other at a higher speed. Figure 5.18 illustrates a typical overtaking 
situation.
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Figure 5.18, Overtaking situation.
In this situation, the ship which initially was placed more to the East than the other, with 
a first time marker of 0102, overtook the other at a distance of 2 cables at 01:43. Of these 
288 encounters 84 resulted in a NME. The NME passing distances are shown in figure 
5.19.
Overtaking NMEs
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Figure 5.19, Overtaking NMEs.
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This means that 29% of all overtaking manoeuvres resulted in a NME. Within these 
figures it should be noted that 30 (36%) resulted in passing at distances of 3 cables or less 
and this represents a large number of close passing distances. The mean and median 
figures for overtaking situations were 4.4 and 4 cables respectively. However, the 
overtaking figures were made up of two different situations. One situation was that of 
ferries overtaking one another and the other was ships in transit through the Southwest 
bound traffic lane overtaking each other. These are two different situations and so should 
be considered separately.
The NME histogram shown in figure 5.20 is made up solely of ferries overtaking each 
other as they cross the Dover Strait.
Ferry Overtaking NMEs
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
Passing distance in cables (total 16)
Figure 5.20, Ferry overtaking NMEs.
As can be seen there were 16 NMEs, of which 2 resulted in passing at distances of 3 
cables or less. The mean and median values for ferry overtakings were 6.2 and 7 cables 
respectively. The majority of these NMEs were caused through the ferries overtaking 
each other whilst manoeuvring off the port of Dover. By contrast figure 5.21 illustrates 
the overtaking NMEs resulting from ships in transit through the Dover Strait following 
the Southwest bound traffic lane.
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Transit Overtaking NMEs
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Figure 5.21, Transit ship overtaking NMEs.
There were 68 NMEs resultant from transit overtaking manoeuvres and of these 28 were 
3 cables or less. The mean and median values for this situation were 4.0 and 4 cables 
respectively. All of these NMEs came from the same source, that is, ships overtaking 
each other whilst transiting the Strait. Therefore, this can be seen to be illustrative of the 
navigational decisions made onboard those ships in the area. In order to identify the 
possible causes of these NMEs a plot was made to identify their geographical location. 
Figure 5.22 shows the locations of the NMEs.
124
Chapter 5. Radar Data
SCO
/ £ *  5
*  x *  •
X
X
✓  / X  X  *  x
"  * ^
"  X/ A  *✓ />■ y . ^
'  '  ,  x**’'/  /  x x
s  S x*Xx / /  ^
/ /
/ /
/  X
'  '  X/ / x /  /  * * 
/ V
/L x
/ /
y*MPC
\
/
/
/  /
'  '  *** s  s  * *  * *y  /  
X /
✓ ✓ x
'  '  ** * VAR
x '
, ' V
✓
y
Figure 5.22, NME location.
All bar three of the NMEs involved ships that were lining up to pass to the north of the 
Vame bank. The Vame bank lies in the centre of the Southwest bound traffic lane and is 
marked VAR on figure 5.22. An effect of this bank is to provide the navigators onboard 
the ships with a choice as to going North or South of the bank. The second effect is to 
effectively halve the available space for ships that pass through the area. Therefore, 
when a navigator elects to pass to the South or North of the bank there is a great 
reduction in the area available for navigation. Such a space reduction would be less of an 
issue provided that equal numbers of ships passed to the North as to the South of the 
Varne bank. However, through an aggregation of the tracks of the 131 ships that 
navigated along the Southwest bound traffic lane it was found that the distribution was 
not equal. Figure 5.23 illustrates the situation by showing the aggregated tracks of the 
ships.
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LNI SGO
VAR
Figure 5.23, Aggregated vessel tracks.
From this figure the preponderance of ships taking the route to the North of the Varne 
bank can be seen. Of the 131 ships that passed through, 108 lined up to pass to the North 
of the Varne bank, whereas, only 23 lined up to pass to the South, a ratio of nearly 5:1. 
This issue is further illustrated by a cross-sectional distribution chart. To produce this 
chart, a line was constructed at right angles across the traffic lane (between points A and 
B on Figure 5.23 aggregated vessel tracks), the distance between the vessel’s track and 
the separation line on the west side of the traffic lane was measured. This distance was 
then plotted on a chart to produce the distance distribution chart shown in figure 5.24.
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Figure 5.24, Cross-sectional distribution chart.
The immediate effect of this concentration of traffic is to reduce greatly the relative space 
available for each vessel as it tries to navigate safely along the traffic lane, hence the 
concentration of NMEs, as illustrated by figure 5.22, to the north of the Vame. The 
Marine Accident Investigation Branch in their report of the collision between the Ash and 
the Dutch Aquamarine (MAIB 2001) highlighted the issue of the greater number of ships 
passing to the North of the Varne. In the conclusion of that report they proposed a 
number of possible explanations for this:
• The seafarer’s tendency to sail within the starboard (and so Northern in this case) 
part of a narrow channel;
• The fact that there are fewer navigational waypoints if a route to the North of the 
Vame bank is chosen;
• The tendency for smaller vessels to keep clear of the North bound deep draught
vessels which would be navigating in the area adjacent to the route lying to the
south of the Vame;
• Over-reliance upon previously existing electronic passage plans.
The first explanation being the tendency to sail in the starboard side of a channel would
stem from the requirement within rule 9(a) of the COLREGS which states that:
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A vessel proceeding along the course of a narrow channel or fairway shall keep as 
near to the outer limit of the channel or fairway which lies on her [j/c] starboard 
side as is safe and practicable.
The navigators onboard the ships may, therefore, simply be applying this rule by keeping 
to the starboard side of the channel.
I would add a further possible explanation as to the practice of passing to the north of the 
Vame and that is a concern that transiting ships, under Rule 15, will have to keep out of 
the way of ferries crossing the Strait. This means that any ship transiting the Southwest 
bound traffic lane is under a duty to keep out of the way of any ship crossing from the 
starboard side i.e. ships coming from Dover. The situation is further compounded by the 
warnings placed on the navigational charts covering this area. These warnings highlight 
the probability of meeting ferries and fast craft crossing the traffic lane and so would 
raise the level of concern and the perception of the risk, for those seafarers planning the 
passage. To keep out of the way of a crossing ship the transiting ship would normally 
alter course to starboard. Therefore, if a transiting ship chose a route to the south of the 
Vame, then the seafarer may think that there would be a danger of going aground on the 
Vame bank if they needed to alter course to starboard for the crossing traffic. Therefore, 
to allow for what is perceived as a greater risk, a collision with a crossing vessel, the 
passage is planned to pass north of the Vame bank even though this unwittingly exposes 
the vessels to a much greater risk of a NME from an overtaking manoeuvre, because of 
the reduction in space for each vessel, due to the concentration of traffic. It is probable 
that one or more of these explanations would account for the actions of the seafarers 
planning and navigating ships through the area.
5.5 Crossing situations
There were 484 crossing situations within the study period. The classification of a 
crossing situation was one where two ships crossed each other’s path at an angle of more 
than 60°, within 5nm of each other. Figure 5.25, illustrates a typical crossing situation.
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Figure 5.25, Crossing situation.
In figure 5.25, a ferry crossed from Calais to Dover and passed 1.3nm ahead of a ship 
following the Southwest bound traffic lane at 14:08. It was found that of those 484 
crossing encounters 66 resulted in a NMEs. The NME distribution is shown in figure 
5.26.
Crossing NMEs
Passing distance in cables (total 66)
Figure 5.26, Crossing NMEs
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This means that 14% of all crossing manoeuvres resulted in a NME, this should be 
compared to the figure of 29% for overtaking manoeuvres. Furthermore, there were only 
6 NMEs with passing distances of 3 cables or less, whereas there were 28 similar NMEs 
involved overtaking situations. Similarly, there were great differences between the mean 
and median values for the passing distances of the NMEs for crossing and overtaking 
situations, table 5.3 illustrates the differences between the two situations: \
Number of NMEs 66 68
Number of NMEs of 3 cables or less 6 28
Mean passing distance (cables) 5.8 4.4
Median passing distance (cables) 6 4
Table 5.3, Crossing v Overtaking NMEs.
From this it would appear that ships crossing the Dover Strait are, in the main, doing so 
with greater passing distances than the ships overtaking each other. Therefore, there is a 
greater margin of safety in place for crossing situations when compared with overtaking 
situations. From this I wished to explore possible reasons as to why this should be taking 
place by analysing the tracks of the crossing traffic.
Taking the example of a ferry leaving Dover and meeting a ship following the Southwest 
bound traffic lane, then the ship following the Southwest bound traffic lane will be the 
give-way vessel. Conversely, the ferry leaving Dover would be required to maintain its 
course and speed as per Rule 17(a)(i) which states that:
Where one of two vessels is to keep out of the way of the other shall keep her
course and speed.
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The stand-on vessel is only relieved of this obligation when it becomes apparent that the 
give-way vessel is not taking action in compliance with the rules and then it may take 
action by its manoeuvre alone as per Rule 17(a)(ii) which states that:
The latter vessel [the stand-on vessel] may however take action to avoid collision 
by her manoeuvre alone, as soon as it becomes apparent to her that the vessel 
required to keep out of the way is not taking appropriate action in accordance with 
these Rules.
Mandatory action by the stand-on vessel is required by Rule 17(b) in the event that the 
stand-on vessel finds itself in a position where collision cannot be avoided by the actions 
of the give-way vessel alone. Therefore, if the rules are being correctly applied to the 
crossing situations, then the ships leaving Dover will maintain the same course across the 
Strait and the ships following the Southwest bound traffic lane will keep out of their way. 
This would translate into the ships crossing from Dover maintaining the same tracks up to 
and possibly across the first lane of traffic. Tracks may deviate to some extent across the 
first lane of traffic dependant upon traffic in the second lane. This is with respect to the 
position of the ferries being reversed as they would now become the give-way vessel due 
to the ships following the Northeast bound traffic lane. To this end I isolated all the ships 
that had clear runs across the Southwest bound traffic lane. The criteria used in deciding 
whether the run was clear was that of no other ship should come closer than 1.6nm, twice 
the NME distance.
5.5.1 Dover to Calais ferry crossings
It was found that of the 47 ships that departed from Dover for Calais only 12 had a clear 
run. The tracks of the 12 ships were then aggregated as shown in figure 5.27.
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Figure 5.27, Dover to Calais Clear Run.
Similarly, all the tracks of the 35 ferries that did not have clear runs were also aggregated 
as shown in figure 5.28.
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Figure 5.28, Dover to Calais Unclear Run.
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As can be seen it is quite clear that ships that do not have clear runs are deviating from 
the normal track. This deviation is further illustrated by constructing a cross-sectional 
distribution chart showing the crossing points of the ferries. The crossing point for each 
ship was found by measuring the distance from the Vame light (marked VAR on figure 
5.28) along a line parallel to the TSS. Figures 5.29 and 5.30, illustrate the differences in 
the crossing points for the ships.
Dover to Calais Clear Run
1 4 7 10 13 16 19 22 25 28 31 34 37 40 43 46 49 52 55 58 61 64 67 70
Distance from the Varne
Figure 5.29, Dover to Calais, Clear Run.
Dover to Calais Unclear Run
 —
1 4 7 10 13 16 19 22 25 28 31 34 37 40 43 46 49 52 55 58 61 64 67 70
Distance from the Varne
Figure 5.30, Dover to Calais, Unclear Run.
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The differences between the clear and unclear crossings are quite striking. The vessels 
crossing the traffic lane and encountering traffic within it took considerably different 
routes from those that had a clear crossing. The mean distances from the Vame light buoy 
were similar for both clear and unclear crossings 35.5 and 35.6 cables, however, the 
standard deviations varied from 1.3 to 6.0 respectively. It may be argued that the 
differences in the crossing patterns could be accounted for by the routes selected by 
individual ships. That is to say that a certain ship might adopt the direct route and 
another may be more circuitous. By putting together the multiple crossing tracks of 
single ships, any variations in route can be seen. Figures 5.31 and 5.21 illustrate the 
aggregated crossing tracks of two single ships.
✓ /
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Figure 5.31, Single ship crossing 1.
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Figure 5.32, Single ship crossing 2.
Both of these two figures show how the tracks of the same ship alter throughout the day. 
Therefore, the selection of various tracks is taken by the people in command of the ships 
at the time of the crossing, rather than individual ships taking the same route across 
regardless of the traffic in the Southwest bound traffic lane.
An argument could be made that, apart from not following the COLREGS, it does not 
matter that the ships may deviate from their planned tracks. However, there is a serious 
cost element to these track deviations. The straight line route across the Strait is 
approximately 30 miles long. However, if the ship altered course by 30° and deviated by 
one mile from the straight line route then the crossing distance would increase to 35 
miles. The ships burn 0.1 tonnes of fuel per nm, taking ten (five each way) crossings per 
day that amounts to a fuel consumption rate of 30t and 35t per day for the straight line 
course and the deviated course respectively. Fuel costs were approximately $160 per 
tonne when this data was collected and so over a year a ship deviating by a mile from the 
shortest route across would cost an extra $292,000 in fuel at the time of the fieldwork. 
Therefore, there is a strong economic argument to be made that the companies involved 
would want their ships to follow the shortest route across the Strait in order to reduce fuel
135
Chapter 5. Radar Data
costs. However, as can be seen, the ships do deviate from the shortest route as a matter of 
routine.
From this illustration of the vessels' tracks, it was apparent that there was a clear variation 
in the routes chosen by the personnel onboard the ships crossing the TSS. Where the 
vessel was crossing, and there was no near encounter with another vessel, then the 
standard route, plus or minus 2.5 cables was taken. However, when a ship that did have a 
near encounter with another ship, then different tracks were taken. Rather than sticking 
within a narrow corridor 5 cables wide, the ship with an unclear crossing took a route 
plus or minus 18 cables of the mean line. From this it can be inferred that the ferries are 
keeping clear of ships following the traffic lane. This also means that the stand-on ships 
are giving-way to the other ships and we have a reversal of the positions under the 
COLREGs.
5.5.2 Calais to Dover Ferry crossings
The analysis was then conducted upon the 47 ships that crossed from Calais to Dover. 
The area of study within this analysis only covers the Southwest bound traffic lane and so 
1 do not have any data covering the actions that the ships undertook within the Northeast 
bound traffic lane. This means that I cannot determine through this data whether the 
ferries coming from Calais gave-way to the ships crossing from their port side in the 
same manner as the Dover ships do. However, by Rule 15 the Calais to Dover traffic are 
the give-way vessels for the ships using the Southwest bound traffic lane. By the 
COLREGS the ferries are directed to take early action to avoid collision with the ships in 
this lane. By using the same criteria of clear and unclear passage any avoiding action 
taken by the ferries will be shown. Cross-sectional distribution charts were constructed 
for the clear and unclear situations as shown in figures 5.33 and 5.34.
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Figure 5.33, Calais to Dover clear run.
Calais to Dover Unclear Run
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Figure 5.34, Calais to Dover Unclear Run.
There were 18 clear runs compared with 29 unclear ones with mean distances from the 
Varne of 48.9 and 55.3 cables respectively. As can be seen, there was a wider range of 
crossing points for both situations, reflected in the standard deviations for clear and 
unclear situations of 4.5 and 7.9 respectively, than for the Dover to Calais ferries. This 
range of crossing points is probably a reflection of any alterations of course that the
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ferries may have had to make for ships in the Northeast bound traffic lane, but still shows 
a greater range for unclear crossings.
The NMEs for ships crossing from Calais to Dover were similar to those ships crossing 
from the reciprocal direction, see figures 5.35 and 5.36.
Dover to Calais NME
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Figure 5.35, Calais to Dover NMEs.
Calais to Dover NME
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Figure 5.36, Calais to Dover NMEs.
This shows that the passing distances for ships, which had different obligations under the 
COLREGS, were broadly similar.
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The conclusion to be drawn from the variance between clear and unclear crossing routes 
for Dover to Calais crossing traffic is that the vessels that should be maintaining their 
course and speeds are not. Rule 15 is not being applied as required by the rules, as 
vessels preparing to cross the TSS are taking action to keep out of the way of vessels 
crossing from their own port side. A reasonable explanation for this is that the people on 
the ships crossing the TSS do not want to have their actions constrained by the rules (the 
maintenance of their course and speed), because they do not trust the people on the give­
way vessels to actually keep clear and so take unilateral action to keep out of the way. In 
this way the people on the crossing ships will make an assessment of the traffic situation 
within the Southwest bound traffic lane and then adopt a route across in such a way that 
the ship does not have a near encounter with any other ship. This then removes the need 
to rely upon the other ship to solve the collision situation. This explanation would then 
account for the deviations within the tracks of the crossing vessels. However, this is an 
explanation which can only be fully explored onboard the ships through observations of, 
and speaking to, the personnel taking those decisions. What is clear is that the margin of 
safety involved in crossing situations is of a higher order than that shown within 
overtaking situations.
5.6 Passing situations
There were 137 passing encounters which were defined as two ships meeting on 
reciprocal courses. All of these encounters involved ferries meeting each other as they 
sailed from opposite sides of the Strait. 25 (18%) of these passing encounters resulted in 
a NME. Of these 25 NMEs, 5 resulted in passing at a distance of 3 cables or less and the 
full details are shown in figure 5.37.
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Passing NMEs
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Figure 5.37, Passing NMEs.
Rule 14(a) of the COLREGS governs the actions to be taken when ships meet on 
reciprocal courses and it states that:
When two power-driven vessels are meeting on reciprocal or nearly reciprocal 
courses so as to involve risk of collision each shall alter her course to starboard so 
that each shall pass on the port side of the other.
Therefore, when two of the crossing ships met on reciprocal courses both are directed to 
alter course to starboard. Through the analysis of the crossing points of the ships it can 
be seen that ships crossing from Calais to Dover take a more Northerly route than ships 
crossing from the other direction. Figure 5.38 shows the cross-sectional distribution of 
all the ships.
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Figure 5.38, Cross-sectional distribution of all crossing traffic.
However, these course selections were not due to the ferries altering course for other 
ferries as the route selections were also evident when the ships had clear runs across the 
Strait. Figure 5.39 illustrates the clear runs for the ships crossing in both directions.
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Crossing Clear Runs
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Figure 5.39, Cross-sectional figure for ships with clear crossing runs.
From this it appears that the adopted routes are there through choice rather than resulting 
from alterations of course for other ships. The appearance is that ships crossing from 
either direction adopt a route across which does not conflict with ships crossing from the 
other direction. This will be an aspect that is explored further in Chapter 6.
5.7 Sum m ary
Through the analysis of the ship track radar data I have been able to highlight the 
collision avoidance practices for all of the ships using or crossing the Southwest bound 
traffic lane of the Dover Strait for one 24 hour period. This analysis has been further 
refined with the classification of the near miss encounter which has been used to describe 
the passing distances of all the ships within the area. From this it appeared that the ships 
crossing the Dover Strait exhibited a mixture of non-COLREG following behaviour. It 
was found that ships overtaking each other did so at very close distances with 28 
incidents in which ships passed within 3 cables. This is in comparison to the crossing
1
_ 1 I
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situations where there were only 6 incidents in which ships passed within 3 cables. An 
explanation for the number of ships passing close to each other when transiting the TSS 
was due to them passing in a ratio of 5:1 to the North of the Vame bank. This resulted in 
a greater concentration of ships and hence a smaller amount of room available. From an 
analysis of the tracks of those ships, there was little evidence that ships altered course for 
each other. Conversely, it is clear from the tracks of the ferries crossing the Strait that 
they kept out of the way of the ships within the TSS regardless of their obligations under 
the COLREGs. The resultant of this keeping clear of the ships following the traffic lane 
was an increase in the passing distances such that there appeared to be a greater margin of 
safety involved in crossing situations. Furthermore, it would appear that the crossing 
ships also adopted different routes across the Strait which had the effect of separating the 
opposing traffic flows and so increasing passing distances between the ships.
This analysis of the traffic movements during this 24 hour period raised a number of 
questions which I found both interesting and intriguing. Why for example, do the ships 
crossing the Strait keep clear of ships within the TSS regardless of the COLREG 
obligations? In the second, ethnographic stage of the research the actions taken by the 
people in charge of the ships will be explored. In addition, the reasoning behind those 
actions will be investigated. This should then allow for a more nuanced understanding of 
the process of collision avoidance and the application of the COLREGs. The application 
of the COLREGs would not then be simply black or white matter of compliance v non- 
compliance. Through the ethnographic phase in which the people in charge can be 
interviewed, actions and explanations placed in context and a fuller understanding 
gained.
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6.0 Introduction
In this Chapter I will explore the strategies and actions taken by the people in charge of 
ships crossing the Straits of Dover. The aim of this exploration is to investigate the 
second of the main research questions, namely “why are the COLREGs applied in the 
manner that they are?” Through the utilisation of a number of representative examples 
based upon the detailed analysis of 52 crossing (33 of which were recorded using a hand­
held camcorder) and 12 interviews, I will illustrate how the people in charge of the ships, 
undertake a process of risk analysis and assessment of the situation before taking what 
they view as the most appropriate action to avoid the collision risk. It will be shown how 
these practices provide an explanation for the deviations from the most direct route across 
the Channel as illustrated in figure 5.27 Chapter 5 [Dover to Calais unclear run], I will 
show how the strategies employed to cross the first lane of traffic differs greatly from the 
requirements under the COLREGs. Conversely, it will be shown that the people in charge 
of the ships actively complied with the requirements of the COLREGs when crossing the 
second lane of traffic. I will then try to show that this paradox of active non-compliance 
followed by active compliance with the regulations actually fits into a pattern of 
avoidance of all ships regardless of the requirements under the COLREGs due to the lack 
of trust in the other, lack of enforcement of the regulations and compliance with a 
company rule. By contrast, I will then describe the co-operative actions adopted by 
crossing ships to ensure that they are not in conflict with each other when crossing from 
opposite sides. Through this co-operation undertaken between the crossing ships and 
their respective companies, the need for the application of the head-on rule of the 
COLREGs is removed. The net effect of all these actions is to ensure that the collision 
risk is minimised. Such co-operation occurs due to the level of trust that exists between 
the actors due to an ongoing relationship combined with a concept of shared values. The 
justification for these actions will be returned to in chapter 7.
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6.1 Fieldwork data and analytical method
The data collection during this ethnographic stage in the fieldwork was undertaken 
onboard seven different ships and from two different companies. This represents half of 
all the ships and companies which operate out of the port of Dover. The ships were 
employed on runs between three continental ports and the port of Dover, see table 6.1.
Name of ship Company Run between
Wye
Iberian Ferries Dover and Zeebrugge/Calais
Usk Iberian Ferries Dover and Zeebrugge/Calais
Taff Iberian Ferries Dover and Calais
Tawe Iberian Ferries Dover and Calais
Dee Iberian Ferries Dover and Calais
Cam Sirius Line Dover and Dunkirk
Exe Sirius Line Dover and Dunkirk
Table 6.1, Ship details.
Whilst onboard these seven ships I observed 52 separate crossings of the Dover Strait. I
recorded contemporaneous fieldnotes of each of the crossings, in addition to notes made 
shortly afterwards in the privacy of my cabin. Additionally, with the use of a hand-held 
video camera, I recorded the radar picture and speech of the participants during 33 of 
those crossings. Furthermore, 1 undertook 12 tape-recorded interviews with the officers 
onboard the Wye and the Usk. The number of the participants is shown in table 6.2.
Rank Observed Interviewed
Captain 14 4
Chief Officer 11 3
Second Officer 18 4
Cadet 3 1
Total 46 12
Table 6.2, Number of participants.
From this it can be seen that the data recorded represents a significant dataset relating to 
the actions undertaken by people in charge of ships as they apply the COLREGs whilst 
crossing the world’s busiest shipping lane. The data was explored using the methodology 
outlined in chapter 3 section 3.4. Through this, I was able to immerse myself in the data 
and explore the recurrent themes and analytical categories. In order to retain the richness
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of the data, as well as to represent the temporal aspects of the process of collision 
avoidance, I have reproduced sections of the ethnographic transcripts. These 
ethnographic transcripts include radar screen shots that show the manner in which the 
person in charge of the ship relates to the outside world and the traffic situation. Through 
these representative crossing transcripts the decision making process and the application 
of the COLREGs to resolve the risk of collision will be demonstrated.
6.2 Requirements under the COLREGs
The varying obligations under the COLREGs are important for the analysis of the actions 
taken by the ships in the following collision avoidance situation. As previously outlined 
in Chapter 4, Rule 15 states that
When two power driven vessel are crossing so as to involve risk of collision, the 
vessel which has the other on her |>/c] own starboard side shall keep out of the 
way and shall, if the circumstances of the case admit, avoid crossing ahead of the 
other vessel.
Rule 15
Therefore, the ship with the other on its starboard side is the give-way vessel and should 
keep clear of the other, simply put, the ship should give-way to the right. Conversely, the 
other ship is the stand-on vessel and should maintain its course and speed, Rule 17(a)(i). 
The give-way ship should now take action to avoid the potential collision and this should 
be positive, made in ample time, with due regard to the observance of good seamanship, 
Rule 8(a) and be large enough to be readily apparent to the other vessel, Rule 8(b). Once 
the give-way ship has taken action, it should check that it has been effective and resulted 
in passing at a safe distance, Rule 8(d). Throughout this process, the stand-on ship will 
have been monitoring the situation and, if necessary, applying Rule 17(a)(ii) which 
allows the stand-on vessel to take action by its manoeuvre alone, if the give-way vessel is 
not taking appropriate action. The stand-on vessel must take action when it gets to the 
stage when collision cannot be prevented by the actions of the give-way vessel alone. 
What this means to the Dover Strait traffic is that any ship crossing the first lane of traffic 
is the stand-on vessel and any ship following the first lane of traffic is the give-way
146
Chapter 6. Crossing the Dover Strait
vessel. However, the situation is reversed when a ship crosses the second traffic lane as it 
becomes the give-way vessel and the one in the traffic lane becomes the stand-on vessel. 
In essence these requirements simply boil down to:
Give-way vessel: give-way to the right and make it clear that you have done so.
Stand-on vessel: keep the same course and speed until you think that the other ship
is not going to give-way.
Ferry leaving port: stand-on vessel for the first lane, give-way vessel for the second
lane.
However, these rules only apply once risk of collision exists. As shown in chapter 4 
section 4.2 the only guidance given as to when risk of collision exists is that given in 
Rule 7(d) which is devoid of any reference to temporal or situational aspects. The net 
effect of this is that before risk of collision is deemed to exist, the restrictions of the 
COLREGs do not apply. Therefore, before this point the ferries (who would become the 
stand-on vessels when risk of collision exists) are free to take what ever action they wish 
to resolve the collision situation.
6.3 The Risk Assessment
In the first instant the people in charge of the ship undertake a quantitative assessment of 
the risk of collision with other ships in the Channel. To facilitate this process all of the 
ships are fitted with sophisticated radar systems. These systems, known as an Automatic 
Radar Plotting Aids (ARPA) allow for the tracking of other ships in order to assess their 
movements and their passing distance. It should be noted that the terms radar and ARPA 
are used interchangeably. The person in charge looks at the radar screen as it starts to 
pick out the ships which look as if they may be a problem when the ship departs. I asked 
during interviews onboard the Wye and the Usk, how the people in charge undertook this 
first assessment of the risk:
Cameron: Before we’ll leave harbour we’ll be picking up the ships which will be 
known, you’ve got a rough idea of lets say if all the ships coming in the south 
west lane that are roughly at the CS4 buoy [a navigational mark] or just coming 
up to it and some of the slower ships just after coming down to the Goodwin [a
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large sandbank to the North] any of those ships there you know that you’ll 
probably meet with those. So before you leave you start to pick those up. So you 
can give yourself a good indication then of roughly what you are going to meet.
Cameron Wye.
OK, to start with, what I do, I like to set the radars up, the Quartermasters set 
them up but I like to have the final little play and put them where I want. I always 
have them up on the twelve mile range, and start acquiring everything coming 
down the lane so that I know what’s out there. Basically, as for here because it’s a 
longer departure [Zeebrugge] and there’s more things going on before you get to 
the pier heads, I have the radars on, because it’s a more concentrated area because 
of the channels, then I have the radars on six miles. Start acquiring anything in 
the channel on six miles, its impossible to acquire everything. But, so that gives 
me an overview of what’s outside. I mean it would be foolish of me to say that I 
am only interested in the big echoes and not the small ones but the little ones tend 
to be much more unpredictable than the big ones if you see what I mean. You can 
identify the actual cargo vessels in the channel and you know where they are 
going.
Morris, Usk.
You look at the close traffic first, anything further away than 3 miles isn’t a 
problem leaving Dover, because, obviously, you look at the first problems before 
the next problems. But before you leave you have already acquired the targets in 
the South-west bound lane, so you’ve got a fairly good idea.
Damon, Usk.
This was the practice that was seen for each and every crossing that I observed during the 
field work. The person in charge would start up the radar systems, look at the screen to 
see what ships’ echoes were displayed, acquire them using the radar’s software and 
ascertain which of them could be a problem. Figure 6.1 shows a typical radar screen 
image.
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Figure 6.1, Radar Screen
The ship, the Taff, is located at the centre of the two circles. The T ajfs  heading is 
indicated by the green line extending from the central point. The purple diagonal line 
across the centre of the screen indicates the edge of the traffic separation scheme (TSS). 
The yellow lumps to the right of the screen are radar echoes of ships with a green vector 
line extending from them to indicate their movement relative to the Taff. As can be seen 
one of the ship’s vector’s passes very close to the position of the Taff. This means that 
this ship poses a risk of collision to the Taff. Figure 6.2 shows the way in which the 
radar’s software quantifies and displays the information relating to that radar target.
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Figure 6.2, Quantified data on the collision risk
Figure 6.2 shows the data relating to the movement of one particular ship. At this point 
the other ship is 3.9 nautical miles (NM) away bearing 103.9°. Its closest point of 
approach (CPA) is 0 .1NM (1 cable) and this should occur in 8.7 minutes (time to closest 
point of approach TCPA). It is moving on a course (course over the ground, COG) of 
233.6° at a speed (speed over the ground SOG) of 10.6 knots. Its bow crossing range 
(BCR) is projected to be 0.3NM (3 cables) and this will take place in 8 minutes time 
(bow crossing time BCT). This was the data that the person in charge of the ship used in 
order to assess the risk of collision. This data was based purely upon the computers’ 
calculations of the radar information and represents a quantified statement of the risk of 
collision. This process by which the individual attempts to quantify the risk that they are 
faced with is similar to that found in other studies). Rochlin et al. (1987) for example, in 
their study of naval flight operations, described how through the use of checklists and 
performance data, the risk of certain operations being undertaken was quantified and then 
compared with acceptable parameters. If the risk lay within the acceptable parameters
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then the task would be undertaken. However, if it lay outside of it then additional 
measures were put in place in order to return the risk to an acceptable level.
In the situation outlined above, there exists a risk of collision between the Taff and the 
other ship which represents a breach of the acceptable risk parameters. It is problematic 
to find any form of definition for what is and is not acceptable with regard to passing 
distances. The COLREGs only specifies that risk of collision exists when the compass 
bearing of an approaching vessel does not appreciable change. In that case the closest 
passing distance would be 0 NM. In addition, nowhere within the COLREGs does it 
specify the parameters of the risk and neither do the IMO nor the MCA offer any 
definition. Furthermore, as explored by Curtis (1986) and Corbet (1986) in cases where 
the passing distance is more than 0 NM people undertake considerable variations in their 
actions. From the previous studies of ship domains it would appear that 0.8 Nms is 
regarded as the inner limit of the risk parameter (Fuji and Tanka 1971, Goodwin 1977, 
Coldwell 1983). In fact, following the early results of this study, the MCA now use a 
definition of a ship domain as being a circular area of 8 cables in diameter (MCA 2006) 
(this will be returned to in chapter 8). Iberian Ferries do specify the minimum parameters 
by which their ships must operate. This rule is that the person in charge of the ship must 
not pass closer than one mile ahead or half a mile astern of another ship. This rule was 
well known by all of the officers and cadets onboard Iberians’ ships.
You must run half a mile astern of a vessel and one mile ahead, that’s a minimum. 
That’s the safe distances and so that was what he was doing, just looking for a gap 
to get across.
James, Deck Cadet Usk.
I can squeeze in there with a mile ahead of someone and half a mile astern of 
others. So if there is a mile and a half gap, then I can go through.
Max, Second Officer Wye.
A mile ahead, half a mile astern, that’s the rule.
Morris, Captain Usk.
This rule giving the parameters were also passed on at a very early stage in the training of 
new officers as they joined the ship.
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Similarly Sirius Line, also stated that when crossing the ship must not pass closer than 1 
mile ahead of the other.
[T]here is this sort of general rule, and I think that is for most of the operators, is 
that we do not cross closer than a mile ahead of any vessel.
Gus, Captain Exe.
PB- So what do you normally work on as passing distances astern of other ships? 
Spencer- Half a mile. Sometimes we follow the stems pretty close. But on this 
route it's a mile ahead of them, which is more important I would say.
Spencer, Second Officer Exe.
PB- What’s the passing distance?
Jack- CPA is six cables. So we'll pass a mile ahead of him.
Jack, Second Officer Cam.
Such a common approach is not surprising as there had been a considerable number of 
people moving from Iberian Ferries to Sirius Line. This was because Sirius Line 
attracted experienced officers to work on their ships when they first moved into Dover 
with generous pay offers. I will return to this issue in chapter 7 section 7.5.
Therefore, on all of the ships within this study the people in charge firstly undertook an 
assessment of the risk of collision. If the radar predicted that the other ship would breach 
the safety parameters around the ship then they would take steps to ensure that that safety 
threshold was not breached.
6.4 Collision avoidance risk management
As outlined in chapter 2, once it has been found that a safety threshold is predicted to be 
broken steps are then put in place to manage the risk (see chapter 2, section 2.3 and Royal 
Society 1992, Seiler 2001, Fleury 1998). In the case of collision avoidance this means 
the application of the COLREGs. During the approach to the first traffic lane, ships will 
be crossing from the port side of the ferries and so they have right of way over those 
ships. The other ship following the traffic lane will then take actions to keep out of the 
way, whereas the ferry is directed to maintain its course and speed. Those are the 
requirements under the COLREGs which if applied will manage the risk. However, on
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only one crossing throughout the entire period of the fieldwork, did I observe a ferry 
maintaining its course and speed whilst waiting for the other ship to keep out of its way. 
Furthermore, as illustrated by figure 5.28 [Dover to Calais Unclear Run] in chapter 5, the 
crossing ships alter their courses as a matter of routine to avoid ships which represent a 
risk of collision.
6.5 Crossing the first traffic lane
The following examples illustrate the actions taken by the people in charge of the ships 
when faced with a situation in which risk of collision was present. It should be noted that 
consideration was never given to the idea that they might give the other ship a chance to 
give-way to them.
In this example the Dee, operated by Iberian Ferries, had just sailed from the port of 
Dover for Calais.
PB- If it’s OK can you just tell us what’s going on?
Ross- OK, so about 5 minutes before we sailed I acquired all the stuff in the SW 
lane here. Looking at what Miles [C/O] just done there and putting it on relative 
and looking at the relative speeds, what I’m going to do is actually pass in 
between the fast one and the two slow ones there.
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Figure 6.3, crossing 1.1.
The situation that Ross is describing is shown in Figure 6.3. Ross is concerned with the 
three ships crossing from the port side in the South-west traffic lane, marked A, B and C. 
Ships A and B are the two slower ones and ship C is the fast one. If Ross continued on 
the course that is currently being steered (121°) then the Dee would be in a collision risk 
with ship A. Ross’s intention is to alter the course of the Dee to starboard to pass ahead 
of A and B and behind C. Ross has come to this decision within half a mile from the port 
of Dover.
[to helm] Chris, nice and gentle around to 135° please. We’ll see what that looks 
like. In fact 145° please.
Helm- 145° easy.
Ross - Yeah, looking at 145°, looks quite reasonable. The tide is actually really 
shooting us up that way [NE]. So we’ll pass astern of that and in front of these 
two.
PB- Fair enough. So you simply look at the length of the true vector and see 
where you'll be in a few minutes' time?
Ross -That's exactly that. I wouldn't want to pass closer than eight to nine cables
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off their stem. Also bearing in mind all the time that he [is] supposed to give-way 
to me if he feels that way inclined. 155° please.
Helm- 155°.
Ross - Probably won’t be enough so [to helm] 160° please.
Helm- 160°.
Dee sailing Dover to Calais.
From this it can be seen that Ross has carefully assessed the situation, noted the risk 
posed by several ships and then taken action to avoid that risk. This action has involved 
taking the decision to alter course to starboard within half a mile from the port of Dover. 
This means that Ross is taking action at a very early stage. It could be argued that risk of 
collision does not apply at such an early stage and so Ross is free to take whatever action 
he likes as the COLREGs are not in operation (see the discussion in chapter 4 section 4.2 
and this chapter section 6.2). However, Ross does make reference to the responsibilities 
between the ships as he states that the other ship is the give-way vessel. Furthermore, 
Ross understands that there is a risk of collision posed by the other ship. Additionally, 
Ross makes a series of small alterations of course to starboard by asking the person 
steering to go from 145° to 160° over a period of time. Such small alterations have been 
found to be a breach of the COLREGs (Cockcroft 2005). The net effect of these actions is 
that Ross has resolved the collision situation through unilateral action. It may be argued 
that Ross is utilising the flexibility found within the COLREGs (i.e. taking action before 
they apply) but it could also be argued that by stating that the other ship is the give-way 
vessel and through the taking of a series of further small alterations, he has gone beyond 
the flexibility and is simply ignoring the requirements of the COLREGs to unilaterally 
resolve the collision situation. As will be seen, this unilateral strategy to resolve collision 
situations becomes the normal pattern of behaviour for ships crossing the first traffic lane.
In the next example the Cam, operated by Sirius Line, had just sailed from Dover to cross 
the first traffic lane before heading to Dunkirk.
PB- So how is it going then?
Albert- So what we've just left Dover. Ships plotted coming down the lane. One... 
we've got one coming down the inshore zone. Quick look ahead.
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Figure 6.4, Crossing 1.2.
We've got a fishing boat here crossing. And nothing else further up the lanes. So 
at the moment the plan is to come around the stem of this one. So by the time we 
get across here, that one will be at a bit further down. So by the time we're over 
here, he'll be long gone down there. Just this little one here and to keep an eye on. 
It's the end of a flood tide pushing us along up there. Southerly wind as well.
Albert (the ship’s Captain) described the situation shown in figure 6.4 where ship A is 
coming down the inshore traffic zone and ships B and C were within the South-west 
traffic lane. Ship D was a fishing vessel. The Cam had just left Dover, about 1.2 miles 
from the port during which time Albert altered course to 100° following an initial 
assessment of the traffic in the Channel. Due to this alteration the Cam would then pass 
well ahead of ship A and astern of ships B and C. However, under the COLREGs a ship 
crossing a traffic lane should do so at right angles to the traffic flow. Such a course 
would be approximately 135° and so the Cam's steered course was considerable different 
from that. Furthermore, under the COLREGs a ship should not take any action which 
could conflict with action taken by another ship. If either ship B or C did give-way to the
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Cam and they complied with the requirements under the COLREGs, then they would 
have altered course to starboard. This would have meant that the Cam and ship B or C 
would have turned towards each other and so created a much worse situation. However, 
the action taken by Albert did resolve the collision risk and so there was no need for 
either ship B or C to take any action.
Albert then handed over control of the navigation of the ship to Jack.
Albert- [Handing the ship over to Jack]. You are steering of 100. 
Automatic. You've got a couple of ships in the lane. The plan is to run 
astern of them. One incoming down the inshore zone there. Crossing 
ahead of him [ship A]. A few small ones behind, probably fishing boats or 
coasters struggling with the weather. End of the flood and a South-west 
wind. So if you are happy with that?
Jack- Yep. [Turning to me] As the skipper said we've got these two here. 
So don't want to cut ahead of them so we've got the ideal passage here.
We can decide whether we want to come astern or ahead of it. If we want 
to come astern then we can just go to port a bit and travel up till we want 
to come across. It's really handy. So you just come around a bit.
PB- To port?
Jack- Yeah, so that I don't worry these guys.
Cam sailing Dover to Dunkirk.
In this Albert passes on all the relevant information relating to the traffic, the controls of 
the ship and the weather. The term automatic means that the ship is being steered by 
automatic control rather than in the case onboard the Dee where it was steered by hand. 
The flood means the flood tide in which there is a current running up the Channel which 
combined with the wind pushes the Cam to the North.
Jack explained that he would continue with the actions put in place by Albert (the 
skipper) and keep astern of ships B and C. He then described how this was an ideal 
passage in that he could decide to take whatever action that was required to get across. 
So once again the ferry is taking unilateral action to resolve the collision risk. 
Furthermore, there was no consideration given to the idea that the other ship should give­
way to the Cam. It could be argued that the people in charge of the Cam were free to act 
as the COLREGs were not in force at the time of the initial decision making. However, as
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was seen, the taking of unilateral action was the only action that was ever under 
consideration.
In the next transcript the Exe, a ferry operated by Sirius Lines, had just sailed from the 
port of Dunkirk. In contrast to sailings from Dover, Dunkirk has a long navigational 
fairway (an open channel) which has to be negotiated before the crossing of the Dover 
Straits. This means that the ships travel along this fairway and then turn to cross the 
traffic at right angles. Consequently, as the ferry navigates the fairway the person in 
charge has a much greater time in which to plot all the traffic in the lane than when 
leaving Dover. The person in charge is then able to work out the effect that their turn to 
cross the traffic lane will have upon the other traffic. In effect this is like turning from a 
side street into a main road and then coming up to a roundabout where other cars have to 
give-way to your car. The driver of the car then alters their approach in such a manner as 
to allow the other car to pass without having to give-way at the roundabout. In this 
example Boris uses a trail manoeuvre facility on the radar to work out the course to take 
across the Channel which would ensure that the Exe passes astern of the ships in the 
traffic lane. It should be borne in mind that Boris is taking this decision to keep clear of 
ships in the lane, long before he actually gets to a point where the other ship is on a 
constant compass bearing and so before the COLREGs start to apply.
PB- So then Boris, how's it going?
Boris- Well not too bad. We'll be coming down [the fairway] and then setting a 
course from the anchorage [the end of the fairway] up to the Goodwin [a 
navigational mark]. The only real thing to worry about this morning at the 
moment is this fella here [Ship marked B in figure 6.5, Boris is pointing to the end 
of the ship’s vector in the figure]. By doing a trial manoeuvre we can work out 
the best time to come around in order to pass astern of him. Just increase the 
vectors. If we come down a range we can see that if we come around in about 11 
minutes through the anchorage he will have already passed our head and we can 
pass safely around his stem. That's the biggest thing to worry about this morning, 
passing across his head at a safe distance there. That's the situation we are in at 
the moment.
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Figure 6.5, crossing 2.1
In this Boris described how he worked out the time when he would alter course to cross 
the traffic lane in such a manner as to pass astern of ship B. In figure 6.5 the Exe is 
located at the centre of the hashed circle to the right of the screen. The passage plan [red 
line] for the route is shown as a red line, with the TSS marked in purple. Ships A and B 
are located within the Northeast bound traffic lane and so would be the give-way ships if 
risk of collision existed between either of them and the Exe. The passage plan indicates 
the pre-planned route across the TSS and shows how the Exe should cross at right angles. 
However, Boris has fed this pre-planned route into the radar system and it has indicated 
that if he proceeded on this course then a risk of collision would result with ship B. Boris 
then altered the timing of the turn to find a course which did not put the Exe on a 
collision course with ship B and instead found one that would ensure that the Exe passed 
astern of the other ship. I then asked if that was the usual practice to take into account the 
traffic in the lane.
PB- Hm OK. This is quite normal coming across like this is it?
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Boris- Yeah, yeah obviously it changes on a daily basis, you never know what 
you are going to get but yeah it's a normal route to take. So a pretty standard 
morning really.
PB- Except the weather is lovely.
Boris- Yeah it's not blowing a hooley. Might even be some sunshine today.
PB- So do you always take into account the traffic in the lane when working out 
when to turn?
Boris- Well yeah, I know we could turn into the lane anytime and they are all, we 
are the stand-on vessel in this situation here. But again we're joining and leaving 
a lane so try to cause as less disruption as possible.
Exe sailing Dunkirk to Dover
If Boris had continued along the pre-planned route then this would have resulted in a risk 
of collision with the other ship. Therefore, Boris, in common with the other examples 
undertook, an assessment of the risks and then took a course of action which resulted in a 
reduction to that risk. He stated that this was the normal course of action to take and I 
observed that this was true on each and every crossing from Dunkirk on both the Exe and 
the Cam. Therefore, we can see the pattern continuing of keeping clear of all other ships, 
regardless of the obligations under the COLREGs once risk of collision exists. 
Furthermore, it is clear that the people in charge of these ships possess considerable skills 
to interpret the situations, understand how they will evolve and put in place actions which 
should resolve potential collisions.
In the next example of a crossing the Iberian Ferry, the Tawe, with Milton in charge 
undertook a considerable number of course alterations to get through the traffic without 
the slightest consideration given to maintaining course and speed for the ships crossing 
from the port side.
Milton- So we've um just departed Dover at the moment and currently 
we're increasing speed. 2 south bounds here keeping an eye on and them 
two coming across into Dover. The vectors are still very much sorting 
themselves out at the moment. I haven't made any firm decisions about 
which way we'll be going. Chances are that we will out run them just 
depends on how the vectors on these two pan out, very much in a state of 
flux at the moment.
PB- OK.
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Figure 6.6, crossing 3.1.
Once again an assessment of the risk of collision was made and all the ships in the lane 
were acquired on the radar screen, see figure 6.6. However, Milton stated that he could 
not at that point decide upon the action to be taken as the situation was still in a state of 
flux due to the acceleration of the Tawe. In this situation ships A and D were ferries 
inbound for Dover and ships B, C and E were following the Southwest bound traffic lane.
Milton - Up to 20 knots now. We are out running one of them already now [ship 
BJ and the other one is getting very close to a CPA of zero [ship C] as the speed 
increases. So we'll be keeping an eye on him as well. But we can always get 
ahead of these two here [ships B and C] and tuck under behind him so [ship E]. 
It'll depend on how it pans out. Only just a mile off the break waters. So you 
could come astern of those two [ships B and C], but if you get too close to those 
two then there is always a danger that they could come around to starboard, so. 
We are now up to 21 knots.
PB- So how long does it take for it all to settle down then?
Milton- It's starting to settle down about now, now that we are up to 21 knots.
Best to leave it a little while just for the vectors to sort themselves out. To get a 
mile ahead of those you come down here and you still got plenty of room to cut 
astern of this little fella here. I mean it's not ideal. In a perfect world it would
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have been nice to set your course up and go astern of those. But those two in­
bounds means that that is not the most brilliant thing to do.
Milton allowed the situation to settle down, ensuring that the information that he based 
his risk assessment on were reliable. His plan was to alter course to starboard and pass 
ahead of ships B and C and then passing astern of ship E. He stated that his ideal course 
of action would have been to pass astern of ships B and C by altering course to port. 
However, the two ships A and D, prevented him from taking that action as he did not 
want to become involved in a head-on situation with them. It should be noted that Milton 
took this action without waiting to see if the other ships would give-way to him. 
Furthermore, he describes the possibility of the ships altering course to starboard and 
hence giving way to him as a “danger”. Milton subsequently altered course by 40° to 
starboard and passed one mile ahead of ships B and C. He then altered course to port to 
pass astern of ship E.
As can be seen from these examples the person in charge of the ship undertook unilateral 
action to resolve the collision situation. Such action was taken before waiting for the 
other ship to take the avoiding action required under the collision regulations. It could be 
argued that the people in charge of the ships were just using their skills to interpret the 
COLREGs in the most advantageous manner. This most advantageous manner is one in 
which they took action before risk of collision existed and so before the COLREGs 
applied. This meant that they were free to take whatever action they wished as they were 
not bound by the requirement to maintain their course and speed. However, although this 
may be the case for the very first alteration of course, as time went on the people in 
charge of the ships continued to alter course. Furthermore, no regard was given to the 
possibility of maintaining course and speed as there was no expectation that the other 
ship would alter course for them. Therefore, there was simply a pattern of taking 
unilateral action to resolve the risk of collision without having to rely upon the actions of 
the other ship. However, although this unilateral action taking from the very first instance 
was the norm, in one case there was an attempt to stand-on and maintain course and 
speed. This could be viewed as deviant as it departed from the operating norms. 
However, as will be seen, even though there is an attempt made at standing-on for the
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other ship, this continues for only a very short period of time before the normal pattern of 
keeping clear of all ships is undertaken.
The analytical process of grounded theory (Glaser and Strauss 1967, Lofland 1995, 
Frankland and Bloor 1999) requires scrutiny of deviant cases, including partially deviant 
ones. This case involved one crossing of the Tajf(an Iberian Ferry) in which the decision 
was made to stand-on and maintain course and speed for a ship crossing from the port 
side. The Taff sailed from Dover to Calais with a bridge team consisting of the officer of 
the watch Joseph, a deck cadet (who is a trainee officer) Drew, a quarter master Nick and 
a lookout Ben. The ship was under the control of Drew, who was under Joseph’s 
instruction. I commenced recording just after the ship had left the port of Dover when 
approaching the South-west bound traffic lane. The elapsed time is shown in the square 
brackets.
PB- So how's it looking?
Drew [00:30]- At the moment we've got a coaster [ship 3] which is that one and 
it's CPA is only 2 cables at the moment. And we are going to stand-on with 
caution.
PB- Oh, [hesitation] OK.
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Figure 6.7, crossing 4.1.
Figure 6.7 shows the navigational situation. Ships 1 and 2 are inbound ferries that are 
passing to the North and ships 3 and 4 are following the South-west bound traffic lane. 
Drew describes the traffic situation by stating that ship 3 is a coaster, which is a small 
ship that trades on the coast, that has a passing distance of 2 cables. This means that 
there is a risk of collision posed by ship 3. Under Rule 15 of the COLREGs the Taff is 
directed to maintain its course and speed. Drew states that this is what they intend to do 
by standing-on. Drew, however, qualifies this statement by adding, “with caution”. I 
was very surprised that they would maintain their course and speed and comply with the 
requirements under the COLREGs and showed this through a very hesitant “OK”. I had 
never seen anyone adopt such a strategy during any of the crossings that I had previously 
observed. Furthermore, I had observed this particular bridge team on several previous 
occasions taking unilateral action by keeping out of the way of all other traffic. 
However, on this occasion it had been decided that keeping the Tajf s course and speed 
was the most appropriate course of action. It later transpired that this route was a
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continuation of the initial course of departure that the Captain had set upon leaving the 
port. The Captain had misinterpreted the speed of ship 3 and set a course that he thought 
would pass 0.5 miles astern of it. However, as the Taff accelerated, a risk of collision 
developed with ship 3. The control of the ship was then handed over to Drew. Drew 
being a trainee officer then took a period of time in deciding what actions to undertake. 
Joseph’s training style was one in which he believed in total delegation and would only 
step in if Drew asked for help or if he thought that the ship was in danger. Therefore, he 
allowed the situation to continue under the total control of Drew. It appeared likely that 
Drew continued on the course set by the Captain, in part, from not wishing to 
countermand the Captain’s decision even though he had left the bridge. This was 
coupled with Drew’s lack of experience in avoiding the development of collision 
situations. Furthermore, Drew was still under training and so would have been very 
aware of the obligations under the COLREGs. In addition, Joseph was about to leave the 
bridge and hand-over to Dean and so this may have diverted his attention from the 
situation at hand. The resultant of all of these factors was that the Taff actually complied 
with its obligations under the COLREGs.
At 01:08 elapsed time, Drew then adds to the first statement that the ship would “stand- 
on, with caution” with the action that would be taken in the event that the other ship did 
not keep out of the way.
Drew [01:08]- Otherwise come around.
By this Drew meant that he would alter course and keep out of the way of ship 3. Figure
6.8 shows the quantification of the collision risk.
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Figure 6.8, crossing 4.2.
In this figure the radar’s computer has calculated that ship 3 is 3.9 miles away with a 
closest point of approach of 0.1 miles. This closest point of approach would occur in just 
under 9 minutes. The other information related to the course and speed of the other ship. 
It should be noted that above this information there is a line which states “NO 
ALARMS” even though the Taff was on a collision course with another ship. The reason 
behind there being “no alarms” is that the alarm conditions were set by the people on the 
ship and those parameters had not been breached.
Drew [01:40] Otherwise we will come around to starboard.
PB- OK.
Drew - Other option is to slow down but it's easier to come to starboard.
Drew reiterated the that he would alter course to starboard if the other ship takes no 
action. The option of slowing down is disregarded by stating that it is easier to alter 
course to starboard. Dean then arrives on the bridge and receives a hand-over from
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Joseph. A hand-over consists of a verbal description of the state of the ship and the 
navigational and collision situation. It is designed to include all relevant information so 
that another person can take control of the ship. Joseph then informed Drew that Dean is 
taking over.
Joseph [02:10]- Tell Dean what you are going to do. Dean is taking over from me. 
Drew - OK. We've got this coaster here about 2 points and at the moment got a 
CPA of 2 cables with her, about 1/2 a mile ahead but if she doesn't come around a 
bit, probably come around to starboard.
Dean - Yeah I think what I would do is see the one that has just been overtaken by 
the container ship I'd follow him around all the way.
Drew - OK. So starboard to 135.
Nick - Starboard to 135 aye.
Drew explains the situation regarding ship 3 and describes its position as “about 2 
points”. This refers to where the ship is located in relation to the T a ff s heading. The 
horizon is split into 32 “points” such that a single point consists of an angle of the arc 
over the horizon of 11.25°. Drew stated that ship 3 was about 2 points and so Dean was 
able to see that the ship was located approximately 22.5° from the heading of the ship. 
Drew explained that the intention was to watch how the situation developed before 
altering course to starboard. Dean’s reaction to this was that he advised Drew to start to 
alter course immediately and steer straight towards ship 4. Drew then commenced this 
course of action by giving the instruction to alter course from 130° to 135°. At this point 
the bridge then fell silent for just over a minute. During this time the bridge team gave 
the traffic situation their complete attention, alternately staring at the radar screen and 
peering out of the window at ship 3. This period was characterised by tense 
concentration by all the people involved. Further alterations of course were undertaken as 
the ships got closer and ship 3 never altered course.
From this case it can be seen that even though it was the intention of Drew to maintain 
the T a ffs  course and speed, he was unable to do so following direction given by Dean. 
Furthermore, this intention to maintain course and speed was brought about by a 
miscalculation by the ship’s Captain during the initial course selection. In addition the 
Taff did not maintain its course and speed for very long after its departure from Dover.
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Therefore, although in this case the ship did stand-on as required by the COLREGs, the 
Taff did take unilateral action consistent with the pattern of actions undertaken on all 
other crossings.
Crossing the First lane, summary.
From this it can be seen that there was no intention by the people in charge of the ships to 
comply with the requirements of the COLREGs. That is that on every single crossing 
that I observed, in which there was a risk of collision with a ship crossing from the port 
side, the ferry took action to keep clear of that vessel. This was undertaken even though it 
had right of way over that other ship. Action was taken, or at least the decision to take 
action, was undertaken at the very earliest moment. Whether the people in charge took 
this action through a clear understanding of the freedom to act before the COLREGs had 
started to apply can be debated. However, it was clear that when faced with a risk of 
collision from ships coming from the port side, then the decision was taken to keep out of 
their way regardless of the requirements under the COLREGs.
6.6 Crossing the second traffic lane
When crossing the second traffic lane the requirements under the COLREGs are of 
course reversed. Therefore, it is the ferry that is directed to keep out of the way of the 
other ship and where possible avoid crossing ahead of the other ship. In order to comply 
with the requirement not to cross ahead, the ferry will have to either slow down or alter 
course to starboard. The following examples illustrate the actions taken by the people in 
charge of the ships when faced with a situation in which risk of collision is present. It will 
be shown that the people in charge of the ships took early action to keep out of the way of 
ships crossing from their starboard side in compliance with the requirements of the 
COLREGs.
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In this first example, the Exe (operated by Sirius Line) had sailed from Dover bound for 
Dunkirk and was approaching the second traffic lane. Spencer described the situation to 
me.
Spencer- On a course of 128 and making 120 over the ground with the Northerly 
set. And we've got three vessels on the starboard side. It is the Southernmost of 
the three, target 14 [Ship C] here that is going to give us a problem. Got a CPA of 
2 cables at the moment. So envisaged to come around to starboard in a while to 
come under her stem. I don't want to come too early, just want to check what the 
Iberian boat is going to do [Ship B]. Because he is going to follow her [Ship C ’s] 
stem.
PB- Yeah I see.
Spencer- It should be quite clear-cut, there is nothing to interfere with us. Just be 
a small alteration on the auto pilot. Even 5 degrees now should bring it up to the 
mile. Nothing special.
The traffic situation is shown in Figure 6.9.
Figure 6.9, crossing 5.1.
As Spencer has described the Exe was being pushed to the North by the flooding current 
so that although they were steering 128° but making 120° over the ground. In Figure 6.9
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two ferries can be seen coming across the Channel, ships A and B. Ship B was the 
Iberian ferry noted by Spencer. Ships C, D and E were all following the Northeast bound 
traffic lane. As with crossing the first traffic lane, the person in charge of the ship 
undertook an assessment of the collision risk. Spencer identified that ship C posed a 
collision risk to the Exe. He then stated that his intention was to alter course to starboard 
to pass around the stem of ship C. However, before he undertook the alteration Spencer 
was concerned that an Iberian ferry, ship B, would pose a collision risk once it had passed 
behind ship C. It should be noted that this Iberian ferry gave-way to ship C by altering 
course to port even though it had right of way. It should be noted further that Spencer 
could see that ship C did not give-way to ship B.
Spencer then stated that this was a routine alteration of course undertaken on the auto­
pilot control and amounting to approximately 5°. Spencer also stated that he intended to 
pass the other ship at a distance of about 1 mile. This was in line with the company 
regulations.
3 minutes later Spencer altered course by 10° to starboard to pass astern of ship C. The 
traffic situation is shown in figure 6.10.
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Figure 6.10, crossing 5.2.
PB- So you altered course there 6 degrees and you've already opened up to... 
Spencer-1 increased it up to 10. And its now giving a CPA of 7 cables. And cross 
our head at a range of 2 miles. So once he sees my red I'll stop worrying and 
follow his stern around and not get involved with any out-bound traffic from 
Calais.
Figure 6.10 shows how the Exe altered course to starboard such that it would pass safely 
astern of ship C. Ship B proved not to be a major concern for Spencer as it can be seen to 
be passing well to the South. Spencer described how he had altered course by 10° to 
clear ship C such that the closest point of approach was 0.7 miles. The radar’s computer 
had predicted that ship C would pass ahead of the Exe's  bow at a range of 2 miles. 
However, Spencer stated that situation was still causing him some concern and that he 
would not be happy until “he sees my red”. Seeing the red referred to the red port 
sidelight of the Exe which would only be visible to ship C once ship C had crossed the 
bow. So once ship C had crossed Spencer stated that he intended to alter course back to 
port to follow the stem of the ship around.
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From this example it can be seen that an assessment of the risk was undertaken. The 
person in charge of the ship then identified the risk of collision and took action to 
minimise that risk. The action taken consisted of an alteration of course to starboard 
which was in compliance with the requirements of the COLREGs.
In the next example the Tawe (operated by Iberian Ferries) had just cleared a group of 
fishing boats in the Northeast traffic lane after sailing from Calais and was approaching 
the second traffic lane. The traffic situation approaching the second traffic lane is shown 
in figure 6.11.
The vectors on the ships in this figure were shown in relative motion. This meant that the 
vectors indicate the movements of the other ships relative to the Tawe. Therefore, if a 
vector is pointing directly at the Tawe (located at the centre of the hashed circle) then
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there is a risk of collision. Ships A, B and C were a number of small fishing boats. Ships 
D, E and G were ships navigating down the Southwest bound traffic lane. Ship F was a 
Sirius line ferry bound for Dunkirk. By looking at the vectors it can be seen that it was 
predicted that ship G would pass very close to the Tawe. Figure 6.12 shows the predicted 
movement of ship G, marked target 13.
t * * G e t
Tom, the officer in charge of the ship then stated how close it would pass and the action 
that he intended to take to resolve the situation.
Tom- He's crossing the bow now, point 4. And CPA point 3 and so I'll need to 
come to starboard a tad.
PB- OK.
Tom then altered course to starboard
PB- So what you came around there 10 degrees did you?
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Tom- Just come round 5 degrees to open the CPA on number 13 there. He's now 
crossing the bow 1.4, CPA 0.6. CPA will be as we go under his stem. 0.7 
opening.
PB- Hm OK.
Tom then explained how by altering course at that early stage he was saving himself from 
having to make a much larger alteration at a later stage. It should also be noted that Tom 
stated that he wanted to make the situation clear to the other person on ship G. It should 
further be noted that Tom makes it quite clear that he knew that he was the give-way 
vessel.
Tom- 5 degrees alteration done early on has a big difference. I suppose I could 
carry on and carry on until we get within 2 or 3 miles of him but then you've got 
to make a large alteration of course. He's in doubt as to your intention. If you do 
it nice and early, gives him time to think and see the situation. And at the end of 
the day, I am the give way vessel.
I then made a comment about the interaction between ships G and F. In this Ship F made 
a large alteration of course to starboard and passed ship G at close range. The traffic 
situation can be seen in figure 6.13.
PB- He's probably more concerned about that number 7 [Ship F].
Tom- Yeah well he's obviously making his way around his stem now. Large 
alteration of course to starboard. But that number 7 there if he'd altered when he 
was back here, he wouldn't be making that large alteration now would he.
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Figure 6.13, crossing 6.3.
Tom was reasonably critical of the actions taken by ship F to clear ship G. He made it 
clear that it would have been better to take action at an earlier stage in the manner that he 
did in order to resolve the situation. Tom then decided to alter course a to starboard a bit 
more to ensure a safe passing distance.
PB- So you are happy with that distances and everything or...
Tom- Yeah, I might come around another couple of degrees to starboard. I'll just 
do that a moment. So I've just come around 5 degrees more and he's got a clear 
aspect then to what I'm doing and as he crosses our bow, I'll follow him back.
Keep him on the port bow and follow him back.
From this last section it can be seen that Tom, in a similar manner to Spencer on the Exe, 
altered course back to port once the other ship had crossed the bow.
In this next example Vince a second officer was in charge of the Cam (operated by Sirius 
Line) on a crossing from Dunkirk to Dover. Figure 6.14 shows the traffic situation as the 
Cam passed through the first lane of traffic with Vince looking ahead to the traffic in the
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So what I would do. You play it either way here. The rules say go to starboard, 
but they don't say you can't go to port. So if you go to port, then you have to pass 
him by more than a mile.
Vince undertook an assessment of the risk and found that ship E had a close CPA of 0.2 
miles. This was not within the acceptable parameters of the company rule or protocol as 
he termed it. Vince then explained that he had two options, alter course to port or 
starboard. He clearly understood that he was the give-way ship through his reference to 
the rules. He then stated that he would have to make a large alteration of course to port, in 
order to comply with the company rule. However, a much smaller course alteration 
would result if he altered course to starboard. Vince then immediately altered course to 
starboard to pass astern of ship E. This situation can be seen in figure 6.15.
Figure 6.15, crossing 7.2.
PB- So you are happy with that?
Vince- I'm happy with that. That's a good situation where a small amount at an 
early stage is a lot better than 40 degrees three minutes to go.
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As can be seen, the Cam altered course to starboard and passed astern of ship E. Vince, in 
a similar manner to Tom above, made it clear that he viewed a small alteration at a larger 
distance was much more preferable than a large alteration at a short distance.
PB- So you are just coming back to port now are you?
Vince- Yeah, I'm just going to chase this guy around. Now what I should be able 
to do is as I come around here, I can just really continue to turn onto a westerly 
leg to leave the lanes rather than taking a steep turn.
A few minutes later Vince began to alter course back to port as ship E passed safety 
across the bow of the Cam.
This example further illustrates how the people in charge of the ships alter course as a 
matter of routine for the ships in the second traffic lane. Furthermore, they also make 
reference to the COLREGs and the fact that they know that they are the give-way vessel.
6.7 Crossing the lanes
From this it can be seen that there are both differences and similarities between how the 
ships resolve collision risks. The common points can be classified as:
• Undertaking an assessment of the collision risk.
• Taking early action to resolve the risk.
• Adherence to the company rule on passing distances.
In each of the crossings a careful assessment of the risk of collision was made. This was 
then followed by a decision to take early action to resolve the risk. The action consisted 
of alterations of course such that they resulted in passing at a safe distance as required by 
the company regulations. However, in crossing the first traffic lane it can be argued that 
the person in charge of the ship did not comply with the COLREGs, but when crossing 
the second lane, they did. Furthermore, in crossing the second lane, in the main, the 
respondents stated that they were the give-way vessel. In contrast, such statements were 
not made in crossing the first lane. This then raises the paradox that the people in charge
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of the ships are actively undertaking both compliance and non-compliance with the 
COLREGs within a short space of time. This is to query why the people in charge of the 
ships will break the rules when crossing one lane, but a few minutes later comply with 
the same rules. However, I would claim that the respondents are simply taking unilateral 
action to keep out of the way of all other ships. It is just a co-incidence that the action 
complies with the requirements of the regulations when passing through the second 
traffic lane. For the people in charge of the ships, the risk of collision is simply too great 
for its resolution to be placed in the hands of those onboard other ships. Therefore, they 
have to take unilateral action to resolve the collision risk. I will explore the reasons 
behind this phenomenon in greater detail in chapter 7.
6.8 Parallel crossings
In chapter 5 section 5.4 it was found that there were only 25 NMEs resulting from ships 
on parallel courses. From the analysis it appeared that the adopted routes for crossing 
vessels came about through choice rather than resulting from alterations of course for 
other ships. The appearance was that ships crossing from either direction adopted a route 
across which did not conflict with ships crossing from the other direction. This deduction 
was proved to be true shortly after stepping onboard the first ship, the Wye, during the 
second phase of the research. On the first crossing I observed that there was a voluntary 
traffic separation scheme put in place to de-conflict the crossings of the ferries. Figure 
6.16 and 6.17 show the radar screens of the Dee (Iberian Ferries ferry) and the Exe (Sirius 
Line ferry) in which the outline of the voluntary traffic separation scheme can be seen 
marked as a rectangular box perpendicular to the flow of traffic.
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Figure 6.16, voluntary traffic separation scheme, Dee.
In this the voluntary separation scheme can be seen as a rectangular box running at right 
angles to the main TSS. The heading line of the Dee can be seen passing though the 
voluntary scheme.
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Figure 6.17, voluntary traffic separation scheme, Exe.
The Exe’s radar screen can be seen in figure 6.17. Again the voluntary scheme can be 
seen as a rectangular box at right angles to the main traffic scheme.
This voluntary scheme came about through a meeting between all the ferry companies. 
This forum still meets at intervals of approximately 6 months and is called the Dover 
Strait Navigation Committee. In this committee problems between companies are aired 
and solutions found. The problem of de-conflicting ferries as they crossed was raised in 
the 1980s and it was proposed that the ferry operators should unilaterally adopt a 
voluntary traffic separation scheme. The operation of this scheme was such that Dover to 
Calais ferries would pass to the South and Calais to Dover ones would pass to the North. 
The separation zone between the traffic flows was one mile. It was further agreed that 
those ferries on routes to and from Dover and Zeebrugge and later Dunkirk would pass 
well to the North of the voluntary scheme.
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The effectiveness of this scheme is demonstrated by the passing distances in chapter 5 
section 5.4. Before this scheme was put in place ferries would have been meeting head- 
on and would be directed by the COLREGs to alter course to starboard. This, as 
explained by Captains Cameron and Neil, could result in problems and confusion with 
regard to other ships in the area and so through its introduction has improved the safety 
record.
Cameron- No doubts about that it keeps the ferries apart and it’s... We do need 
that separation. If you get on the wrong side of each other then you can imagine it 
if you have to alter course to starboard for something that’s coming, that’s on 
your starboard side. At the present time with the voluntary separation scheme you 
are not going to be hindered by traffic coming facing you, coming at you from 
ahead. Because they are going to be over on your port side but take that voluntary 
separation scheme away and they could well, you could well find them suddenly 
on your starboard side as well. Which would make your alteration to starboard 
for something that is you know 90 degrees to you it could make it very difficult. 
You’ve got another element to worry about.
Interview with Cameron onboard the Wye.
PB- This voluntary TSS seems to work very well, do you get anyone problems 
with it?
Neil- We don’t worry about that, between the companies we have regular 
meetings between all the companies and we chat about these things. Since it was 
introduced it has reduced the number of end-on situations with other ferries 
dramatically.
Interview with Neil onboard the Wye.
This removal of the head-on situation was one of the main aims behind the introduction 
of TSSs in the first instance. As stated in chapter 4 section 4.2.3 with the introduction of 
the first TSS in the Dover Strait and the Southern North Sea area in 1970 the incidence of 
collisions occurring in the area fell from 142 (for the period 1956-1965) to 37 (for the 
period 1971-1980) (Cockcroft 1982). Furthermore, in July 1994 a TSS scheme was set up 
in the Turkish Straits and the incidence of collisions fell from 155 (for the period 1990- 
1993) to 11 (for the period 1995-1998) (Cockcroft 1998; Grey 2001). Prior to this the 
Dover Strait and the southern North Sea area accounted for almost half of the worlds’ 
collisions (Richey 1966).
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The benefits to the people in charge of the ships following the introduction of the 
voluntary scheme have been high. By reducing the head-on risk posed by other ferries, 
the people in charge of the ships are able to concentrate on the risks faced by the ships 
following the traffic lanes as they cross them. In effect a risk has been designed out of 
the situation. This is a means identified within the risk assessment process (Fleury 1998) 
in which the designing out of a risk removes the need for people to apply rules to control 
that risk.
6.9 Summary
In this chapter I have looked at the process of collision avoidance through the assessment 
of the risk of collision followed by action to minimise that risk. At all times the people in 
charge of the ships attempted to minimise that collision risk. Firstly they undertook a 
quantitative assessment of the risk through the use of the electronic navigation 
equipment. They then decided upon an action to resolve the risk. In the case of the 
collision risk posed by ferries meeting head-on, the risk had been greatly reduced through 
the introduction of a voluntary traffic separation scheme. In effect this was an example of 
the process of designing out of a risk. The companies operating the ships, following a 
series of meetings, co-ordinated the actions of their employees in order to ensure that 
conflict between their ships was removed. The result of this was to allow the respondents 
to ignore other ferries and concentrate upon the risk posed by the crossing traffic. In 
crossing the traffic lanes the resolution of the collision risk took the form of a unilateral 
alteration of course. This occurred in every case that I observed. In crossing the first 
traffic lane this action could be seen as being in violation of the COLREGs, whereas in 
crossing the second lane, this was in compliance with the COLREGs. This paradox of 
conflicting rule compliance should be viewed as a pattern of risk minimisation. It could 
be argued that the people in charge of the ships were using the flexibility within the 
COLREGs such that they did not apply during the very early stages. However, as was 
seen, in only one case was there any attempt to maintain course and speed and see if the 
other ship would comply with their obligations under the COLREGs. Therefore, it can be 
stated that very little regard was given to the concept that they should comply with their
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obligations under the COLREGs and maintain course and speed. In every case unilateral 
action was undertaken to resolve the collision risk. Furthermore, by taking unilateral 
action the collision risk was resolved without reliance upon another person. The reasons 
underlying the reluctance to rely upon the other person will now be explored in chapter 7.
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7.0 Introduction
In this chapter I will draw upon the ethnographic data in order to analyse the reasons 
behind the actions taken to resolve collision risks whilst crossing the Dover Strait. These 
actions were identified in Chapters 5 and 6 and may be summarised as the taking of 
unilateral action to resolve the collision risk. Such unilateral action can be seen to be not 
complying with the requirements of the COLREGs. These actions were taken by people 
with a great deal of knowledge regarding their obligations under the collision regulations. 
Therefore, the aim of this chapter is to analyse the reasons lying behind the taking of 
unilateral action to resolve collision risks by people with good knowledge of the 
COLREGs whilst under a strict scheme of surveillance.
Firstly, I will look at the 5 recurrent themes provided by the people in charge of the ships 
during the ethnographic and semi-structured interviews. These themes were the result of 
an in-depth analysis of the ethnographic interviews and observations of the 46 
participants on 52 crossings. The themes related to the concept of trust, and issues 
revolving around consideration of others, rule flexibility, the precedence of a company 
rule and ease of unilateral action. The issue of surveillance and its effects upon the 
actions of the individuals is then analysed. Surveillance is of relevance to this study due 
to the presence of the surveillance regime at Dover Coastguard. It will be shown that due 
to a lack of rule infraction enforcement, the people in charge of the ships take very little 
account of the surveillance regime and so its deterrent effects are limited.
It will be shown that the people in charge of the ships adopt strategies to cross the Dover 
Strait which minimise their reliance on the other ship to resolve the collision risk. I will 
demonstrate that there is no one single reason lying behind this strategy, but that the 
actions of the people in charge of ships lie at the nexus of a number of interrelated factors
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that impact upon the process of rule compliance. However, the underlying issue will be 
shown to be the wish to maintain control of the management of the collision risk at all 
times due to a lack of trust in the other ship to comply with the COLREGs.
7.1 Reasons for taking unilateral action
Through the process of analytical induction, undertaken within the paradigm of grounded 
theory (see chapter 3 section 3.4), the recurrent themes and analytical categories relating 
to the taking of unilateral action were identified. Table 7.1 summarises the 5 reasons 
given by those in charge of the ships for the taking of unilateral action.
Lack of trust that the other ship will keep clear 22
Being considerate to the other ship 18
Using the flexibility within the rules 15
Complying with the company rule 14
Easier to take the action 11
Table 7.1 Reasons for taking unilateral action.
7.2 Lack of Trust
As can be seen, the most common reason for keeping out of the way of other ships was 
that the respondents did not trust the other ship to comply with their obligations under the 
COLREGs. For example,
Dan-1 wouldn’t trust the way that they interpret the rules. So for that reason, I try 
not to be the stand-on vessel. It’s very simple really.
Dan- Usk.
However, as illustrated by the literature, trust is constructed from a number of 
components including: previous experience; encountering predictable, consistent 
behaviour; the concept of shared values or vested interest; a belief in the competence of 
the other; and a belief that the other cares about their welfare (see chapter 2 section 2.4). 
Furthermore, Luhmann (1988) found that without trust nobody would undertake a risk
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when an uncertainty was present. In addition, Rousseau et al. (1998) and Siegrist et al. 
(2003) identified that for trust to be present the prerequisite was a state of vulnerability. 
This means that for a person to trust another to resolve an issue, they must place 
themselves in a vulnerable position and this is in itself a risk. Therefore, for risk taking 
to occur, trust had to be present (Bachmann 1998, Viklund 2003, Beck 2002). This issue 
of trust is of critical importance to the stand-on ship. The stand-on ship must maintain its 
course and speed whilst waiting for the other to resolve the collision risk. The means that 
the stand-on ship is placing itself in a position of vulnerability for it is relying upon 
another whilst getting closer to the point of collision. When I probed the issue of trust the 
manner in which the participants constructed the concept of trust came through. Thus, 
trust, or lack of, was constructed from a variety of factors which will be explored.
7.2.1 Vulnerability.
As identified above, the essential pre-requisite of trust is that of being willing to place 
yourself, and by extension the ship, in a position of vulnerability. This vulnerable state 
would exist where a person was reliant upon the actions of another to avoid a risk such 
that they no longer had control of the situation. This is the case for ships that are directed 
to maintain their course and speed.
PB- So how do you see this avoiding a situation where they have to rely on others 
to keep out of the way?
Morris-1 see it as good practice. It’s self preservation. All the time that you are 
relying on someone else to get you out of a situation then you are not controlling 
it are you? That’s basically it.
Morris, Usk.
Gary- Very rarely do you have to stand-on. If you have to go charging in there 
then that means that you really don’t have control. You’ve lost control of your 
own ship haven’t you? Let alone the situation.
Gary, Usk.
Casey- Well we've really put ourselves in the position of the give-way vessel all 
the time. Whichever traffic lane we cross. So to be honest I like it that way 
because you are in control. If you put yourself in the position of the give-way
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vessel irrespective, then you've got control of the situation. I feel happy with that 
anyway. You know from a purely practical safety point of view I feel happy with 
that.
Video transcript: Exe.
Therefore, there was an unwillingness to place themselves and the ship in a position of 
vulnerability which could only be solved through the actions of others. This risk of 
relying upon another to resolve the situation was just too great for the people in charge of 
the ships to undertake. They, at all times, wished to maintain control of the situation such 
that the only people that they needed to rely upon were themselves. However, this can be 
seen as a reversal of the position that both Rousseau et al. (1998) and Siegrist et al. 
(2003) required for vulnerability to be acceptable. For the people in charge of the ships, 
maintaining control of the situation was of primary importance. The participants did not 
wish to place themselves in a vulnerable position.
7.2.2 Previous history.
The experiences of the personnel involved was of prime importance in their construction 
of trust with regard to other ships. It was very common for people to state that they had 
considerable experience of other ships not following the COLREGS.
PB- [question asked whilst observing a ship not observing the COLREGS] So that 
one crossing from the port side, he’s altered course has he?
Sam- No, he’s not. See this is the worst thing... you have to be very careful.
Video transcript, Tawe Calais to Dover.
PB- So do you think that a lot of people don’t know the rules then?
Tim- Yes, I must say yes after 2 years in this traffic separation scheme most 
people think that when you cross the TSS on their starboard side they think that I 
am the give-way vessel.
Interview with Tim, Second Officer Usk.
In this extract I asked the chief officer, Monty, how likely it would be that the other ships 
would follow the COLREGS and alter course for him:
Monty- Very very unlikely. I've never seen ships alter when you are that close to 
Dover for you in that lane. They... it's not going to happen. They are locked into
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their tramlines, they've got their road, they are driving down and they are going to 
stay in it you know. It's a little bit like you overtaking something on the hard 
shoulder, it doesn't work.
Video transcript, Taff Sailed Dover to Calais.
Alan the chief officer on the Tawe, was asked whether he would ever wait and see if the 
other ship would follow the COLREGS and keep out of his way?
Alan- If you did that then 99.9% of the time you’re going to have to alter course 
anyway, they never, you just cannot rely on other people altering course.
Video transcript, Tawe, Calais to Dover
Noah, the chief officer on the Exe had experienced poor watch watchkeeping practice on 
other ships:
N oah-.. .maybe the guy has left the bridge as I've seen before or he's nodded off 
and then we've got to take our own action.
Video transcript, Exe. Sailed Dunkirk for Dover
The level of mistrust for other ships was also reinforced by the on the job training 
through the passing on of tacit knowledge to junior officers and cadets. In the following 
extract James a deck cadet is relating how he has been taught to keep out of the way of 
everyone else:
PB- What I’m wondering about is, I talked to somebody two weeks ago, and I 
was saying about this practice you know finding a gap and they said, “that was 
outrageous, they can’t do this, that’s against rule 15, they’re meant to come out, 
stand-on and go through, wait for the other guy to alter”.
James- Well but it’s a question of what’s safer in the end isn’t it? I mean the rules 
are there but you’ve got to adapt them, I’ve forgotten the exact phrase but, “only 
if it’s safe to do so”. I mean is it safer to storm out into the middle of the lane 
where there are five ships and they all have to come to starboard, or is it safer to 
come around to port 10° really early so you pass around their stem and everyone 
is happy. It’s just a matter of what is safer. It just seems safer to come out and go 
to port 6 miles off while they are not doing anything and they can see your aspect 
and see what is happening. Certainly on here the other day, I was on watch with 
Tim and we did the same thing. There were three coming up the north east lane 
and we’d just come around the comer and they were three abreast, all 4 or 5 
cables from each other, so all three of them coming to starboard you know, they 
would all get a bit worried all deep sea people as well, you know. So, instead of 
coming around to 290, which was our course, we just came around following their
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stems. And it worked well. They were all past, we were 6-7 cables astern of all 
of them. No one got embarrassed or anything so. Seems the way that everyone 
does it on here, seems to work.
Interview with James deck cadet Usk.
This should be compared with how Max second officer on the Wye failed a training 
course in a shore based training college when he applied the same thinking and operation 
to a simulated situation.
Max-1 see that as excellent seamanship, because, unfortunately I was failed on 
my ENRAS for doing it. OK I did it a little bit closer, say at about 2 miles. But 
then again I was in a faster ship in my ENRAS course.
PB- Sorry what’s the ENRAS Course?
Max-It’s the navigation, ARPA simulator stuff and you have to do it for your 2:2. 
And I was picked up for this and failed when I altered course to port. Its done 
before the person has even altered most of them are looking at 2 miles to alter and 
if they haven’t altered before 2 miles then you are looking at slowing down and 
you are talking about a ship that is 280000, gross tonnes, I can’t remember the 
deadweight 200000t, you know and having to pull the handles right back. 
Basically putting the prop to stop at 2 miles.
PB- So were they trying to teach you or trying to indicate that you...
Max- That you shouldn’t alter course to port. Because the rules say that an 
alteration of course to port should be avoided. But it should be avoided, but, I ’m 
avoiding a collision situation altogether if I am doing it.
Interview with Max second officer Wye.
However, this lack of trust in others was also coached in terms of assisting inexperienced 
people on the other ship by keeping out of their way. Drew a cadet on the Taff explained 
how they are always taught to imagine the other person as being unsure and 
inexperienced and thus by extension, untrustworthy.
Drew- Yeah. Have to go into hand steering and come around a bit more. So I 
might as well come around a bit more now. I've always been taught to think as if 
you are the person on the other bridge and, you know, not used to coming down 
here and, you know, obviously a bit scared and so you don't want a ferry pointing 
directly at you, so just showing them what you want to do.
Video transcript Taff sailed Calais for Dover.
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Therefore, through the training of cadets and junior officers the tacit knowledge relating 
to the unreliability and untrustworthiness of other seafarers due to their previous 
experience was passed on.
The experience of observing COLREG non-compliance by other ships was found across 
all ranks and most of the people involved in the study. Therefore, for a large number of 
the participants (if not all) there was a belief that the other ship had a past history of non- 
compliance with the COLREGs and so could not be trusted. For the participants it did not 
matter that they had no direct experience of that single ship or the people onboard it. For 
the participants the other ship was simply a representation of all other ships and so 
represented their past history. This form of risk reflection based upon the past history co­
incides with the views of Giddens (1991, 1994, and with Pierson, 1998) who claimed that 
the creation and destruction of trust reflects a future orientated relationship. Giddens 
equates this to the reliability of a system in that it will perform to expectations, trust is 
therefore based upon the reliability of past performances being repeated in the future. 
Similarly, Liebeskind and Oliver (1998) claimed that trust had a basis in the past 
performances of the individuals. Therefore, if there is a history of non-compliance, 
coupled with a training process that reinforces the unreliability of the other, then it is not 
surprising that the people in charge of the ships do not place their trust in the hands of the 
other.
7.2.3 Predictable, consistent behaviour.
Another factor that people would take into account when constructing the issue of trust in 
another ship was that of their predictable behaviour. This was of particular concern with 
regard to fishing vessels as many people onboard had a great deal of experience of their 
unpredictable movements.
PB- Do you get a lot of problems with fishermen then?
Ray- Yeah, but we expect it you know. They are just unpredictable. They are
trawling away and they know where there is a wreck so they alter course to avoid
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the wreck, but they do it regardless of what’s about. It’s you know, they’ve got to 
give-way to us, but you expect it.
Video transcript, Dee, Calais to Dover.
Tom- So we've got a gaggle of fishing boats in the middle of the separation zone 
there. They are, I think one of our biggest worries because, you don't know what 
they are going to do. One minute they are heading north and suddenly they are 
picking up their nets and heading south at full speed 
Doug- And showing all their fishing lights.
Tom- Showing all their fishing lights. You just don't know where you are with 
those boys. Yeah, I want to get through these fishermen, coasters whatever they 
are. See this guy here, he's picked up speed. You see you never know what these 
guys are going to do.
Doug- You can be quite nicely set for a route through the middle of it, the fishing
fleet and it seems that
Tom- They put their Kamikaze hats on
Doug- And start closing you down.
Tom- Yeah, I think that they are so busy with what's going on on the deck of their 
fishing boat that it seems that the traffic situation is almost irrelevant to them. 
Almost take it for granted that we aware of them. They could do almost anything 
and almost probably will.
Video transcript Tawe. Sailed Calais to Dover.
PB- What about fishing boats, do you get much problems with them?
Spencer- Going the wrong way up the lane?
PB- No, just generally.
Spencer- Generally, yeah you get quite a bit. They always seem to alter at the last 
minute and always end up in a cluster. Quite lucky in that we've got a few lads 
who are ex-fishermen. One of them is a class one who has been a master of big 
boats. So he's very helpful to have because he knows all the signs that they do 
and so he says right they are doing this. But you get some that are countering the 
rules so much that they've got their trawling lights on and their nets are fast on an 
obstruction and you check their speed and they are doing 14 knots. You just can't 
do it.
Video transcript Exe Sailed Dover 6/9/02.
The low level of belief in the general watchkeeping abilities of fishers was illustrated in 
one incident in which an American ship was overheard in its attempt to call a fishing 
vessel via the radio (VHF). In this the second officer Dean thought it highly unlikely that 
the American ship would successfully contact the fishing boat.
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VHF- [American accent] Fishing vessel on my port bow at approximately 2.2 
miles you're position is 51 degrees 06 minutes north and...
Dean- He's having a laugh if he thinks he's going to get a response from a fishing 
boat. He obviously hasn't been in the Channel before.
VHF- [American accent] this is the Strong American come in please.
Dean - That's definitely guaranteed a response.
VHF- [Second voice, fake American accent] Is that Forest?
Video transcript Taff Sailed Dover to Calais.
In another incident Noah a second officer on the Exe recounted how he had been 
involved in a collision with a fishing boat whilst working onboard another ship:
Noah- When I worked on the cable ship we had all our lights up and everyone had 
to get out of our way.
PB- Did you ever get situations where they weren't getting out of the way?
Noah- Oh yeah. We used to fire flares at them, maroons, yeah it was great fun. 
Had loads of pyrotechnics. One time we were putting in a fibre optic cable and 
quite wrongly they decided to use a barge instead of a proper ship and so we lived 
in this barge, with all the gear onboard, laying this cable and it had a single anchor 
mooring on it and it was dragging ourselves along with two anchors and so we 
had to do a total repositioning and at night we weren't working, so the tug would 
came alongside, we were anchored and made fast and there were all these big 
beam trawlers out there and the first thing you could see were these huge poles, 
like telegraph poles and one foggy night "clang" they took the top off the tug 
bridge front.
Video transcript Exe. Sailed Dover.
From this it can be seen that one of the factors influencing the level of trust for other 
ships revolved around the belief that they would be unpredictable in their behaviour. 
Such a belief in the predictability of the behaviour of the other is closely allied to the 
previous theme of the previous history. The belief in the predictability or not of the other 
ship is based upon the past history of the other ship. In the previous section the concept 
was constructed that the other ship would conform to their past history and not comply 
with the COLREGs. Similarly, in this section it is seen that the fishing vessels previous 
history is that of being predictably unpredictable in their movements. Thus, the 
participants to this research cannot rely upon them to comply with the COLREGs due to 
the belief in their unpredictable behaviour.
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7.2.4 A belief in the competence o f  the other.
In many instances the competence and professional standards of the people onboard the 
other ship and in more general terms of the wider shipping industry were called into 
question.
People need to properly understand the rules, I mean many people don’t.
Interview Mitch. Usk.
One of the other things that annoys me about navigation, the number of times that 
I have been going up to Zeebrugge and you will find people, they must know you 
are there. They have seen you on their port side they have seen you alter around 
you know perhaps they are a couple of miles ahead of you and they are going 
exactly for a point on the chart, a point on the damned chart. I ’ve seen it where I 
have had them on my port side where they have crossed over from the Thames or 
something coming to wherever and they have crossed on my bow, crossing ahead 
of me, got right on my bow, slower than me, and then they have gone directly 
ahead of me. You know and I am catching them up. And I’m thinking, “what on 
earth are these people doing”.
Max, Interview Wye.
In the Irish Sea, when I was here we had Polish officers on here when we were 
running between Liverpool and Dublin and I used to tell them I used to say "all 
these ships you see out here, imagine there is a bloody idiot on the bridge of 
everyone of them and act accordingly and then you won't be surprised."
Charlie, Video transcript Exe Sailed Dover.
Standards have slipped amongst the flags of convenience or third world nations as 
the traditional shipping companies have off loaded their costs. I mean it started 
with the oil crisis in the 70's and then it carried on with the monetarism band 
wagon in the 80's. You know it became fashionable to cut costs at all costs and 
flag things out and there have been massive consequences as a result. You know 
you've only got to listen to some of the conversations that go on on the radio its 
scary.
Monty, video transcript. Taff. Sailed Dover to Calais.
These were hardly surprising comments for in one of Iberian Ferries training and 
operations manual it stated:
It is not uncommon for a vessel within the traffic lanes to wrongly assume it has 
right of way by virtue of the fact it is following the routeing, assumptions are 
often made that this takes priority over the collision regulations and there is a 
reluctance to alter course.
Iberian Ferries training and operations manual.
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Other instances were often based upon a false understanding of training around the world. 
In the following extract the chief officer Alan decried the standard of training that 
Filipino ratings undertook. A rating being a seafarer who was not an officer. He believed 
that the extent of the training that Filipino ratings undertook was directly comparable to 
UK ratings. UK rating training is based around a small number of months in a training 
centre and once completed they are awarded an efficient deck hand (EDH) certificate. 
This compares with the Filipino rating’s training in which the person will spend three or 
more years in a college and upon successfully completing the training will be awarded an 
officer of the watch certificate of competency (Amante 2003). Once trained the rating 
would then sail as a rating at the rank of an AB (an able seaman) rather than as an officer. 
Alan’s misunderstanding of the training system then impacted upon his level of trust for a 
Filipino crewed Liquefied Petroleum Gas (LPG) carrying ship, as demonstrated by his 
account of the VHF radio conversation in the second part of the transcript.
Alan- So many people from like, I'm not decrying the Philippines or the Indians 
etc... The Indians they do almost the same exams as we do, but you've got a lot 
of the Philippines, I was on one ship, for example, where all the ABs on deck had 
a third mates ticket, all the ABs, because they are issued with it as soon as they 
come from college instead of getting an EDH certificate, they get a class 3 or an 
officer of the watch certificate. So, I mean they just employ them as officers and 
they haven't done any rules or. We had a third mate join as well, Filipino, and all 
he knew was alter course to starboard.
PB-Well that's a start.
Alan- You know it's sad. And the Captain had to be with him all the time. So 
what’s the point in having him. All these companies are employing them as 
cheap labour. As long as they don't have an accident. There was another 
situation where, that was quite funny, north east lane there, there was a Philippine 
calling up and he was an LPG carrier, and we were looking at it on the radar and 
he was giving his position and there was for five ships around him and you could 
see the space, literally from the time he said that this is the Philippine LPG carrier 
all the ships just went right out and the space around him just expanded and you 
think, well that’s what it's like at times. I don't know how some of these British 
captains can go deep sea now. I mean with the crew they’ve got, the officers.
You know where it's a British Captain, Britain's chief officer and all the rest are 
Philippines. Must be pulling their hair out.
Video transcript Tawe Calais to Dover.
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There was also a belief that if the COLREGS were made hard enough it would protect 
their own jobs. However, there could also be an element of racism within this statement 
as ‘monkey’ is a derogative term at sea for a Filipino.
PB- Do you think they should change any of the rules? Are there any of the rules 
that you would like to change?
Peter-No, I don't think they should change them. I don't think they should add to 
them as often as they do. The basic principles remain the same. The main reason 
people change rules is to make them easier so that they can employ monkeys to 
do the job and they will do it by numbers.
Video transcript, C am .
In an interview with Damon, one of the captains on the Usk, he spoke about the incident 
where David Cockcroft, general secretary of the ITF union was able to buy a Panamanian 
chief officers licence without any seagoing experience thus reinforcing the idea that 
others cannot be trusted:
Damon- One of the nautical people bought a Panamanian chief officers ticket two 
years ago, there was a big blurb on it. He paid cash for it. So you can understand 
why we are a bit apprehensive about trusting any other ship.
Interview with Captain Damon Usk.
The issue of the perceived lack of competence of the people in charge of the other ships 
of course had a significant impact upon the level of trust. Many of the people in charge 
of the ships did not believe that the other people had received adequate training and so 
could not trust the other to comply with the COLREGs. Renn and Levine (1991) believed 
that a belief in the competence of the other was a pre-requisite in trusting another person. 
Similarly, Kasperson et al. (1992) believed, in part, that trust was built on a foundation of 
a belief in the competence of the other. Conversely, if the person doubted the competence 
of the other then trust would evaporate.
The comments relating to the competence of the other can also be seen as a reaction to a 
perceived de-skilling of the job of navigating ships. On many occasions comments were 
made by the participants as to their long-term employment prospects. There were 
considerable fears that other nationalities (primarily from Eastern Europe) would come in
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and take their jobs. Hence the comments that other nationalities were not trained properly 
and could not do the job safely. So it is hardly surprising that the people onboard would 
take a defensive stand and claim that the people navigating other ships were not 
competent if they were seen as both a threat to their ship in addition to their livelihoods.
7.2.5 The concept o f  shared values or vested interest.
Trust based upon the concept of shared values is of particular importance in instances 
where a person is reliant upon another to resolve a risk (Kasperson et al. 1992). As 
previously outlined above it is clear that the respondents took a low view of the training, 
experience and competence of the people in charge of other ships. However, when asked 
about their relationship with other ferry operators it became clear, especially when 
coupled with the observed behaviour, that the respondents trust was based upon the 
concept of shared values and a vested interest. The basis for this appeared to be due to 
the ongoing relationship between all the parties, a belief in a shared outlook, good 
communications and the exchange of ideas. Bennett’s research on the application of 
environmental rules (1999) claimed that trust could be greatly increased through a 
combination of a stable group who expect to continue to interact in the future and who 
share information.
For example, I asked Neil onboard the Wye and Damon on the Usk, if they encountered 
problems with other ferries.
We don’t worry about that, between the companies we have regular meetings 
between all the companies and we chat about these things.
Neil, interview Wye.
There were problems. You would see a ship coming out and you wouldn’t know 
what was happening. You’d be thinking, “if he comes out past that one he come 
this way, or if he comes that way” and it has improved it immeasurably and they 
have meetings about it twice a year, the Dover Strait Navigation Committee.
They bring all the operators including the fast craft operators which increases 
your understanding of other companies views. And the Sirius Line boys do the 
same as us.
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Damon, interview Usk.
Neil on the Wye explains how he sometimes contacts other ferries with the VHF radio to 
explain what he is doing and that they seldom reply as they have a shared understanding 
of what he is up to.
Sometimes we do contact other ferries, like last night when I tried to contact the 
Monet, all I was going to tell them was, of course, I should have come round to 
port for the other guys. So all I was going to tell them was that I will be keeping 
this course till I passed them and then come around. He didn’t bother answering 
because he knew I wouldn’t be embarrassing him by coming around to starboard. 
There was no problem.
Neil interview, Wye.
Similarly, Casey on the Exe explained that they have a greater confidence in the other 
person because they are a known quantity.
Casey- Like when we meet our own ships in the channel outside Dunkirk, going 
in and out of Dunkirk. I mean I get on the VHF I talk to him and OK we'll do 
that, we know exactly what is going on, both of us, that is not a problem. It's not 
an unknown quantity.
Video transcript Exe, Casey Sailed Dunkirk.
The use of the radio to communicate with other ships was particularly widespread 
onboard the Wye and the Usk as they entered Zeebrugge. The following are brief 
extracts from my field notes written onboard the Usk.
VHF contact made with the dredger and an arrangement to pass to the north was 
made.
Fieldnote Usk 2/5,0940.
VHF contact made with a dredger within the harbour to arrange the passing. Also 
we passed a floating amphibious land-rover.
Fieldnote Usk 3/5,0805.
VHF contact used to contact a dredger within the harbour of Zeebrugge. Did this 
by contacting Zeebrugge port control and asking for its name. Then with the 
name contacted the dredger direct to allow for an arrangement to be made to pass 
the other vessel. In this case it was green to green. VHF was again used to 
contact a ferry that was out bound to make a local arrangement to pass.
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Fieldnote Usk 2/5, 1215.
It was viewed as being acceptable, this use of the radio as the other ships was known to 
them.
Damon- Yes, if the facility is there. So we do use radio quite a lot. But we know 
who we are talking to and all the publications on this state identification. So as 
we use it a lot and so ... take that dredger or the Dart line ship, we know it’s the 
Dart 4, traffic centre knows it is the Dart 4 and so there is no risk. There is no 
other ship there, it is safe. The danger with it is when some one miss identifies or 
assumes then it is dangerous.
Interview with Damon Usk.
Casey- Like when we meet our own ships in the channel outside Dunkirk, going 
in and out of Dunkirk. I mean I get on the VHF I talk to him and OK we'll do 
that, we know exactly what is going on, both of us, that is not a problem. It's not 
an unknown quantity.
Video Transcript Exe. Sailed Dunkirk.
The use made of the VHF should be compared with chapter 4 section 2.1, where the 
MCA discourages its use to resolve collision risks. Furthermore, this belief in the 
reliability of the other ferries translated into allowing much closer passing distances 
between the ferries and the fast SeaCats. On many occasions I observed the SeaCats 
passing at very close range. Such situations did not cause concern onboard the ferries 
among the people in charge. In fact the passage of the SeaCats was almost ignored as the 
attention was focussed onto the crossing traffic.
PB- So that's fine then is it that Seacat coming past at what is it half a mile? 
Jacob- It's, it's OK, because we know what he's doing.
Video transcript, Taff Sailed Dover to Calais.
PB- Seems like the seacat’s pass you quite close?
Sam- Yes, that's normal. See she already agree with me. She’ll be passing my 
stem and overtaking me, and then she's clear of the channel. You know passing 
in the channel it could be one cable, half a cable. In Calais pass into cables. It's 
not open sea.
Video transcript, Tawe Sailed Calais to Dover.
PB- So you are not worried about that Seacat coming in??
Tom- No not worried about him. He'll... I'll go up to starboard in a moment.
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Video transcript, Tawe. Sailed Calais to Dover
The shared values exhibited by the ferry traffic has come about through exposure to their 
practices over time. However, this belief in their shared values was tempered with a 
certain amount of scepticism such that the trust was more of a level of that identified by 
Poortinga and Pidgeon (2003) who termed it critical trust.
PB- So this Seacat looks like it might pass really close is that a worry for you or... 
Drew- As long as it stays outside of 5 cables then it's OK. Sometimes they pass a 
lot closer than that, you can see them on there bridge they are that close.
PB- What would you do then if it came within 5 cables then?
Drew- Um, alter course but not too much because at the end of the day they have 
to keep out of your way don't they?
Video Transcript Taff, sailed Calais for Dover.
It was interesting to note how the people in charge of the ships trusted the people onboard 
the SeaCats to such an extent that they allowed much closer passing distances. This was 
enhanced by the communication between the companies in such forums as the Channel 
Navigation Users group. Both Bennett (1999) and Aalders et al. (1999) saw 
communication and an ongoing relationship as being important in the generation of trust. 
This communication aided the exchange of beliefs and demonstrated the sharing of 
values and beliefs. Brenkert (1998) saw the concept of shared values and beliefs as a 
means of facilitating the creation of trust and the willingness to make oneself vulnerable. 
Such trust though, mirroring the research of Poortinga and Pidgeon (2003) and Horlick- 
Jones et al (2003), was tempered to reflect the risk and so could be viewed as critical trust 
which was trust balanced with scepticism.
7.2.6 Trust: a summary.
The issue of trust was critical to the decision to keep out of the way of other ships. The 
reason behind this was the concept of vulnerability in that the stand-on vessel should 
place itself in a vulnerable position in relation to the other ship in order for the other ship 
to resolve the collision risk. Rousseau et al. for example defines trust as:
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A psychological state comprising the intention to accept vulnerability based upon 
the behaviour of positive expectations of the intentions of or behaviour of another.
(Rousseau etal. 1998: 395)
However, the concept of trust was constructed from a variety of factors. These factors 
reflected the previous research in this area in that they included: previous history, 
consistency in behaviour, understanding of the competence of the other and a concept of 
shared interest (Chapter 2 2.2 and 2.3). However, in previous research in this area these 
concepts have always been used to demonstrate how trust is generated between different 
parties. However, I have contrasted this literature with the situation found onboard these 
ships in which there exists a state of mistrust. In the previous research both empirically 
and theoretically the concept of trust revolved around the idea of the positive outcome of 
placing oneself in a position of vulnerability. Whereas, in this research the participants 
did all that they could to remove the vulnerability from the equation. This of course then 
has a detrimental effect upon’the application of the COLREGs as trust that the other 
person will undertake their obligations is central to their operation. This does have 
resonances with the research undertaken by Rasanen et a l  (2002) where they found that 
bicyclists would not force car drivers to comply with the rules and give-way to them. 
Rasanen et al. claimed that this was due to the asymmetrical risk experienced by the 
bicyclists. For the participants in this research the asymmetrical risk was of course 
present. The culture of the two companies reflected the total unacceptability of any un­
controlled collision risk. The spectre of another Herald o f Free Enterprise1 was 
mentioned on a number of occasions by personnel working for both Iberian Ferries and 
Sirius Line. To this end, there was a reluctance to accept any vulnerability as this would 
mean relying upon the other ship to resolve the collision risk. This would entail loss of 
control of the situation and, in part, of their ship with major negative consequences. 
Therefore there was a great reluctance to trust the ships who had demonstrated in the past 
their non-compliance with the COLREGs. Furthermore, the people in charge of the ships 
did not believe in the competence of the other ship, nor that they would act predictably
1 The Herald of Free Enterprise was a roll-on roll-off (RoRo) ferry that capsized and sank off the port of 
Zeebrugge in 1987 with the loss of 135 lives.
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and that they did not share the same values as themselves. These themes when aggregated 
comprised the lack of trust that the participants had for the other ship. It should be noted 
that this mistrust, based in part on the past behaviour of the other ships, was directed at 
all the ships transiting the Strait, regardless of any previous interaction. It is unlikely that 
trust between the ferries and the ships in transit will ever be in place in the future. 
Therefore the efficacy of having trust placed so centrally within a set of collision 
regulations should be questioned.
However, the trust that was generated for the ships in transit should be compared with 
that shown for the other ferries. There was considerable levels of trust and a willingness 
to place themselves in vulnerable positions in order to gain a advantage in the future. This 
level of trust may be seen to have its foundation in the ongoing relationships between the 
ships. Zey (1998) saw the concept of the future expectation of a relationship as being 
vital to the generation of trust. Lane (1998) claimed that trust was required for an 
interdependent relationship to Nvork. Such a relationship exists between the ferries in that 
they relied upon each other to conform to local custom and practice within the port areas. 
It is a complicated process manoeuvring a large passenger ferry off a berth during a storm 
and one that is facilitated by the co-operation of the other ferries. Through this belief in 
the shared values, past experience, the concept of an ongoing relationship and clear 
communication, trust was created between the ferries. Through this trust, the people in 
charge of their ships were more likely to place themselves in a vulnerable position. 
Although it should be noted that such trust was more akin to the critical trust as espoused 
by Poortinga and Pidgeon (2003). Such an ongoing relationship was missing from the 
encounters with the ships that navigated through the Dover Strait. In these, there was no 
expectation that they would have any form of relationship in the future. The phrase “ships 
that pass in the night” was coined to reflect such transitory relationships.
The construction of the concept of trust between the parties to the collision risk was seen 
as being of great importance in understanding the reasoning behind the taking of 
unilateral action to resolve the risk. However, it was not the only reason given by the 
participants. The other reasons will now be explored.
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7.3 Being considerate to others
18 of the 46 respondents in this research talked about how they were simply trying to be 
considerate to the ships navigating within the traffic lane by not causing them any bother. 
By this they meant that by keeping out of their way then they would not be causing them 
any worry and that they would be helping them to have a stress free life. It was all for 
their benefit, truly altruistic gestures.
PB- OK. So is that the way you prefer to do it, to get across without getting in the 
way of the traffic coming down?
Gus- Yes, that's it. It's like I said to you earlier you must give them a little bit of 
consideration, don't steer straight for them, don't scare the hell out of them. 
Because they are watching us these fast ships coming in and out, so if we can help 
them at all we change course like we said we would that gives him ample 
distance, you know instead be miles and miles away and see what we are doing 
and he still doesn't have to do anything himself and it will be ample clearing. 
Video transcript Exe, Dover to Dunkirk.
I personally I take the time not to inconvenience people, lets pick a course where 
I’ll go astern no more than a mile away and then they don’t worry.
Interview with Max, Wye.
Drew- I've always been taught to think as if you are the person on the other bridge 
and you know not used to coming down here and you know obviously a bit scared 
and so you don't want a ferry pointing directly at you, so just showing them what 
you want to do.
Video Transcript Taff, sailed Calais for Dover.
Joseph- You want to remove all of his anxieties, he knows exactly what you are 
doing and that means he should cross at least a mile ahead of you and he should 
be in no doubt. What we try to do is get about 2 miles so there can be no doubt 
that he knows that we are passing behind him, if you've got the chance.
Video Transcript Taff, sailed Calais for Dover.
Chris- Let's put it this way. What would the general average deep sea man want 
us to do- set a course that is nice and safe and not hassle anyone, or just come box 
standard out and make everyone's life a misery. Would they prefer that? I don't 
think so.
Video transcript. Tawe, sailed Dover to Calais.
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However, it would be hard to categorise such actions as being altruistic as the 
respondents also gained from such actions through a clarification of the situation. In this 
quote Neil used the word “embarrass” to mean not get in the way of the other ship.
Now certain people would just plod on and let him sort it out because he is the 
give way vessel, but I ’m a bit of a pragmatist and I will do my best not to 
embarrass another vessel and the payback for all of this is that if I show this guy a 
green light or if I bring myself around to a course of 150 when I really want to do 
130 and I go to 150 to get ahead, the payback is that I don’t get stressed. I’m not 
for the next ten minutes thinking “is this guy going to do anything”. He doesn’t 
have to do anything because I ’ve altered course, so he can keep on plodding on 
drinking your tea mate.
Interview with Neil, Wye.
There did appear to be a belief among many of the respondents that making life easier for 
the ships transiting the Straits was part of the underlying process of keeping clear of 
everyone else. Undertaking such action did of course produce perceived benefits for the 
people in charge of the ferries but should also be seen as being undertaken, in part at 
least, due to a concern for those transiting the area. Such concern for others was not seen 
in other studies on non-compliance. This consideration for the other person appeared to 
be related to the belief that the people onboard the other ship would not be able to cope 
with the collision situation. This was due, in part, to a lack of trust in their training and 
experience rather than as an act of altruisms. Therefore, this factor had direct resonance 
with the belief in the competence of the other (see section 7.2.4). The people onboard the 
ferries simply did not believe that the other was capable of applying the COLREGs and 
so to make it easier for them, they would remove the need for the other to take any action.
An additional factor in taking the actions in order to reduce the workload on the other 
ship was that of a demonstration of the superior professional skills possessed by those 
onboard the ferries. Such demonstrations applied to both within the shipboard structure 
and without. For example, it was viewed as unprofessional to alter course by too much in 
order to keep out of the way. When an officer did take what was seen as unwarranted 
action then they would be subject to ridicule from the quartermasters. Dean the person in
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charge of the Taff explained his actions to keep clear of another ship. In this he stated 
that he had altered course to 140° in order to show clearly to the other ship what he 
intended to do. However, the actions were seen as too much by Dylan and Sean, the two 
other people making up the bridge team, both of whom were subordinate to Dean..
Dean- So I've come to 140 so that they'll be able to see exactly what I am doing. 
Dylan- Sometimes we go looking at Boulogne.
Sean- More often than not.
[Laughter]
Sean- It's very nice at this time of the year.
Dylan-1 thought that it was Margate that I normally aim for.
Video transcript Taff Dover to Calais.
On two other occasions I observed Dean being the subject of ridicule due to ‘excessive’ 
alterations of course. Similarly, Drew a cadet under training was viewed as going too far 
North in his attempts to clear another ship.
Drew- 325.
Luke- We shouldn't be going this far North?
Edgar- Penguin!
Luke- Penguin on the starboard bow.
Edgar- 325.
Drew- Thank you.
Video transcript Taff Calais to Dover.
Leaving aside the accuracy of the geographical distribution of Penguin’s, the examples 
indicate the manner in which other work associates demonstrated their disquiet at what 
was viewed as deviations from the accepted practice. Bloor (1980) stated that such 
unacceptable formulations were subject to being penalised by the other workers.
Where actors must engage in activities under the gaze of their work 
associates then they run the risk of being penalised for offending their 
colleagues sense of piety by engaging in practices which appear to others 
unacceptable formulations of the formal scheme.
(Bloor 1980: 51)
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In effect the criticism put forward by the work associates was a form of control through 
admonishment. The people who I observed gaining the greatest respect among their peers 
were the ones that altered course just enough to clear the other ships by a wide safe 
margin, but still remained close to the planned route across the Strait. This is in contrast 
to the research published by Habberley et al. (1986) who claimed that the people who 
were regarded as the most skilled navigators were those who passed very close to other 
ships, i.e. those who used the smallest margin of safety. Habberley et al. stated that this 
was because those with the greatest skills demonstrated that by placing themselves in 
positions in which they knew from their past experience that they would be able to 
extricate themselves from.
Many of the participants in this research attributed the taking of unilateral actions as 
being considerate to the other ships following the traffic lanes. The participants claimed 
that they were only taking these actions in order to make the lives of the others easier. 
However, this should also be seen in the light of a lack of regard for the skills and 
experience of the others navigating their ships through the Strait. A number of 
participants claimed that the other ships would not possesses the skills or have the 
experience to navigate through this area safety. Therefore, in order to relieve their stress, 
the participants would engage in practices to relieve the others of their obligations under 
the COLREGs. This strategy does show that the participants have concern for the well­
being of the people onboard the other ship. Such a concern for the other is missing from 
the literature on compliance with rules. However, such concern for the other also goes on 
to further reinforce the concept that the other person does not possess the requisite skills 
and so cannot be trusted to perform their duties, therefore control of the situation must 
remain in the hands of the people onboard the ferry. Concern for the other person is 
therefore, used simply as an excuse for taking unilateral action in order to retain control 
of the management of the collision risk.
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7.4 Using the flexibility within the rules
15 of the respondents in this research stated that they were not breaching the COLREGs 
but in fact using the flexibility found within them. In essence these people were applying 
what they perceived to be the etcetera  clause (Sharrock and Button 1999), This is a 
clause within rules which asks those applying them to extrapolate the existing rules to 
cover unforeseen, but similar, situations and to do it within the spirit of the existing rules 
(see chapter 2 section 2.3). As was described in Chapter 4 (see section 4.2 and figure 4.2) 
there is a period of time before risk of collision exists. The only guidance that is provided 
for when risk of collision exists is that given in Rule 7(d) and that is devoid of any 
reference to temporal or situational aspects. Risk of collision is important as this is the 
point when the COLREGs come into force and it is at this point that the people in charge 
of the ships are constrained in their actions. The point at which risk of collision 
commences has not been addressed by either the regulators or the courts (the Banshee 
1887). This means that there is a certain amount of flexibility as to when the COLREGs 
apply. Furthermore, Rule 2(b) allows for departures from the COLREGs to avoid 
immediate danger. Both of these factors were taken advantage of by the people in charge 
of the ships.
Cameron on the Wye, Monty on the Taff and Neil on the Wye spoke about the flexibility 
found within the COLREGs.
It is, it is whilst keeping within the rules, you use all the flexibility that in actual 
fact the rules give you. I think that when you first come out of getting your 
tickets2, you are very kind of rigid on the rules in a rather blinkered sense and you 
tend to stick to them like glue but the more experience that you have of using 
them and the more that you see that they are that they do have a fluidity about 
them then you can sensibly use it.
Interview with Cameron, Wye.
Monty- You know, effectively what we are doing is flexible passage planning put 
it that way, you know, dictated by traffic flow. It's something that the rules don't 
cater for and if they did try to cater for it it would be an absolute disaster because 
it would be so rigid and so inflexible because that is the nature of the legal beast.
2 “Ticket” is the colloquial term for an officer’s certificate o f competency.
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There is no other way that you can do it. It really wouldn't work. This system 
works as proven by these ferries that maintain the schedule and you know keep 
out of the way of other vessels 365 days of the year and so I think that the trick is 
if it aint broke don't try to fix it.
Video transcript, Taff, Calais to Dover.
You do what’s in common with the rules, but the rules have to be interpreted 
intelligently.
Interview Neil, Wye.
Stan on the Exe referred to this flexibility as bendy when I asked him about his actions. 
In this he admitted that his actions were not as “bold” as specifically directed by the 
COLREGs but were both adequate to the situation and within the scope of the rules.
Stan- It is very hard, especially on a certain level. So I'm just starting to alter 
now, just a few degrees. About 6 degrees should do it. Not exactly a bold 
alteration, but that's the-bendy rules.
Video transcript Exe, Dunkirk to Dover.
Similarly, Max saw the actions that he undertook as being both within the interpretation 
of the COLREGs as well as being taken before they applied.
Max- Well you know they [the COLREGs] are open to interpretation. There is no 
risk of collision at 4 miles, you have to be a lot closer. So I’m, the way I’m 
looking at it I ’m not getting into a collision situation. I’m avoiding a collision 
situation to start with. When its 2 miles and some one is not altering for me then I 
can start to think, this is a collision situation. And I will generally not alter course 
to port although I had to for a fishing boat the other night. Because if I had to 
alter course to starboard, it would just be a lot quicker to go to port.
Interview with Max Wye.
From this it can be seen that these respondents viewed the COLREGs as having a certain 
flexibility with regard to their application. The respondents were seeing their actions, not 
as being in breach of the COLREGs, but as being in keeping with the spirit of the them. 
In this manner the people in charge of the ships justified, in part, the actions they took as 
being within the scope of the COLREGs. They were not seeing there actions as being in 
contravention of the COLREGs, but as being taken either before the rules applied or as a 
natural extension of the rules. The COLREGs were written to manage the risk posed
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when two ships approach each other. However, with over 400 ships passing through the 
Dover Strait, and as illustrated by the ship to ship interactions in Chapter 5, collision 
avoidance in this area is much more complicated. Therefore, the people in charge take 
actions which they believe is consistent with the spirit of the COLREGs.
This form of justification has a resonance within studies which have identified that 
regulations cannot cover all circumstances (see Chapter 2 section 2.3.2) Bittner (1965) 
for example in his study of police officer arrest procedures, observed how the officers 
would apply procedures in a flexible manner when the situation deviated from them. 
Similarly, Dien (1998) in a study of nuclear power station operatives, noted that they 
would extrapolate from the existing rules for emergency situations and apply them to 
normal operating conditions. Shultz (2003), for example, saw how managers developed 
new in-house operating procedures in order to deal with new situations not envisaged by 
the rule makers, but such that these new operating procedures took into account the 
existing rules.
7.5 Complying with the company rule
Both Iberian Ferries and Sirius Line were fully compliant with the International Safety 
Management (ISM) Code (ISM Code 2002). This is an international instrument adopted 
by the UK and so forms part of the domestic law of the UK which applies to ships 
operating from UK ports. To this end both companies laid down their operational 
requirements for ships navigating within the area. With respect to passing distances 
Iberian ferries and Sirius Line in their training and operations manuals state minimum 
passing distances for their ships. These are shown in table 7.2 (see also chapter 6, section 
6 .2).
( o m p a m  Rule  Iber ian  Fer r ie s  S i r ius  L ine
| Passing distance [ I mile ahead, half a mile astern | 1 mile ahead, no distance astern 
Table 7.2, Passing distance company rule.
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14 individuals stated that the actions that they were undertaking were simply in 
compliance with the company rule to keep clear of other ships. For example, Morris on 
the Usk, explained Iberian Ferries’ passing distance rule.
A mile ahead, half a mile astern, that’s the rule.
Interview with Morris, Usk.
However, strict compliance with this rule did not always occur. Pat on the Wye for
example explained the way that he operationalised Iberian Ferries’ rule.
PB- Do you have a minimum passing distance that you like to use?
Pat- Well if I ’m going around the stem of another vessel then it’s no problem, but 
on here they insist on a mile. You must be at least a mile if you are going to be 
going across the head of someone.
Interview with Pat, Wye.
Similarly Noah, onboard Sirius Lines’ ship the Exe explained how he applied their rule.
PB- What about passing distances, do you work on any minimum passing 
distances?
Noah- Yeah. It has to be at a minimum of 1 mile across his bow, any closer than 
that and we will alter course and let him go first. So that's the rule, one mile.
Phil- What about astern of them?
Noah- I've never really had any problem, you can tuck in right astern of them, 2 
or 3 cables. But I think that the official word on it, probably about half a mile. 
Video transcript, Exe.
In these extracts the individuals indicated how the most important aspect was the distance 
at which the ship passed ahead of another, rather than the astern distance. This would 
indicate their perception of the relative risk that would occur if crossing ahead at a 
reduced range.
Monty on the Taff also referred to these passing distances but claimed the source of them 
was a local bye-law rather than the company regulations. This bye-law was given added 
weight from a common law derivation.
PB- So do you always try to maintain at least a mile ahead do you?
Monty- Well we've got this rule which is a local bye-law or been interpreted as 
such and as I said to you the other day, people have been fined for getting closer 
than a mile ahead. There was a court case, don't know how long ago or what the
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details were but it was decreed that a mile was the safe passing distance you know 
if you are going to go ahead of you know alter to go ahead of traffic. That's what 
people tend to work on. Sometimes it can be a little bit limiting for certain ships, 
you know, does it really matter if it is 9 cables. That's what we work to.
Video transcript, Taff.
It should be noted that no such bye-law exists nor did any court case which involved the 
application of such a rule. However, Monty indicated the significance of the passing 
distances by reference to the sanctions which would be imposed if the law was breached. 
This aspect of the enforcement of rules will be returned to in section 7.7, when issues 
surrounding surveillance will be analysed.
Mitch a second officer on the Usk, believed that such regulations should be followed as 
they provide specific guidance as to what actions should be undertaken.
Mitch- Since I started working for this company I have always tried to work to the 
fleet regulations as there is information in the fleet regs in addition to what the 
rules of the road says. The fleet regs specify certain situations such that you must 
not cross ahead of a vessel that is meant to give-way at certain ranges. So it does 
make it clear in certain aspects. So a vessel that you are meant to give way to, 
you must not pass at a certain distance, cannot cross ahead of him at a certain 
distance. Also it covers a vessel that is meant to give way to you and isn’t, what 
you will do. It does give distances that you have to cross to them, if you want to 
cross ahead of him. So all those things are just kind of there for the situations, 
which are there so we won’t get into close quarters situations with other vessels.
If you follow the fleet reg it is pretty good, well I personally stick to it. I won’t 
speak for everyone.
Interview with Mitch, Usk.
From this it can be seen that the companies running the ships have put in place additional 
rules which state the minimum passing distances. Now not one person said “well I have 
to break the COLREGs in order to pass no closer than one mile ahead of that ship”, but 
the effect of the company rule, in its operation, is the same. In order to comply with the 
requirement, the people in charge of the ships had to take action at a an early stage. As 
shown in chapter 6, those ships crossing the Strait did take action to keep clear of the 
crossing ships by this minimum distance. Taking such action ensured compliance with 
this company rule. Therefore, it would appear that in order to ensure compliance with the
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company rule, a ship crossing the Strait had to take unilateral action to resolve a collision 
situation. Furthermore, through the strict application of these company rules, the people 
in charge of the ships were able to avoid the restrictions placed upon them by the 
COLREGs. The avoidance of the restriction then dove-tailed with the lack of trust in the 
other person to comply with their obligations under the COLREGs.
7.6 Easier to take action
The last reason given for taking unilateral action was that it was simply easier to do it 
themselves. Non-compliance with regulations has often been attributed to either taking a 
short-cut or the desire to just get the job done (Reason 1990, Hutter 2001a, Comeliussen 
2004). In 11 instances the respondents stated that the actions that they were undertaking 
were simply because it was easier to get out of the way of the other ship.
Stan- That was the right choice, it is much easier to keep out of everyone's way. 
Video transcript, Exe Dunkirk to Dover.
PB- Hm OK. So do you see this when you come out of Dover and sort of adjust 
your course to find this gap, do you see that as sort of courtesy or sort o f...
Casey- Just making life easier for myself.
Video transcript, Exe Dunkirk to Dover
You know in an awkward situation it's just easier to get out of the way. Get 
yourself into a gap which isn't going to cause a problem.
Monty, Taff.
In an interview with Neil onboard the Wye, I asked whether he viewed their actions as 
being within the requirements of the COLREGs. He admitted that he was breaking the 
COLREGs but that it was just easier to do so given the other options open to him.
We do follow the rules, but sometimes its easier, a classic example is what a lot of 
ships would consider to be wrong, but coming out of Dover to come out of the 
entrance you know that we come out at 125. You come to 125 the vectors 
stabilise and you realise that you have a ship on your port side that will be a 
problem. You then have 2 choices, say if he’s reasonably fast, 3 choices: you 
can plod on and let him do all the work which probably mean a 90 degree 
alteration of course, you can come round to 200 and steam half way to down to
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Southampton to get ahead of him or after a few miles because that’s how long it 
takes for the vectors to settle down to can come to port by 40 degrees, show him a 
green light, he knows what’s going on, he’s happy he’s going to Southampton,
I’m happy because I’ve got out of a port hand Charlie situation. So I’ve broken 
that rule, but that’s good seamanship.
Interview with Neil Wye.
Dave, on the Taff explained that when on refresher courses ashore the actions that the 
lecturers tried to get them to undertake were impractical in the “real” world.
Dave- The times we go on our little courses up there bridge management and all 
that, we always end up having a heated discussion with these lectures saying 
come on this, this is the real world, you know it doesn't happen like this at all, you 
know, you can't do this.
Video transcript Taff, Sailed Calais for Dover.
As illustrated, a number of the participants in this research were different from those 
found in earlier studies (See chapter 2 section 2.3.2). For example, in Hutter’s research 
(2001a, 1997) she found that a large proportion of those not complying with rules did so 
through omission rather than acts. Safety gear was not worn or rail tracks were crossed 
because by following the rules required extra effort. Reason (1990) for example, claimed 
that an individual will always take the shortest route from A to B. Whereas in this 
research those admitting that their actions amounted to taking the easier route in fact 
involved considerable mental and financial effort of their part. In order to ascertain a 
course across the Channel that did not conflict with other ships, required a great deal of 
thinking and care on the part of the individual. Furthermore, as shown in Chapter 5 there 
was a financial cost to deviating from the most direct route across the Channel. 
Therefore, the people in charge of these ships undertook actions that they perceived to be 
easier, but which involved a great deal of effort on their part. It would appear that 
“easier” in this instance referred to it being easier to take action rather than to rely upon 
the other person to resolve the collision risk. In essence this factor refers back to the issue 
of trust. In this it would be both less mentally and financially taxing to allow the situation 
to be resolved by the other, but they cannot be trusted to. This then means that even 
though effort has to be expended, it is still beneficial to take action themselves.
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7.7 Summary: Reported reasons for unilateral action
Through an analysis of the transcripts and fieldnotes taken during the ethnographic stage 
of the research, 5 recurrent themes came to the fore as to the stated reasons behind the 
taking of unilateral action to resolve the risk of collision. These themes related to the 
concept of trust, and issues revolving around consideration of others, rule flexibility, the 
precedence of a company rule and ease of unilateral action. The issue of trust was directly 
referred to by a large number of the respondents. However, trust was also reflected within 
three of the four other stated issues. The respondents did, in part, justify their actions with 
reference to the flexible nature of the COLREGs. However, trust in the other lies at the 
heart of the other reasons why the participants in this research took unilateral action. 
Being considerate to others, applying the company rule and it being easier to take action 
themselves, all have their grounding in the lack of trust that the participants have for the 
other person. As was illustrated within the review of literature (see chapter 2 section 2.3) 
the concept and issue of trust featured in a number of studies. However, the manner in 
which the COLREGs were written, with the emphasis upon one party resolving the 
collision risk, trust in the other to comply with this requirement, underpins the 
relationship between the ships. Therefore, if trust is not present, then the people in charge 
of the ships will not comply with requirements or will attempt to implement strategies 
that removes the need to rely upon the other ship. However, this area is under the 
constant surveillance of an authority that possesses the ability to apply sanctions in the 
event of rule transgressions. Therefore, the issue of why the people in charge of the ships 
routinely avoid complying with the requirements under the regulations needs to be 
analysed.
7.8 Surveillance and sanctions
As previously outlined in chapter 2 section 2.5.3 the Maritime and Coastguard Agency 
(MCA) operate a radar station on the cliffs of Dover. This station overlooks the Dover 
Strait, observes and records the actions of the ships in transit through the area. Their 
stated functions are:
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The functions of CNIS are to keep the Dover Strait TSS under observation, to 
monitor the flow of traffic and to detect and report vessels which contravene the 
International Regulations for Preventing Collisions at Sea 1972, as amended 
(COLREGS).
(MCA 2004b: 3).
These functions are made known to all seafarers in the area through warnings on charts, 
radio broadcasts at 30 minute intervals and merchant shipping notices. Details of 
prosecutions following transgressions of the COLREGs are regularly reported in the 
maritime press and are posted on the MCA’s website (www.mcga.gov.uk). Furthermore, 
Iberian Ferries have a policy of encouraging seafarers to visit the radar station in order to 
observe its operation. In addition, every ship that transits the Strait must call the CNIS to 
inform them of their movements. Foucault (1975) describes how through the use of a 
surveillance system, disciplinary power is used to train the behaviour of the individual 
such that they conform to the regulations in force (Rabinow 1991, Mills 2003, see also 
chapter 2 section 2.5.2). Therefore, the question must be asked, if there is such a 
surveillance regime, which is coupled with powers of enforcement, why are the 
COLREGs not being complied with?
The sociological literature on surveillance draws heavily upon and has actively developed 
the writings of Foucault (see for example: Dandeker 1990, Agamben 1998, Feeley and 
Simon 1994, Ditton 1999, Norris and Armstrong 1999, Bogard 1996, Gandy 1993, Ball 
2000, Lyon 2001, McCahill 2002, Wood 2003, Vaz and Bruno 2003, Ball 2003, Yar 
2003, Lianos 2003, Campbell 2004, Williams and Johnson 2004). However, what came 
to light during this research, was not the accounts of how people managed the pressures 
of the surveillance that they were under, but the very lack of such accounts. Only in a few 
cases did the issue of surveillance come to the fore. This finding indicates how little 
regard the people in charge of the ships placed upon the surveillance that they were 
constantly under. The radar surveillance played such a small part in their daily routine 
that it was almost inconsequential to them.
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In a number of studies it was found that people accounted for their non-compliance with 
reference to a lack of surveillance (Hutter 2001a, Baldwin et al., 1999, Hutter 1997, 
Bennett 1999, Aberg 1998, Young 1999, Black 2002, Comeliussen 2004), or through an 
indifferent regulatory environment (Reason 1990, Rothstein 2003), or because of a lack 
of sanctions following a rule transgression (Kagan and Scholz 1984, Hutter 2001a, 
Baldwin 1995, Hutter 1997, Aberg 1998, Young 1999, Black 2002). Hutter (2001a) 
found that railway workers would ignore certain safety rules if they believed that they 
would not be caught. In studies of CCTV systems it was found that the mere presence of 
them did not ensure compliance with regulations and laws by the people under 
observation and were mainly used as a means of collecting evidence of transgressions 
(Feeley and Simon 1994, Ditton 1999, Norris and Armstrong 1999).
7.8.1 Lack of knowledge regarding the enforcement powers.
For any surveillance system to work, those subject to the surveillance must be aware that 
if they break the rules then they will be punished. There must be a deterrent effect, 
otherwise the surveillance simply becomes a means of collecting evidence (Ditton 1999). 
This was the situation that I found onboard these ships, a lack of knowledge of the 
punishments that could be meted out. For example, Stan on the Wye was not aware that 
the coastguard were able to enforce the COLREGs. In this extract, Stan asked me about 
my opinion regarding the requirement to cross the traffic separation scheme at 90° to the 
direction of flow.
Stan- So what's your view on not crossing the traffic lanes at 90 degrees, 
obviously when there's no traffic.
PB- Well all I can say is what I've seen from up in Dover coastguard, where they 
will come down heavy on you if you don't cross at 10, 15 degrees off. But if 
anything that is starting to get a bit naughty they do crack down on. And they 
prosecute as well.
Stan- Do they?
PB- Yeah.
Video transcript Wye.
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Similarly, Morris on the Usk did not know that the coastguard recorded all of his 
movements.
PB- So when you are coming out of Dover and you are picking a course do you 
see this as well within the rules? Somebody could argue that you are not 
standing-on for these ships and that you are taking action.
Morris- They could, but how could they prove it?
Similar findings were noted by Ditton (1999) in a study of CCTV systems. In that he 
found that nearly 60% of people were unaware of the surveillance system. Furthermore, 
Feeley and Simon (1994) found that CCTV had no practical effect in reducing the crime 
rate and were used as a technical means of evidence gathering. Therefore, people who are 
not aware of the surveillance regime cannot comply with that which it is trying to 
enforce.
7.8.2 The lack of visible rule transgression enforcement.
The lack of the enforcement of rules was observed on a daily basis by the people in 
charge of the ships. As illustrated in chapter 5 and 6 the people in charge of the ships 
adopted actions which were not in compliance with the COLREGs and saw numerous 
rule infractions undertaken by ships transiting the Strait. The MCA state that they chase 
every observed infraction of the COLREGs (Toogood 2005). This is undertaken through 
either visits by MCA personnel to ships which call at UK ports or through letters sent to 
the flag state and owners of the vessel. However, this enforcement is invisible to the 
people in charge of the ships crossing the Strait and so rule infractions appear to go 
unpunished. This lack of punishment was seen by Casey on the Wye as giving tacit 
agreement to the practices by the power behind the surveillance.
Casey- Well Dover coastguard are monitoring our progress on their radar and I've 
thought often enough that if they are not happy with us doing that then they'll 
send us a letter about it. And I haven't had any letters yet, so.
Video transcript, Wye.
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Similarly, Ditton (1999) found that the deterrent power of the CCTV system was 
undermined due to a large portion of the observed being unaware that they were subject 
to surveillance. This should be compared with the deterrent effects of speed camera signs 
and camera boxes in the reduction of traffic speeds (Ball 2000, Department for Transport 
2003). Furthermore, the lack of enforcement of regulations has been seen as a major 
reason behind rule transgressions (Kagan and Scholz 1984, Hutter 2001a, Baldwin 1995, 
Hutter 1997, Aberg 1998, Young 1999, Black 2002). Hutter (2001a) for example, 
claimed that if rule infractions were not visibly punished, then any deterrent effects of the 
mere presence of sanctions would be limited.
7.8.3 Justifications for non-compliance.
Where people knew that the actions they were taking could be construed as breaching the 
COLREGs, they often blamed their actions on a force majeur. The most common 
example would be to use the weather as an excuse for their actions. Peter on the Cam for 
example, explained how the coastguard do, on occasion, inform the people on the ship 
that they were breaking the COLREGs. However, he stated that he would use the state of 
the weather as an excuse for his actions.
Peter- Yes, if you carry on in this direction Dover coastguard will be giving us a 
call. When the weather is bad we of course do weather courses. That gives us a 
little bit more leeway.
Video transcript, Cam.
A similar point was made by Vince, also on the Cam. In this he explained that the 
weather could dictate the manner in which they crossed the Strait due to the limitations of 
the vessel. Iberian Ferries’ ships are all fitted with stabilizing fins. These are large sheets 
of metal that fold out from the side of the ship and limit the quantity of movement of the 
ship in bad weather. The reason behind this is to provide comfort for the passengers and 
limit damage to the ship’s equipment. However, the Cam was fitted with a different 
system which was not as effective. Therefore, Vince was able to use this as an excuse for 
not complying with the rules.
219
Chapter 7. Risk, Trust and Surveillance in Collision Avoidance
So if you go to port, then you try to pass him by more than a mile you'll have to 
go over here which is sort of stretching the 90 degree rule a little bit. Sometimes 
you can say I'm going to cross on the weather course because we don't have fins. 
We just have a flume tank system which if we have a swell its sometimes nice to 
go across on about 290 degrees to give a more comfortable course. Whereas, if 
we went on about 310, 315 which is the normal course, then rolling and crashing 
all the plates.
Video transcript, Cam.
7.8.4 Resistance to coastguard control.
One very interesting incident occurred onboard the Tawe, whilst crossing from Calais to 
Dover which illustrated how the bridge team did not welcome any interference by the 
CNIS. In this incident the CNIS called up on the radio to inform the bridge team that the 
ship in front of us had a deep draught. At the time that they called the bridge team 
onboard the Tawe had just altered-course to keep out of the way of that deep draughted 
ship as it was crossing from the starboard side. The implication of the radio call from 
Dover was that they were reminding the Tawe of its obligations to keep out of the way of 
that ship. The ship was under the control of Karl, Alan was the Chief Officer onboard 
and just happened to be on the bridge and Seth was steering.
Seth-1 wonder if he [the deep draughted ship] called them up and went “Oiy, 
who's that ferry”.
Alan- Now I could have seen the point if he'd been on our port side and we would 
be expecting him to alter course for us. But you know...
Karl- my action there wouldn't have shown up yet on their plot [their radar 
screen].
Alan- .. .but it doesn't matter whatever ship, if he's deep draught or not.
Karl- Would have given way.
Phil-yeah, yeah, you've got a good point there. Why have they decided to call 
you?
Alan- Silly.
Phil- Shows how much faith they've got in you then Karl.
Karl- Yeah.
Alan-Well it's not just Karl.
Karl- 22 m that’s deep.
Alan- That's the only other thing I would change is coastguards don’t really know 
what they are doing. Because most of them have never been at sea. They've 
never read the rules. They've never passed any exams, not to the same extent you 
know, that we sit exams about collision avoidance. And yet they are sitting at a 
radar screen telling you where you are going wrong sometimes.
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In this the bridge team were unhappy at the idea that the coastguard would attempt to 
point out the Tawe 's responsibilities under the COLREGs. Karl, for example, was very 
indignant that his actions could be subject to criticism. Seth blamed the actions on the 
deep draughted ship in that it forced the coastguard to call the Tawe on the radio. This 
could be seen as to having similarities with the way in which the MCA only appear to 
prosecute ships for breaching the COLREGs in the light of aggravating circumstances 
such as one ship reporting another (see chapter 2 section 2.5.3). In addition Alan called 
into question the whole idea that the coastguard operators were capable of directing 
traffic due to their lack of training and experience. However, Alan’s lack of respect for 
the coastguard probably derived from what, he thought, was an unfair allocation of blame 
following an incident that occurred some time before. In this incident a ship did not give­
way to him and so he reported the incident to the coastguard station.
Alan-1 had a situation where a vessel, to me, was contravening the traffic 
regulations, he didn't give way to me and so I slowed down and let him cross 
ahead, I reported him to Dover and the coastguard then turned around and said it 
was my fault. And he was the vessel on my portside who should have given way. 
So the MCA turned around and said that and so since then, my attitude has been I 
won’t say anything, ever.
Phil- How could it have been your...
Alan- That's what I couldn't understand, they just read it the wrong way.
Phil- OK.
Alan-1 mean it wasn't my fault, it was just them saying. But since then I thought, 
well as long as I miss the guy, I don't care. No point complaining.
Resistance to control by an authority that a person holds in low regard or when one does 
not identify with the role and purpose of the body, has been found identified in a number 
of studies undertaken by Baldwin (1990, 1995, 2000, and with Cave 1999). In this 
Baldwin argues that the legitimacy of the enforcement of regulations must be 
underpinned by regulators with a clear understanding and expertise of the subject. Alan 
and others expressed doubts regarding the training and experience of those monitoring 
their actions.
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7.8.5 CNIS Surveillance.
From this analysis of how the surveillance by CNIS is viewed and received onboard the 
ships, it is clear that the deterrent effects of the surveillance system are somewhat 
lacking. The deficiency of deterrent effects commences with the lack of knowledge of 
the enforcement of infractions of the COLREGs by the authorities. This has the effect of 
reinforcing in the minds of the people in charge of the ships that what they are doing is 
either within the requirements of the COLREGs or condoned by the authorities. 
Furthermore, the people onboard the ships observe rule infractions on a daily basis by 
other ships going unpunished and so their regard for the authorities enforcement powers 
is further denuded. In addition, a number of people in charge of the ships resented having 
their actions being called into question by people who they consider to lack sufficient 
training and experience to judge their actions. The lack of the deterrent effects of the 
radar surveillance system was further reflected in the lack of comments on the subject. 
This finding indicates how little regard the individuals placed upon the surveillance that 
they were constantly under. The radar surveillance played such a small part in their daily 
routine that it was almost inconsequential to them. The CNIS operation (in a similar 
fashion to CCTV systems as identified by Feeley and Simon 1994) merely acts as a 
technical means of evidence gathering to be used in the event of a major rule 
transgression, rather than as a means of deterring rule transgressions.
7.9 Summary
From this analysis of the actions undertaken to avoid traffic in the Strait of Dover it is 
clear that people deviate from the COLREGs as a matter of routine. The maintenance of 
course and speed for other ships in the approach to the first traffic lane did not form part 
of the usual practices found onboard the ships. The justification for taking such actions 
was seen to be varied and demonstrate the complicated nature of rule non-compliance. 
Non-compliance, as shown in chapter 2, section 2.3, is made up from a variety of reasons 
ranging from lack of trust to a demonstration of professional skill. Such varied concerns 
were mirrored in this research. Trust or rather a lack of trust in the other was one of the
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main reasons for the deviation from the COLREGs. The COLREGs required co­
operation with the other ship for the successful negotiation of the collision risk 
(Cockcroft and Lameijer 2004). However, this required trust in the other, due to a 
diversity of reasons, was not present. Another reason for the non-compliance was that of 
making the situation easier for themselves and the other ship. By this the people in 
charge of the other ship kept clear of the other ship, in part, through a desire to be 
considerate to the other ship. This was a particularly interesting finding as the perceived 
easier course of action actually involved considerable effort on the part of the individual. 
This should be contrasted with the reason behind taking the easiest option found in other 
studies in which the individual undertook such actions, in part, in order to avoid 
expending additional effort (Reason 1990, Hutter 2001a, Hutter 1997, Habberley et a l 
1986, Lawton 1998, Baldwin et a l  1999, Young 1999, Olin and Wickenberg 2001, 
Comeliussen 2004). However, the basis for this “easier” course of action appeared to be 
related to a belief that the other ship would not be able to handle the collision situation 
and apply the COLREGs correctly. This reason once again relates back to a lack of trust 
in the abilities of the other people. However, it was interesting to note that a number of 
the people in charge of the ships believed that they were taking these actions in order to 
benefit the other person. Such reasoning is missing from the literature on rule non- 
compliance. The flexibility found within the COLREGs was cited as a further reason for 
deviation from the rules. This was also closely allied with a belief in the inadequacy in 
the COLREGs when applied to situations which went beyond simple encounters. Such 
instances can be seen in the light of previous research on the etcetera clause, see Chapter 
2 section 2.2 (Sharrock and Button 1999). In this the people in charge of the ships 
inhabited the “real world” in which they had to take action to deal with situations which 
could not be managed through the COLREGs.
Compliance with the company rule of not passing closer than one mile ahead of a 
crossing ship was very closely observed. The effect of compliance with this company 
rule was that people would take action to avoid the situation developing regardless of the 
collision situation. One reason lying behind the compliance with the company rule was 
that the person in charge of the ship was able to avoid the restrictions placed upon them
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by the COLREGs, The avoidance of the restriction then dove-tailed with the lack of trust 
in the other person to comply with their obligations under the COLREGs.
One interesting aspect was that lack of knowledge of the rules was missing from this 
research. The lack of knowledge of the rules is an oft cited reason behind non- 
compliance (Baldwin 1995, Hutter 1997, Hutter 2001a, Hutter 2001b, Rasanen et a l 
1999, Leplat 1998, Davis and Kottemann 1995). In this research every single respondent 
demonstrated clear knowledge of the COLREGs and their duties and obligations within 
them. Furthermore, each respondent had sat for at least one MCA oral examination on 
the COLREGs and most were master mariners. They knew that they were under an 
obligation to maintain course and speed for ships crossing from their port side. 
Furthermore, as demonstrated above, they knew that their actions deviated from the 
COLREGs.
Surveillance was an aspect that had to be dealt with in some detail. The main reason 
being that the Dover Strait is under constant surveillance by the MCA’s body the CNIS 
(see chapter 2 section 2.5.3). Furthermore, the MCA have the authority to use the CNIS 
collected information in order to prosecute people in charge of ships. Such prosecutions 
were publicised and so at first glance it was surprising that the surveillance regime did 
not appear to affect the respondents behaviour. The main reasons behind this was the 
lack of knowledge of the enforcement of the regulations, the lack of visible rule 
transgression enforcement and a resistance to coastguard control. Rule infractions were 
undertaken and observed on a daily basis which were without consequence. Furthermore, 
a number of respondents voiced doubt as to the knowledge and expertise that the 
coastguard personnel possess. Therefore, when there are no apparent consequences for 
taking actions then this negates the deterrent effects of the surveillance system.
From this analysis it can be seen that the reasons underlying the actions taken by the 
people in charge of the ships are complicated, inter-related and diverse. However, the 
overriding desire of the respondents was to take action that ensured the safety of the ship 
that they were in charge of. The moderation of the risk of collision was their primary
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concern and all their actions were directed towards keeping their ship out of danger. 
Compliance with the requirements under the COLREGs would have removed their 
freedom to act in a situation in which they did not trust the other ship. Therefore, it is 
hardly surprising that non-compliance with the COLREGs became an accepted everyday 
practice, especially when the disastrous consequences of any collision are taken into 
account.
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8.0 Introduction
The aim of this chapter is to bring together the findings from the empirical research, 
discuss these conclusions in relation to the management of risk and suggest some 
practical recommendations which may improve safety at sea. Conclusions will relate to 
the application of the COLREGs, the construction of risk, the critical role that trust plays 
within collision avoidance, the operation of regulations, the failure of a surveillance 
system and the role of the ex-practitioner in the research process. This research has 
involved the analysis of radar records of collision avoidance practices using the concept 
of the near miss encounter and the field use of hand-held video cameras for data 
recording. Both of these methods have been successful in the production of reliable and 
useful data.
A number of recommendations relating to the management of collision risk within the 
Dover Strait as well as for the management of risk as applied to researchers will also be 
made. I am keen to stress the practical applicability of this research to the wider world. In 
the same sense that no researcher works within a vacuum, the recommendations should 
be both practical and pragmatic. To this end recommendations relate to: the 
encouragement of widespread debate on the routeing of ships through the area which 
involve all the stakeholders, with particular reference to the crowding of ships in the 
Southwest bound traffic lane North of the Vame Bank; an honest debate on the efficacy 
of the stand-on vessel rule; and a more visible enforcement of the regulations by the 
regulatory authorities. It is hoped that a number of these recommendations will be taken 
onboard by the regulatory authorities, so addressing the problems highlighted by this 
study. Additionally, this research has highlighted the need for a wider use of risk 
assessment before researchers enter the field.
Chapter 8. Conclusions and Recommendations
8.1 Conclusions
This study has involved a variety of methods which have been used to investigate the 
practice of collision avoidance and to answer two simple questions.
• How are the COLREGs being applied?
• Why are the COLREGs being applied in the way that they are?
Previous studies have tried to undertake an analysis of this subject, but have not involved 
the people who are in charge of the ships and who undertake the process of collision 
avoidance. This research has attempted to give those people a voice in order to 
understand the culture in which they work and to comprehend their management of the 
collision risk.
8.1.1 How are the COLREGs being applied?
Navigation and collision avoidance are complicated processes undertaken by well trained 
professional seafarers. This research has identified how this process is constructed from a 
wide range of interrelated factors. Chapter 4 looked at the manner in which the
COLREGs should be applied. From this it was clear that seafarers are given a large
amount of discretion in deciding when the risk of collision exists. The issue of risk of 
collision is important as this is the point at which they are required to both apply and be 
constrained by the COLREGs. No definitive guidance is given within the COLREGs on 
when they come into force nor, on what actions should be taken to avoid the risk of a 
collision. Action to avoid a collision could involve an alteration of course, a change in 
speed, a combination of the two, or nothing, depending upon the roles by which the 
COLREGs attribute to the ships. Only in head-on situations do the COLREGs direct both
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of the ships to alter course to starboard. Furthermore, the actions of each of the ships 
must be co-ordinated with the others, for uncoordinated action could result in conflicting 
action. However, problems have been identified with this co-ordinating approach as there 
is no communication between the ships5. This means that there is a need to decide 
independently what to do, in a situation where other ships must also make independent 
decisions (Taylor 1990). So collision avoidance becomes a game of co-ordination, since 
both players have to choose independently mutually compatible strategies (Cannell 1981) 
and must trust the other to comply with their obligations. In such a situation as argued by 
Stein (1990), a lack of trust between actors ensures that it is a rational for each actor to 
adopt a dominant strategy which will most benefit them at the expense of others. 
However, the COLREGs are designed to negate the taking of dominant strategies for they 
direct both parties to take co-ordinating actions.
Case law does not provide hard interpretations of the COLREGs with regard to when risk 
of collision exists, nor what actions should be taken (for crossing and overtaking 
situations) or at what time. Case law is unhelpful in providing information as to when risk 
of collision exists as they do not consider cases which do not involve a collision. 
Therefore, in each case that they deal with risk of collision has existed otherwise a 
collision would not have occurred. Whereas, in no case did a collision result from any of 
the collision situations studied during this research. It is for this issue, the practical 
resolution of collision risks, which is so interesting. This is because, as identified, the 
COLREGs have within them a number of critical problems: no specific guidance on 
when they should apply; no specific guidance on what should be done to resolve the 
situation; a requirement to rely upon the other ship to resolve the risk of collision; and no 
guidance on what to do in the event of meeting more than one ship at a time. And yet, 
collisions are still relatively rare occurrences even though, as demonstrated in the 
analysis of the near miss encounters, collision situations are not.
5 Communication can o f course be established through the use of such technology as radios, however, such 
communication is not written into the COLREGs and the MCA strongly discourage the use of VHF 
communication within collision avoidance.
228
Chapter 8. Conclusions and Recommendations
Chapter 5 illustrated how, in practice, these collision risks are resolved. From this 
analysis of the radar records of the movements of all of the ships using or crossing one 
lane of the Dover Strait, for a single 24 hour period, reliable data were produced. This 
data showed how routine collision avoidance occurred on that day. Overtaking was 
observed to be taking place at very close distances in the lane. The cause of this close 
overtaking appeared to be the crowding of ships as they lined up to pass to the North of 
the Vame Bank. It was found that nearly five times as many ships passed to the North 
rather than the South of the Bank. Furthermore, in all bar three of the 68 NMEs involving 
transiting ships overtaking each other, involved ships lining up to pass to the North of the 
Vame Bank.
The very close passing distances observed during overtaking however, should be 
compared with the observed passing distances during crossing situations. It was found 
that the mean passing NME distance for crossing situations was 5.8 cables compared with
4.4 for overtaking situations. Furthermore, there were only 6 instances when crossing 
ships (ferries) passed within 3 cables of another ship, compared with 30 for overtaking 
situations. Such close passing distances should be seen as a cause of concern as a large 
oil tanker is approximately 2 cables in length. From the analysis of the tracks of the 
crossing traffic, it was clear that the ferries leaving Dover were adopting routes which did 
not conflict with those of the ships in transit through the Strait. The result of the adoption 
of those routes was an increase in the passing distances between the ships. However, this 
appeared to represent a deviation from the requirements of the COLREGs as the ferries 
were directed, by the regulations, to firstly maintain their courses and speeds and wait for 
the other ship to resolve the collision situation. Furthermore, this deviation from the 
COLREGs was also being undertaken under the gaze of the regulatory authorities located 
within the CNIS. This surveillance system was backed up by the sanction wielding 
authority which was designed to ensure the correct following of the rules. Therefore, the 
fact that the COLREGs appeared to be being breached whilst under observation by the 
authorities warranted further investigation.
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The interactions between ferries were also observed. It became clear that they were 
adopting routes across the Channel such that they did not encounter each other when on 
reciprocal courses. The result of this was that there was a lateral separation of 
approximately one nautical mile. This lateral separation removed the need for the ships to 
alter course for each other as risk of collision did not exist. This derives from an 
agreement between the Companies that operate the ferries, for the imposition of a 
voluntary traffic separation scheme, perpendicular to the existing scheme. This voluntary 
scheme did not, and does not, have the approval of the IMO, nor the governments within 
the area. It is purely based upon a local agreement between the operators and is a 
reflection of local custom and practice. The effect of this scheme was to allow the people 
in charge of the ferries to concentrate their efforts on resolving the collision situation with 
the crossing traffic rather than the head-on situations with other ferries. This was an 
interesting finding as it indicated the level of trust and co-operation that occurred 
between the ferry operators and the people in charge of the ships.
From the analysis of the movements of ships within the area of study, it is clear that the 
process of collision avoidance involved deviations from the requirements of the 
COLREGs. Ships did not appear to be maintaining their courses and speeds. However, 
the reasons for these actions were not clear from the use of this single analytical method 
of analysis utilising the tool of the NME. The analysis of the radar records could only 
provide details of the actions taken to avoid collisions, rather than the reasons behind 
those actions. Only through a mixture of quantitative and qualitative methods could such 
data be produced. Previous research in this area has been limited by the failure to ask the 
people in charge of the ships why they were taking the actions that they did. The second 
phase of this research attempted to give those people a voice and answer the second 
research question.
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8.1.2 Why are the COLREGs being applied in the way that they are?
An ethnographic investigation of the process of collision avoidance involving the use of a 
hand held video camera was undertaken onboard seven ferries sailing from the port of 
Dover and continental ports. During this investigation, the people in charge of the ships 
were observed undertaking the routine process of collision avoidance and questioned 
about the use, and operation, of the COLREGs. From this it was found that an initial 
assessment of the collision risk was made before unilateral action was taken to resolve 
the collision risk. Such unilateral action was undertaken regardless of the obligations 
under the COLREGs. In only one instance was there any attempt at compliance and this 
only resulted in delaying the taking of unilateral action. The unilateral action consisted, in 
every case, of an alteration of course either to port or starboard, but never a reduction in 
speed. No consideration was given to the maintenance of course and speed, the 
assumption being that the resolution of the collision risk would be undertaken by their 
actions alone. Ships were observed to weave their way between the traffic in the lane, 
trying to ensure that they complied with a company rule that dictated that no ship should 
be passed closer than one mile ahead or, in the case of one of the companies, half a mile 
astern. The result of this was that the need for the other ship to take action to resolve the 
collision risk was removed.
Through observation and interviews the underlying issue for the taking of this action was 
found to be the wish to maintain, at all times, control of the management of the collision 
risk due to a lack of trust in the ability of the other ship to comply with the COLREGs. 
Respondents spoke about the need to be considerate to other ships as they would not be 
familiar with this area. Therefore, to remove the element of stress from the lives of the 
people onboard the other ships, the respondents took unilaterally action to resolve the 
situation. However, this consideration for others and the taking of, what could be seen as, 
altruistic action, was simply a reflection of the lack of trust in the other. The assumption 
on the part of the respondents was that they did not believe that the other ship would 
comply with the regulations due to their lack of competence, knowledge and/or 
experience of the COLREGs. Due to this lack of trust that the other ship would comply
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with the COLREGs, the ferries deliberately did not comply with them. It was argued that 
such unilateral action could be seen as being applied before risk of collision existed and 
so before the COLREGs came into force. Therefore, if the rules were not in force then 
they could not be broken. However, at no time was consideration given to maintaining 
course and speed upon leaving port and the working assumption was that unilateral action 
to resolve the risk would be taken in every situation. Furthermore, the manner in which a 
number of crossings involved the ferry weaving in and out of the traffic within the lane 
demonstrated the disregard that the respondents had for the COLREGs.
It was particularly interesting that these actions were being undertaken whilst subject to a 
sanction wielding surveillance scheme. However, for a surveillance system to operate 
effectively, people under observation must believe that if they break the rules, then there 
will be retribution. As Yar (2003) stated, the authority of the surveillance'system rests on 
the belief in its omnipotence. There was a lack of knowledge that sanctions would, or 
could, be brought for infringements of the COLREGs. As illustrated in chapter 2, only 
serious infringements of the COLREGs, which had to be undertaken in conjunction with 
some form of aggravating circumstance which then resulted in a conviction in the courts, 
were ever reported. There is no public information on how many prosecutions fail nor of 
any other forms of reprimands. Furthermore, the people in charge of the ferries observed 
routine infringements of the COLREGs by ships in transit through the Dover Strait. 
These infringements were commented upon on a daily basis by the respondents. In many 
cases it is very probable that these incidents were the subject of official action, however, 
all the respondents ever saw were the actions of ships going unpunished after breaking 
the COLREGs. In addition, the people in charge of the ships never received any notices 
that they were not complying with the COLREGs. This meant that, for the few who 
believed that they were breaking the COLREGs then, they believed that their actions 
were being sanctioned by the CNIS. Moreover, for the majority who believed that they 
were not breaking the COLREGs, then this belief was further reinforced up by the lack of 
official censure. From this, the CNIS fails to deter rule non-compliance due to the lack of 
visible consequences following rule infractions.
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A number of previous studies identified routine non-rule following behaviour as being, in 
part, caused through lack of knowledge of the regulations (Hutter 1997). No such finding 
could be given in this research for all of the people in charge of the ships were both 
aware, and demonstrated that awareness, of the COLREGs. Furthermore, they were all 
highly trained professionals who had undergone oral examinations in front of MCA 
examiners in which lack of knowledge of the COLREGs would have lead to the failure to 
gain their certificates of competency. The issue of lack of knowledge of the COLREGs 
was involved in the non-compliance with the COLREGs, but it was due to a belief on the 
part of the people in charge of the ferries that it was the other person, on the other ship, 
who did not have the knowledge of the COLREGs. Due to this supposed lack of 
knowledge, the other ship could not be trusted to follow the COLREGs and keep out of 
the way.
As identified in chapter 4, the COLREGs have at their centre the principle that one ship 
should give-way whilst the other stands-on. From this it can be seen that the stand-on 
vessel is placed in a position of vulnerability as it watches the point of collision come 
ever closer, whilst waiting for the other ship to take action. Rousseau et al. (1998) and 
Siegrist et al. (2003) identified that for trust to be present, the prerequisite was a state of 
vulnerability in anticipation of a beneficial outcome. This means that for a person to trust 
another to resolve an issue, they must place themselves in a vulnerable position and this 
is in itself a risk. From the analysis of the ethnographic interviews it was clear that the 
respondents would not accept such a state of vulnerability. For them the risk of a collision 
was simply too great to be, as they saw it, placed in the hands of people who did not 
know their responsibilities. For the respondents, this would have meant passing control of 
the situation to the other. Such findings were consistent with previous studies where the 
actions of two parties need to be co-ordinated and one party is reliant upon the other to 
resolve the risk. In taking the decision of whether to trust the other the issue of 
vulnerability was key. If the consequences of the action that the rules are trying to 
prevent is relatively minor then the level of vulnerability is low. However, where the 
consequences are high then the vulnerability is also high. Rasanen et al. (1999) in their 
study of bicyclists behaviour identified the personal risk to a cyclist following a collision
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with a car as being a key element in the adoption of strategies that would reduce the 
cyclists reliance on the motorist to resolve the risk. Similarly, the risk faced by the people 
in charge of the ferries was of such an extent that it could never be allowed to occur for it 
could result in great loss of life. Therefore, the ferry could never be placed in a position 
of vulnerability with regard to ships that they did not trust. The people in charge of the 
ships then adopted strategies to minimise that risk. Furthermore, the perception was that 
the risk of collision would either increase or not be resolved if the COLREGs were 
complied with.
In addition to a belief that the other ship lacked the competency to deal with the collision 
situation, the issue of lack of trust was also based upon previous encounters with ships in 
the Strait. For the people in charge of the ferries it did not matter that they had not 
previously personally observed that particular ship before. All of the ships in the Strait 
were regarded as being unable to follow the COLREGs, therefore, all were perceived as 
being equally untrustworthy. Furthermore, it has been previously identified that for trust 
to exist there must also be a concept of shared values or a vested interest in the successful 
outcome of the endeavour. In the case of other ferries, there was such a belief which 
resulted in a certain level of what could be termed critical trust (Poortinga and Pidgeon 
2003). In this, the respondents did have trust that the other ferry would comply with local 
custom and practice but dosed with a certain level of scepticism. This critical trust had its 
basis in the ongoing relationship between the people in charge of the various ferries. In 
contrast to the ships in transit through the Strait, the other ferries would be met again on a 
daily basis. This created an ongoing relationship. A belief in future relations, Bennett 
(1999) argued, ensured a belief that it was in the best interests of each party to comply 
with the regulations. However, this never resulted in uncritical trust, for the people in 
charge of the ferries still kept an eye on the actions of the other ferries.
In summary, the process of collision avoidance was seen to be a complicated example of 
rule following behaviour. Compliance with rules designed to manage a risk were ignored 
and unilateral action was taken to resolve the risk, due to a lack of trust in the other to 
comply with those rules. This lack of trust was due to past experience in dealing with
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other ships, a lack of belief that the other had the same shared values and a lack of 
confidence in the abilities and competence of the other. This resulted in a unwillingness 
to place the ferry in a vulnerable position which would have required the actions of the 
other to resolve it.
The people in charge of the ferries either did not believe that their actions were in 
contravention of the rules, as they were taking action before the rules applied, or they 
sought to justify their actions as consideration for others in order to make the other’s life 
easier, by removing the need for them to take action. The result of the actions was that 
regardless of the collision situation and the obligations under the COLREGs, the ferry 
would take unilateral action to resolve the collision risk. The radar data showed the effect 
of this in an increased margin of safety when compared with overtaking situations. This 
increased margin of safety is witnessed by the safety record of the cross channel ferry 
route.
8.1.3 Ex-practitioner research
The role of the ex-practitioner is often neglected in the research process even though 
many researchers share a biography with those that they are researching. Lofland and 
Lofland (1995) illustrated this by comparing the biographies of a number of researchers 
with their research topics. Furthermore, both Beynon (1983) and Wichroski (1997) 
illustrated the use that can be made of a shared biography with their respondents by 
facilitating access in order to gain a deeper insight into the subject area. But these are 
rarities and a gap remains in the methodological literature. I have tried to explore the 
issues raised by my status as an ex-practitioner in order to fill that gap. Further, as the 
research progressed it became clear that the issue was integral to the research process. 
Being an ex-practitioner facilitated access to the sites, assisted in gaining the trust of the 
respondents, allowed an immediate understanding of the technical and slang language in 
use onboard ship, and assisted in the gaining of acceptance within the maritime 
community. All of these factors facilitated a fuller understanding of the reasons behind
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the decisions taken by those in charge of the ships. Being an ex-practitioner, I would 
argue, assisted in the exploration of the research questions. The issue of trust, due to 
shared backgrounds, was important. Once trust became established between myself and 
the respondents, the data relating to the decision making process flowed freely.
There were, however, disadvantages to being an ex-practitioner. The first was that of bias 
in data interpretation, or value inertia as Sadler (2002: 124) termed it. This was combated 
through the use of mixed research methods and careful analysis utilising the analytical 
induction method, based upon a process of grounded theory. A second aspect was the 
emotional risks involved in going back to sea. I became an ex-practitioner because I no 
longer wished to be a practitioner. In a similar manner to Lankshear (2000) in her 
research within maternity wards, by returning to sea to undertake this research, I risked 
raising all the issues which had encouraged my leaving the sea in the first place. Further, 
due to the issues of revisiting one’s own biography, as both Himmelweit (1998) and 
Lankshear (2000) have argued, fieldwork such as this may be better classified as a form 
of emotional labour. The third major issue was that of the ethical dimensions brought 
forward by the aspect of informed consent. Hand in hand with the trust came the 
responsibility to ensure that the respondents were freely giving their consent to take part 
in this research. A number of problems occurred when it became apparent that their 
consent was removed. Therefore, ethical issues were of great relevance throughout this 
research. For example, were they telling me what they were doing because they thought 
that they were helping out another seafarer, rather than assisting in a post-graduate 
research project? It is probable that by being an ex-practitioner obscured the respondents’ 
full understanding of the research process.
It should be noted that I do not claim that only ex-practitioners can undertake valid, 
empirical research. However, the issues raised by ex-practitioner research as well as 
research undertaken by researchers who share a biography with their respondents are 
interesting. This research has illuminated some of those aspects, but it is an area which 
may warrant a much fuller study.
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8.1.4 Summary
This piece of research has produced a range of interesting and diverse findings which 
have contributed to the discourse on risk, risk management and rule following behaviour. 
It has involved the bringing together a range of research and analytical methodologies to 
explore the complicated area of maritime collision avoidance. Further, observations have 
been made of the ethical and practical problems associated with ex-practitioner research. 
However, the most important contribution that this research may make is in the realm of 
the recommendations. It is hoped that a number of these practical recommendations will 
be acted upon and safety at sea may be improved.
8.2 Recommendations
The findings of this investigation into navigation in the Dover Strait and the operation of 
the COLREGs warrant a number of recommendations. As I have stated, such 
recommendations should be practical in their outlook otherwise they will be swiftly 
ignored.
8.2.1 Review of Ships’ Routeing in the Dover Strait
This research has highlighted a number of issues which warrant a review of the Ships’ 
routeing in this area. Such a review is currently being undertaken within the technical 
committee of the Honourable Company of Master Mariners (HCMM). The HCMM is a 
city of London livery company whose members are all master mariners and is well placed 
to undertake this study. I will also be taking a lead role in this review. This review should 
also be taken up by other interest groups such as the Royal Institute of Navigation and the 
Nautical Institute, to ensure as wide as possible input into the process. Any outputs from 
this process should then be submitted to the MCA and put in front of the IMO’s sub­
committee on the Safety of Navigation.
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8.2.2 The efficacy of the stand-on rule
As has been demonstrated, within this geographical area, the stand-on rule is routinely 
ignored. Thomas (2001) claimed that basing the COLREGs on the concept of give-way 
versus stand-on vessel, fatally flawed them and increased collision risks. I would 
advocate a wide consultation and discussion on this subject. If the stand-on rule were 
removed and all ships were directed to keep out of the way, then the ambiguity would be 
removed. Such a situation already exists within head-on situations and for the rules 
relating to collision situations within restricted visibility. Therefore, a consultation 
process and widespread debate would be necessary in order to ensure that all options are 
explored.
8.2.3 Sanctions following rule breaking
If the CNIS radar station is designed to deter rule breaking, then the sanctions following 
rule breaking should be widely disseminated. The current knowledge of the sanctions is 
limited due to the MCA’s policy of only placing details of successful prosecutions. It is 
recommended that all sanctions following rule breaking should be disseminated to as 
wide an audience as possible. This should assist with ensuring the deterrent effects that 
are required for such a surveillance system to operate successfully.
8.2.4 Researcher risk assessment
The issue of the risks faced by researchers, both physical and emotional is an often 
neglected aspect of research. During the planning stages of the research an assessment of 
the risks to the researcher should be undertaken. Measures should then be put in place to 
ensure the reduction of those risks. Such a measure, within the realm of the maritime 
industry, should include the undertaking of a basic safety at sea course by researchers 
before they step onboard ship. Other measures would depend upon the situation, but the 
safety of the researcher should not be compromised.
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8.2.5 Future research
I would recommend that there are a number of aspects of this project that should be the 
subject of further research. These being:
Firstly, the undertaking of comparable research in other parts of the world. This study 
was necessarily limited to a small geographical area and I made no claims regarding the 
applicability of the findings to other areas of the world. It would be interesting to 
ascertain the manner in which the COLREGs are operated in other Straits around the 
world. For example, such sites could include the Malacca Straits, the Straits of Gibraltar 
and the Turkish Straits. All of these areas have considerable numbers of ships crossing 
and in transit through them. Furthermore, they are also covered by radar surveillance. 
Therefore, it would be interesting to use the same methods as employed in this research 
in order to explore these findings in those areas.
Secondly, to undertake research on ships following the traffic lanes so as to investigate 
the actions of those overtaking other ships. Further, light would be thrown on their 
understanding of the COLREGs with regard to the crossing ferry traffic.
Thirdly, other research incorporating these methods could be undertaken in other 
transport areas such as on the railways and on flight decks.
Fourthly, the subject of the role of the ex-practitioner is an under researched subject. 
Many researchers share a biography with those that they are researching and so this must 
be seen as a subject worthy of further investigation.
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Previous experience
How long have you worked here
Can you go through the procedure that you utilise to cross the TSS
What are you thinking about when you are putting the rules into practice
How do you view the competence of the people following the TSS
Future of collision avoidance
Future of the rules
Anything that you wish to add.
